“On March 1-5 in Vienna there was held a session of the IAEA Board of Governors, which was dedicated to the issue of the return of the United States and Iran to the JCPOA as well as to the issue of Iran’s withdrawal from the implementation of the nuclear deal provisions. Earlier, Iran announced the cessation of the voluntary fulfillment of the obligations, including those under the Additional Protocol, since February 23 in accordance with the provisions of the law adopted in December 2020 in Iran. Thus, Iran has suspended some IAEA inspections, as well as the transfer of recordings from video cameras installed at nuclear facilities”. On the results of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in the main note of the 530th issue of the Yaderny Kontrol bulletin.
“Arms control is equally required by Russia and the United States. The creation of a next-generation security architecture must be supported by the reciprocal belief in the importance of arms control. It is necessary to resume informal consultations on strategic stability as soon as possible. During an informal discussion, participants could sort all the issues into “baskets” and determine a new priority agenda to be discussed during formal talks. It is unlikely that Russia and the US will be ready or, in the case of the United States, will be able to sign and ratify a legally binding treaty covering all these types of weapons”. Russian and American experts – upon the future of Russian-American arms control in a report following a series of joint seminars between the PIR Center and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, USA).
“There are many definitions of the term “arms control”. Indeed, a complete ban on certain types of weapons is at least easier to verify than reducing the number or limiting parameters. To achieve max results as regards missile defense systems (MDS) control, it is worth focusing efforts on mobile MDS and the US missile defense complexes outside its national territory. Russia and the US have virtually no experience in controlling strategic non-nuclear weapons. Strategic non-nuclear weapons control is complicated by the heavy asymmetry between Russian and the US arsenals. It cannot be excluded that hypersonic glide vehicles will remain a niche project that has little impact on strategic stability”. Andrei Baklitsky analyzes the opportunities for the transformation of arms control mechanisms in relation to new technologies and types of weapons.
“Saudi Arabia is considered a nuclear “newcomer”. Although Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program dates back to the 1960s, the kingdom has demonstrated significant interest in nuclear energy only over the last decade. The Saudi interest in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is due to several reasons, among which both general for all Middle Eastern nuclear “newcomers” and specific only to the kingdom. Under the Saudi Vision 2030, nuclear energy is one of the key components of the kingdom’s successful development”. Инна Rodina examines the development of nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia within the framework of the “Saudi Vision 2030” program in terms of the prospects for nuclear energy cooperation and nonproliferation risks.
“In its modern form, the development of non-nuclear hypersonic weapon systems was stirred up by the US DoD in the early 2000s as one of the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) elements. According to the US military, further plans to modernize missile defense are not able to close the gap with Russia and China. Thus, the decision was made by the US to start the accelerated development of several hypersonic systems at once”. US hypersonic systems under the scrutiny of Konstantin Larionov.