Comprehensive overview of current events and trends in the field of international security and international relations
From Safeguards to Submarines: AUKUS as a Test Case for the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime
Ms. Mikhaela Lokteva, an employee of the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom”
Implications of AUKUS for geopolitics and nonproliferation
The trilateral partnership, known as AUKUS, is gaining momentum and sets an ambitious task of supplying Australia with nuclear submarines and developing its own submarine production autonomy. Despite claiming that the realization of the goals mentioned above would be carried out with the highest commitment to nonproliferation standards, the AUKUS partnership poses significant challenges to the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, as an emerging military bloc, AUKUS carries a range of concerns for the geopolitical architecture.
Does AUKUS actually comply with the nonproliferation regime?
In terms of non-proliferation, AUKUS is particularly connected with the questions of safeguards, as Australia is recognized as a non-nuclear-weapon state and has a CSA with the IAEA in force[1]. Throughout history, Australia cooperated closely with the IAEA and currently holds the position of the Chair of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation[2]. In the framework of AUKUS, Australia and other parties engaged with and informed the IAEA regarding plans to transfer nuclear materials for nuclear submarine propulsion and their maintenance, to formally fix the intended use of such materials and exclude the possibility of their diversion to military purposes. While looking at the application of nuclear treaties to the AUKUS agreement, the technology itself is not safeguarded by either the NPT or the IAEA, by extension. Yet some nuclear materials used in the propulsion of nuclear naval vessels are. Under the AUKUS deal, nuclear submarines require highly enriched uranium, which is generally safeguarded as a fissionable material and is not eligible for unsafeguarded transfer between states under the NPT and the respective safeguards agreements of states with the IAEA.
However, there is a mechanism that can be used for such a transfer when it concerns non-peaceful activities. The INFCIRC/153[3] issued by the IAEA, setting the foundation for safeguards agreements between the IAEA and NNWS that are parties to the NPT, presents provisions on how nuclear materials used in a «non-prescribed military nuclear activity» are controlled. In other words, it regulates safeguarded nuclear materials intended for use in a non-safeguarded activity. According to its Article 14, “the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity…”. In such cases, a state might remove such nuclear materials from safeguards for it to be used in a non-prescribed military activity through a specific procedure. The state would need to ensure that “during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…”. Such removal, however, must be approved by the IAEA and cannot be indefinite to ensure that the material eventually returns to being safeguarded after its purpose is fulfilled. Therefore, for a state to power naval vessels, it can withdraw nuclear fuel and materials necessary for their operation from safeguards, which has never happened among NNWSs but might be part of Australia’s plan within the AUKUS[4] deal.
Let us consider the first key question arising from the essence of the partnership – the transfer of nuclear submarines, materials, and technologies – whether a state can legally execute such a transfer of nuclear units in accordance with the NPT. According to Article III of the treaty, party states are permitted to transfer materials and equipment to NNWS on two conditions: 1) it is meant for peaceful purposes; 2) a safeguards agreement with the IAEA covers it. Articles III and IV of the NPT also highlight that states have a non-discriminatory right to participate in ‘possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses’, especially when it comes to exchanges with NNWS. Naval propulsion in the general sense is not a definite military purpose, as it can be used for research purposes. However, the AUKUS agreement explicitly states that the submarines shall be conventionally armed, implying their future military use. Any nuclear submarine armed with any weapon and headquartered with the navy is undoubtedly intended for military purposes. This simple fact vividly challenges the spirit of the NPT, which, in its preamble, calls for cooperation “on peaceful nuclear activities”. It also challenges the Rarotonga treaty, which calls to “promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all.”
Concerning the application of safeguards, Australia concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA in 1974 and the additional protocol to it in 1998[5], placing all of nuclear materials and objects on its territory under the IAEA surveillance. As discussed above, in accordance with Article 14 of Australia’s CSA, the country can temporarily withdraw safeguarded nuclear materials for a non-safeguarded nuclear activity (naval propulsion in the case of AUKUS) upon approval by the IAEA. Thus, Australia and the IAEA engaged in a set of consultations[6], discussed further in order to develop an approach towards verification of non-diversion of nuclear materials being withdrawn from safeguards.
