MainPIR Press News№ 19 (77), 2025. PIR Center held an expert seminar on “Outcomes of the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT-2026 Review Conference and the 30th Anniversary of the Indefinite Extension of the NPT”
№ 19 (77), 2025. PIR Center held an expert seminar on “Outcomes of the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT-2026 Review Conference and the 30th Anniversary of the Indefinite Extension of the NPT”
MOSCOW. JUNE 9, 2025. PIR PRESS. «Undoubtedly, at the moment the NPT is a diplomatic miracle. Concluding such a treaty is next to impossible now, so it is especially important to preserve it», – Alexander Bulychev, Head of the Nuclear Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation Office, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On May 15, 2025, PIR Center jointly with MGIMO University held an expert seminar on the outcomes of Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT-2026 Review Conference and the 30th Anniversary of the Indefinite Extension of the NPT. The speakers were Russian Foreign Ministry’s officials, PIR Center’s and UN representatives who participated in the third session of the PrepCom for the NPT-2026 Review Conference, which was held in New York, USA, from April 28 to May 9, 2025. The seminar was attended by MGIMO students of International Security and Diplomatic Service master’s programs, as well as it was open for everyone; participants from other cities and countries joined the seminar in an online format.
The seminar was opened by Vladimir Orlov, Founding Director of PIR Center, MGIMO University Professor, Academic Director of MA Program International Security. In his welcoming remarks, he emphasized that 30 years ago a historic event took place – the indefinite extension of the NPT. He noted the tremendous contribution of the Russian delegation, which included Sergey Kislyak, Evgeny Maslin, Gennady Evstafiev, as well as Roland Timerbaev (by that time – PIR Center’s President) to preserve the NPT for future generations.
Vladimir Orlov emphasized Russia’s role in interstate coordination and diplomatic efforts, which helped to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995. Vladimir Orlov specified that extremely hard work was carried out behind the scenes between the depositary countries of the Treaty and a number of other states. South Africa played a constructive role, demonstrating by its own example the advantages of the nuclear-free status. “The mood of delegations – and there were more than 170 of them – for indefinite extension was good. Despite the disputes and differences in the positions of the countries participating in the conference, it was possible to find a constructive solution and conclude a treaty for eternity,” PIR Center’s director recalls.
Alexander Bulychev, Head of the Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation Office of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry shared his assessment of the indefinite extension of the NPT: “The NPT review process has lost much of its meaning after the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. The review conferences are important from the point of view of clarifying the general sentiments of states, but not from the point of view of determining the fate of the Treaty.”
Speaking about the key results of the work of the NPT Preparatory Committee in the following years, the diplomat noted the absence of new ideas that could have contributed to the advancement of the NPT goals, as well as a bias towards disarmament over nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The diplomat noted that modern NPT Review Conferences have lost their content: there are no new ideas, and discussions are reduced to repetition of old ideas and political speculation around Iran, the DPRK or Ukraine. Delegations’ proposals are predominantly country-specific, and the NPT implementation mechanisms have not been adequately elaborated.
In NPT Cluster III (peaceful uses of atomic energy), as Alexander Bulychev noted, only Russia and China can show real achievements. Most countries are focusing on the non-energy use of nuclear technologies – in medicine, agriculture, and industrial purposes. In the disarmament cluster, according to the diplomat, many delegations focus exclusively on the nuclear component, despite the fact that the treaty requires the promotion of general and total disarmament. This tendency leads to an imbalance between clusters and a politicized focus on Russia and the United States.
The speaker pointed out that today the situation has changed: the arsenals of France and the United Kingdom, which should be considered part of NATO’s total nuclear capabilities, cannot be ignored. The discussion of transparency and accountability again revealed the problem of double standards. Western countries refuse to discuss joint nuclear missions and the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of nonnuclear-weapon states.
In conclusion, Alexander Bulychev noted the growing confrontation between the US and China, which is clearly evident in the review process, where both sides accuse each other of undermining trust and building nuclear capabilities.
Artur Balaov, First Secretary of the Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Office of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke about his observations following his participation in the third session of the PrepCom. In his presentation, he drew attention to the issue of security assurances. This topic has traditionally been of concern to nonnuclear-weapon states, which have advocated the creation of a universal legally binding agreement that would provide irrevocable security assurances without reservations. However, there are a number of obstacles in creating such an agreement. As Artur Balaov noted, it is currently difficult to imagine nuclear-weapon states, including Russia, abandoning reservations, since the reservations do not affect the interests of nonnuclear-weapon states that fulfill their obligations in good faith, but protect the national security interests of nuclear-weapon states in the context of, for example, the development of the AUKUS alliance.
The diplomat mentioned that even existing examples of legally binding agreements that provide security assurances, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, face the fact that not all nuclear-weapon states have the ability to ratify the Protocols to these agreements.
Alexandra Zubenko, PIR Center Consultant and Intern at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York (USA). She shared her impressions of the Preparatory Committee Meeting, analyzing separately the results of the discussions within the three clusters. She noted that the most disagreements were caused by the discussion within the disarmament cluster. According to her, the nuclear-weapon states argued that now is an unfavorable time to pursue a comprehensive nuclear disarmament policy. In particular, discussions centered on the upcoming expiration of the New START Treaty, the importance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, nuclear risk reduction, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the adoption of a moratorium on nuclear testing pending its entry into force, and the start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
In addition, during the Preparatory Committee sessions, nuclear-weapon States strongly advocated for tighter export controls, while nonnuclear-weapon states considered it necessary to remove measures restricting access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The PrepCom meeting also focused on nuclear security, strengthening the NPT Review Process, the application of the IAEA safeguards, regional nonproliferation efforts, and the situation around the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
Following the meeting, Alexandra Zubenko answered the questions of the students of the Master’s program International Security in an interview. The material is available on the PIR Center website (in Russian).
The video of the expert workshop “Outcomes of the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT-2026 Review Conference and the 30th Anniversary of the Indefinite Extension of the NPT” is available here (in Russian).
PIR Center’s publications on the indefinite extension of the NPT are available here.