The next central AUKUS question follows – whether a state can transfer nuclear submarines to NNWS in accordance with the NPT. Nuclear submarines under the AUKUS agreement are claimed to be conventionally armed and are intended for military use. The NPT does not regulate or apply to nuclear-propelled vessels themselves, only to nuclear reactors, materials, and technology used in their propulsion, development, and maintenance, provided that safeguards agreements cover them. Thus, in terms of legal obligations, a state can execute transfers of nuclear submarines in accordance with the NPT. The position of the AUKUS member states on the question is clear: “It is untrue that the transfer of highly enriched uranium from a nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State runs counter to the spirit of the NPT. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level to a non-nuclear-weapon State is not prohibited by the NPT….”[7]
While AUKUS does not explicitly contradict the concrete articles of the NPT, it does reject the NPT spirit and ideology. It can be seen by considering several NPT articles regarding the purpose of facilitating and promoting transfers of nuclear materials, objects, and technologies to NNWS.
Firstly, under Article III of the NPT, the transfer of nuclear units to NNWS is to be for peaceful purposes, which contradicts the AUKUS agreement on the transfer of submarines for non-peaceful purposes.
Secondly, Article IV obliges states to ‘facilitate… exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. These articles highlight the ideology behind the treaty, promoting the benefits nuclear energy can provide to the development of states’ peaceful technologies, economies, and industries, e.g., electricity generation, the switch to green energy, research, medicine, etc. Yet neither the nuclear submarines nor the related components under the AUKUS deal fit within the framework of peaceful use. Thus, despite legally complying with the NPT, the spirit and ideology behind the treaty and the regime it established are being countered by AUKUS through the legal transfer of nuclear objects to an NNWS for non-peaceful, unsafeguarded purposes.
Another concern surrounding the AUKUS deal is the planned transfer of large amounts of highly enriched uranium to an NNWS. Some countries, including Russia and China, highlight that such a transfer is a direct threat to non-proliferation. Regarding legal obligations, the transfer is governed by Article III. According to clause 2, no state can transfer nuclear materials unless they are put under safeguards. Clause 4 obliges NNWS to draw agreements with the IAEA to put nuclear materials under safeguards. In this sense, the AUKUS transfers of materials fall within the NPT, as the parties have been negotiating safeguards for the materials and equipment related to the transfers. Since 2023, as part of compliance with Article 14 of Australia’s CSA and the provisions of the AUKUS agreement, the IAEA and Australia have been engaged in negotiations over the transfer of nuclear materials to the latter for naval propulsion. The key goal of the talks is to develop a mechanism through which the agency can ensure that no diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful or non-stated purposes shall occur with the materials supplied under the AUKUS deal. The IAEA Director General Statement[8] revealed that one of the points of consultations is the possibility of verification of the use of materials and the ‘voluntary transparency measures’ which Australia is to undertake regarding the AUKUS implementation. A mechanism for verification has not been publicly revealed yet, but one may imagine the complexity of it, taking into account that naval propulsion is surrounded by a significant scope of classified information. At the same time, it remains uncertain for the public as to what verification activities the agency could undertake, even in theory, after nuclear materials such as nuclear fuel are applied, since inspections on operating submarines are ruled out due to their possible long-term placement in the deep sea and ocean depths, which are challenging to access.
Rarotonga Treaty
While the treaty itself does not prohibit stationing of nuclear-powered vessels, as a Pacific historian Maro de Jong claims, ‘Pacific nations are growing increasingly frustrated at Australia’s reliance on loopholes and technicalities.[9]’, implying that the fact of not including such dual-use objects as nuclear submarines was merely overlooked at the time and seems like a loophole now to some states in the region. Whether the international community merely overlooked it or was intentionally not included, no nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties include limitations on stationing and operating nuclear-powered submarines, which are not considered nuclear explosive devices, meaning that the concerns over the Rarotonga treaty from a legal perspective are not viable. However, the debate was spurred by concerns that the spirit of the treaty was in danger due to AUKUS. Similar to the NPT but on a regional level, the Treaty of Rarotonga was aimed at preserving security and preventing an arms race. If one examines the treaty’s preamble, one of the first points the parties to the treaty state is that they are: “Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people….[10]” On the contrary, AUKUS can be seen as fueling the arms race in the Pacific among the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. Moreover, if not directly linked to an arms race, the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines into the region under a deal with the U.S. would inevitably worsen tensions with China in the area, laying the foundations for potential armed conflicts and degrading the security of other regional actors. Another issue is that the U.S. did not ratify the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty, unlike the U.K.[11] The key provisions of the protocols include the one in Protocol II, obliging states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty or territories within this NWFZ. The other vital provision is covered in Protocol III, which prohibits testing of nuclear explosives in the territory of the NWFZ. By not ratifying either protocol, the U.S. maintains an ambiguous stance on maintaining peace in the region, weakening the overall security and the NWFZ established within it.
All in all, the transfer of AUKUS submarines is not illegal from the point of view of international law. Nuclear materials transferred with nuclear submarines fall under the safeguards agreement. However, the transfer clearly contradicts the spirit and ideology behind key nonproliferation treaties since AUKUS’s transfer objective is far from peaceful.
What if AUKUS submarines were armed?
Since it is clear that nuclear submarines under AUKUS are not intended for peaceful uses, this article considers the question of their ammunition. According the AUKUS agreement of 2024, Article VI (K): “All Australian nuclear-powered submarines shall be conventionally armed”. However, the key question is the extent to which this fact can be verified at the level of international nuclear control. In order to determine that, the overall possibility of placing nuclear weapons on the submarines supplied is considered by the author. One of the stages of AUKUS implementation is the supply of the Virginia-class submarines[12] from the U.S. to Australia. Virginia submarines have been commonly armed with Tomahawk missiles[13], which could be equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads, or both.
In case the submarines in question are armed with nuclear weapons, there would be non-compliance with the key nonproliferation obligations of the AUKUS members under the NPT and the Rarotonga treaty. The presence of nuclear weapons on submarines supplied to Australia is likely a transfer of them from either the U.S. or the U.K., considering Australia is a NNWS. Thus, their transfer would go against Article I of the NPT on the part of the sending NWS. Australia would not comply with Article II of the NPT, as it prohibits states from receiving nuclear weapons or control over them. Moreover, both sides would contradict the clauses of not encouraging or seeking to transfer or acquire nuclear weapons under these articles. Furthermore, the presence of nuclear weapons on the submarines would imply complete non-compliance with the Rarotonga treaty, which proclaimed the South Pacific a NWFZ. Specifically, Australia would be found in violating Article 3 of the treaty, prohibiting the acquisition or control over nuclear weapons in the region and the receipt of any assistance in their acquisition; Article 5, prohibiting stationing on its territory nuclear weapons.
Since it is claimed that the submarines under AUKUS will be only conventionally armed, one would assume that there is a mechanism for verifying that the submarines are not used to carry nuclear weapons. The AUKUS agreement, on its own, does not provide such mechanisms; thus, the author of the dissertation delves into the international legal basis to determine whether there are any legal grounds to conduct any form of verification of submarines to determine whether nuclear weapons are present or absent on them. The only international agency charged with verifying nuclear facilities – the IAEA- can only verify nuclear materials on a particular facility and conclude if there are any concerns over its possible divergence from peaceful to military purposes. According to the IAEA mission statement, it: “verifies through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other nonproliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes[14].” Moreover, the IAEA’s verification covers only those facilities which are used for peaceful “atoms”. As stated in Article III (1) of the NPT, “The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities”. The agency’s scope of operation is limited to nuclear materials and facilities, not to any weaponry.
The IAEA conducts verification at two levels: declared and undeclared nuclear materials and activities[15]. Firstly, the IAEA analyzes whether the declared materials are present and are not being subject to possible diversion. Secondly, it monitors states regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. In case a state receives atomic weapons, the IAEA would be unable to have grounds for any verification regarding the weapons themselves, as it only deals with nuclear materials used in their production or maintenance (e.g., nuclear fuel). At the same time, there would be no undeclared activity aimed at the production of nuclear weapons or undeclared enrichment of nuclear materials that would be subjected to the IAEA monitoring. Thus, the IAEA would not have any jurisdiction to conduct inspections in the event of nuclear weapons being present on the AUKUS nuclear submarines.
Furthermore, aside from the IAEA, there is no and never has been a multilateral body that would be charged with the legal right and the task to verify the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on nuclear submarines and any object on the whole.
The only exception is the merely bilateral Russia–USA START verification mechanism, which was voluntary and legally implemented on a mutual basis. START-1 and its successor, START-3, presupposed thorough inspections of all relevant facilities in both states to monitor compliance with the treaty’s terms. However, such a mechanism would not apply to AUKUS for several reasons. The main reason is the legal deadlock over who would monitor. Neither the IAEA nor any non-nuclear-weapon states could be legally entitled to get access to nuclear weapons. The NPT univocally states: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly”.
The only mechanism that comes the closest to establishing some control over dual-use technologies would be the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export control mechanism with all 3 AUKUS member states adhering to it[16]. However, it merely issues recommendatory guidelines for states executing nuclear export transfers, creating a trigger list of nuclear and dual-use objects and materials which are to be placed under safeguards and which cannot be transferred to a state if there is a risk of diversion, respectively. The mechanism is based on countries’ voluntary adherence to it and its implementation.
There is no international body that could be granted the function of verifying the absence or presence of nuclear weapons on a naval unit, as that would require a drastic international law remake or at least an adjustment of the current nonproliferation legal documents. If a state or a group of states were appointed to conduct such monitoring, it would be impossible to reach an international consensus on which state or states would be appointed. If an AUKUS member were appointed to conduct the inspections, it could create a conflict of interest for the partnership members. Lastly, it isn’t easy to imagine the depth of inspection, given the vast amount of classified information regarding their design and operation, which AUKUS members would not agree to put at risk.
Finally, let us consider the turn of events when confirmed information is made public, revealing that the AUKUS submarines are indeed armed with nuclear weapons. While it would be a clear violation of the NPT, it is unclear what practical steps can be taken to reverse the situation and return it to NPT compliance. On the international level, the issue would need to be raised at one of the discussion platforms designed to resolve the nonproliferation problems. As discussed above, the IAEA General Conference is ruled out as the agency itself does not deal with nuclear weapons, but only monitors atomic materials.
The General Assembly could hold only general debates on the question and adopt non-binding resolutions. It seems that the Security Council would be the only option that could adopt a legally binding decision on the matter and impose sanctions on the AUKUS members. However, such a decision would need a consensus among the Security Council members, with 2 of the permanent members also being members of AUKUS. The issue would remain unresolved, despite the incongruity with the international nuclear obligations of the AUKUS members.
All in all, on the legal basis, AUKUS falls into compliance with the nonproliferation obligations. However, the primary concern regarding the deal is the following fact. Possible arming of missiles on board AUKUS submarines with nuclear warheads is not ruled out, as it is physically possible due to the technical specifications of the Virginia class submarines, and the absence of atomic weapons on these submarines cannot be verified, as there is no international body or a bilateral framework that could fulfill this task. Moreover, the AUKUS plan to transfer nuclear submarines contradicts the rationale behind the nonproliferation regime, and specifically the NPT, since nuclear-powered submarines are armed either way and are intended for military purposes. In contrast, the NPT seeks to promote only the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The case of AUKUS requires special attention: in the case of being confronted with a discovery of nuclear weapons on AUKUS submarines, the international community will not have significant instruments to sanction the AUKUS members and displace such weapons from the board of Australia’s submarines. Therefore, the deal would directly undermine the nonproliferation regime and create a persistent threat of Australia becoming an unsanctioned nuclear player in the region.
Geopolitical impact
Rising tensions
AUKUS is a security alliance that has the potential to shift the regional security architecture. The coalition would affect Asia and the Pacific the most, regions characterized by complex political disputes.
The issues include a range of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan, and the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. AUKUS is openly aimed at targeting China, attempting to deter its influence in the Pacific. With the expected negative response from the country towards the newly formed alliance, AUKUS is likely to trigger a mirroring response from the Chinese government, only leading to fortification of its military position in the Pacific and increased deployment of troops. It should be mentioned that China already militarized a number of islands in South China Sea[17], which could be further exacerbated as a response to AUKUS, which is a concern for regional players and can contribute to the regional arms race. As AUKUS submarines will enter the Pacific, it would be a direct call for China to showcase its own nuclear-propelled submarines conventionally armed with ballistic missiles[18], and if Australia’s nuclear fleet is expanding in accordance with the AUKUS-announced plans, and on the proclaimed scale, it is likely to trigger an arms race. The arms race would concern not only the quantitative presence of states’ military units in the region, but also the technological advancement as China and the U.S. compete in that field as well. It should be noted that Australia has recently expressed reluctance[19] towards openly discussing the use of the AUKUS submarines against China in case of an armed conflict. The author of this article believes that such claims do not reflect any intention on the part of the Australian government not to use AUKUS submarines against China, as the whole AUKUS alliance was established, in part, to deter China. These claims instead show a degree of uncertainty in the U.S. as a strategic partner or an ally, given the recently imposed tariffs on trade by President Trump, which did not exclude Australia. In this sense, the reluctance to announce its willingness to use nuclear-propelled submarines against China can be described as an attempt to avoid increased regional tension with China, in an environment where Australia remains unsure of the U.S.’s reliability.
Arms race
In its turn, a possible arms race between China and Australia backed by the other AUKUS member states would lead not only to a direct regional security threat in the face of a potential armed conflict, but also to nuclear proliferation concerns. Experts like Dr. Leonova[20] talk about the possible collision of nuclear submarines of Australia and China as their deployment and the militarization in the Pacific are increasing. In the event of an armed conflict, several states between China and Australia risk being caught in crossfire, which is one of the significant reasons some regional players opposed the announcement of the AUKUS partnership. The arms race initially between China and Australia would evolve into a regional-wide struggle for defense against the possible Chinese military expansion. Currently, only NWSs possess nuclear submarine fleets. There are a few states that already have ambitions in the field of nuclear submarines, e.g., Japan[21] and South Korea[22], which would now have a much greater motivation to pursue them. In case the arms race gains momentum, China, as an NWS, is not precisely limited to possessing nuclear weapons or developing its arsenal. Australia would be in the middle of a confrontation between the two NWSs on both ends. In this case, the probability of the potential nuclear armament of nuclear submarines in Australia only increases, as for the U.S., which would be the easiest and quickest way to reinforce its own positions in the region. Moreover, given Australia’s similar history of nuclear ambitions, the threat of its divergence persists.
Setting precedent
Australia is not the only state currently seeking permission to withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA supervision to propel its nuclear-powered fleet. Brazil is undergoing a similar process on the same legal basis. However, whereas Brazil is a country that has a peaceful nuclear program and seeks to use nuclear materials developed domestically in conditions where there is a developed practice for the IAEA verification of its facilities, Australia’s case is different and separately detrimental to nonproliferation. Australia is receiving nuclear materials from another state, the U.S., paving a dangerous path for other countries to follow, potentially. In case negotiations with the IAEA and Australia on Article 14 of its CSA end with a favorable decision and the AUKUS agreement is executed in accordance with the countries’ plans, such a framework of exchange would signal to states internationally that it is an acceptable framework. This article finds two major issues with setting such a precedent – it can lead to the proliferation of alliances between military blocs and trigger another nuclear arms race; it lowers barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons for countries that seek or may seek them. Middle Eastern states, as an example, would definitely claim their moral and legal right to acquire nuclear submarines.
Proliferation to allies
One of the underlying political goals of the AUKUS security partnership is to strengthen the U.S. presence in the South Pacific region. By providing its close strategic ally, Australia, with nuclear submarines, the U.S. is ensuring that its strategic rival, China, is deterred in its further attempts to expand its influence in the Pacific. The issue that the author of this article seeks to stress is that it is done through transferring nuclear-propelled submarines with the capacity of carrying nuclear warheads, signaling to other states the lengths the U.S. would go to assert its regional influence. In response to AUKUS and, later, possibly in completely unrelated matters, the framework of arming an allied state with nuclear-propelled submarines can be used by other nuclear powers. In its turn, this leads to uncontrolled proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials across the globe, where the risk of diversion will remain high until a mechanism for controlling nuclear naval propulsion and related units is established and a body for international nuclear weapons control is founded. However, such entities would likely require consensus among key nuclear players, which is hardly imaginable, as it would run counter to their strategic interests.
Barriers to proliferation
The other major problem surrounding the scenario where the AUKUS deal goes through is the overall weakening of the existing system of preventing the divergence of peaceful to nuclear weapons programs. Currently, there is an extensive international legal system as well as political pressure for a state not to acquire nuclear weapons, creating a set of barriers for potential seekers. Article 14 of the CSAs merely addresses previously overlooked nuclear legal base concepts, such as naval propulsion, and attempts to establish some control over verifying that states use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes, despite being able to withdraw them from IAEA monitoring completely. Such a barrier, on its own, appears to be quite effective; however, AUKUS undermines it by showing that a state can acquire not only nuclear materials through direct transfer but also use them in activities where their use can hardly be verified. In reality, there are a minimal number of barriers placed before a state seeking nuclear weapons. Arguably, AUKUS targets two of the most essential parts of such a barrier system. Firstly, for potential seekers of nuclear weapons, not having sufficient nuclear materials is one of the key challenges. AUKUS addresses that problem by demonstrating that a state can acquire nuclear materials if an NWS is willing to execute such a deal. Secondly, potential seekers would be cautious of the political backlash towards the use of nuclear materials for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as it is quite possible to uncover with satellite images and other techniques used by the IAEA to detect possible diversion. The overall legality of materials acquisition, the near-impossible verification of their final use, and the absence of any legal basis for such verification solve this problem. Thus, the case of AUKUS is softening barriers to state proliferation.
The issue gains momentum when potential seekers of nuclear weapons are considered. If the IAEA approves the AUKUS transfer within its scope of work, then other states would have the right to operate within such an established framework and receive transfers of nuclear materials for naval propulsion as well as nuclear-propelled submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads. For instance, this could be demanded by countries like Iraq, which has a history of nuclear ambitions[23], now receiving not only an idea on legal acquisition of nuclear materials, but also leverage to demand approval in case of a similar transfer to it. As more states acquire nuclear materials that would be unverified for a period of time during unsafeguarded activities, the diversion risk rises for both state and non-state actors. The issue of ensuring the physical security of these materials becomes more prominent as more materials are transferred, as the question of the physical safety of nuclear-propelled vessels, and as the risk of related accidents rise. Special attention should be given to states engaged in regional conflict where military action can either damage nuclear-propelled vessels or induce the use of nuclear weapons for military purposes from these vessels. In case such transfers are conducted towards states with less experience with atomic energy, while ensuring physical safety cannot be done or verified by the IAEA on the nuclear-propelled vessels, the danger of environmental hazards intensifies in case of a radiological release into the ocean or sea, causing issues like water pollution, posing threat to the maritime life, as well as potentially inducing flooding and tsunamis.
The role of the IAEA
Consequently, if the framework for transfers of nuclear-propelled submarines and nuclear materials for their maintenance to NNWS is approved and becomes operational worldwide, the legitimacy of the IAEA is also challenged. The IAEA has faced numerous challenges to its reputation over the years of its operation, many of them linked to the politicization of its activities. When it comes to AUKUS, the agency has yet to define its reputation’s future. As a report of a Russian-Chinese think tank claims: “Possible attempts of behind-the-scenes discussions between the parties to AUKUS and the IAEA Secretariat can lead to the politicization of the Secretariat and erode overall trust in the IAEA[24].” Opponents of the deal claim that a potential IAEA approval of it would be a clear case of double standards when it comes to nonproliferation obligations. That has two major reasons. Firstly, a comparatively more straightforward case of Brazil has still not seen a favorable IAEA decision despite its pristine history of observing safeguards and planning to produce domestically materials for naval propulsion on safeguarded objects, making the process far more transparent than the AUKUS transfer framework. Secondly, the IAEA has yet to publicly accept that it will not be able to fully verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials in the AUKUS transfer for the reasons previously mentioned in this article, and will be unable to ensure the absence of the threat of diversion of nuclear materials in unsafeguarded activities.
Security of nuclear materials
While this primarily concerns potential future attempts to replicate the AUKUS framework, the security of nuclear materials in unsafeguarded activities should also be discussed. Nuclear security of materials is essential for the following reasons. Firstly, it is key to ensure that materials cannot be accessed by an unauthorized party at any point during their existence on a state’s territory to avoid potential misuse and proliferation. This also concerns non-state actors like terrorists and marginalized groups, which could take advantage of unsecured materials for illegal trade or the development of their own explosive devices. Secondly, it is vital to ensure that materials remain intact, as materials such as nuclear fuel and nuclear waste can be harmful to the environment and human health. In the case of AUKUS, it poses a problem for materials security, since, as discussed above, the IAEA cannot verify the state of nuclear materials, their use, or their utilization on nuclear-propelled submarines. Thus, it remains within Australia’s control to ensure the materials’ security. Yet it is safe to assume Australia is relatively inexperienced in handling nuclear energy, as it has only one operational research reactor[25] and no nuclear power plants. The same issue might arise in potential seekers of repeating the AUKUS framework which might be just as or more inexperienced in dealing with nuclear materials.
In contrast to NWS, these states did not undergo decades of training, infrastructure adjustments, or legal regulation related to nuclear materials. The second major issue concerns ensuring secure transfers of nuclear materials, as this is the most sensitive part of preventing unauthorized access. In the case of AUKUS, the security of materials is planned to be ensured by supplying reactors for nuclear submarines sealed[26] inside the submarines with the fuel required for them. That said, there is no guarantee or verification that the materials will not be accessed during the operation or deployment of such a submarine under circumstances such as reactor malfunctions, refueling, or routine maintenance.
Military blocks
A possible implication of AUKUS, as a new military alliance gaining momentum, is that it could become a factor in the ongoing polarization of the world. In contrast to the trend of globalization the international system has seen in the 21st century, military alliances such as AUKUS highlight the growing polarization in international relations, where based on security and geopolitical interests countries tend to huddle together and feel the need to “retreat” to their military alliances instead of turning to global cooperation to resolve international issues such as nonproliferation and arms control. This again goes against the spirit of the nonproliferation regime, which was born and developed through the collaboration of states at the global level, finding common goals and compromises.
Conclusion
AUKUS does not contradict the legal obligations of the participating states in the field of non-proliferation, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of Australia with the IAEA, and the Rarotonga Treaty. However, it clearly contradicts the spirit of the NPT and the Rarotonga Treaty. In case nuclear weapons appear on board the AUKUS submarines, it will be an undisputable violation of both treaties’ obligations.
Whereas nuclear submarines are not subject to atomic control under these documents, the materials required for their propulsion are being negotiated with the IAEA regarding the possibility of their use in a military activity. Despite the legality of the transfer, the article reveals a central issue: the potential nuclear armament of submarines and the lack of any legal mechanism to prevent it or verify its absence. This fact creates significant risks not only for the nonproliferation regime on the whole, but also for regional and global security. Moreover, the article considers the legality of the transfer secondary to the damaging effect it has on the spirit planted within the non-proliferation treaties. The AUKUS deal goes against the goals of promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy, as the intended use of atomic submarines supplied within it is military.
AUKUS induces several broader geopolitical implications. Since the AUKUS alliance is aimed at deterring China, the execution of the partnership is expected to escalate tensions between China and the AUKUS member states, causing turmoil in the Pacific region and triggering an unpredictable arms race, with the possibility of nuclear armament. The NWFZ established in the area would be undermined in its core, as its goal was to preserve peace and avoid an arms race. However, the AUKUS transfer’s implications go beyond the regional level, as it sets a precedent for the transfer of sensitive materials to an NNWS. Such a precedent in the case of a successful execution offers an established framework for other states to potentially acquire nuclear materials with the possibility of their undetected proliferation. In turn, this lowers the overall barriers to proliferation worldwide.
Furthermore, the AUKUS transfer raises concerns over the security of materials, as the IAEA cannot verify their state during their use. The IAEA itself would face reputational risks if it approved the deal, as it would have to admit it could not verify the materials involved in the AUKUS transfer and execution. Finally, on the ideological level, the AUKUS alliance and its plans threaten to exacerbate the already persisting polarization in international relations and cause the emergence or tightening of security blocs. Moreover, this article concludes that the AUKUS plans indicate a regression in international nuclear ideology, in which states short-term strategic interests replace the primacy of long-term joint efforts to maintain and strengthen nonproliferation.
The author expresses gratitude to her academic advisor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (retired) Dr. Mikhail Lysenko, for his valuable advice and assistance in writing this work.
Keywords:Nuclear Nonproliferation; Global Security; Australia; AUKUS
[5] Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/217/Add.1. 1998. URL: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc217a1.pdf (дата обращения: 15.04.2025).
[7] IAEA Board of Governors. Agenda Item 10: Transfer of the Nuclear Materials in the Context of AUKUS and Its Safeguards in All Aspects under the NPT. Australia Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Vienna. 2024. URL: https://austria.embassy.gov.au/vien/BoardSept24_10RoR.html (дата обращения: 15.04.2025).
[20] Leonova O. The Impact of the Strategic Partnership AUKUS on the Geopolitical Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region // International Organisations Research Journal. 2022. Vol. 17, No. 3. P. 194–211. URL: https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2023/03/16/1714044301/8%20Leonova.pdf (дата обращения: 15.04.2025).
