Disputes and Debates on the Topical Issues of International Security
Middlegame in the Middle East? Polemics between Evdokia Dobreva and Leonid Tsukanov on the situation in Iran.
March 1, 2026
The situation around Iran has reached a new peak and escalated to an entirely unprecedented level. For the first time, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia – have faced such massive strikes. «Gunboat diplomacy» has become more about «gunboats» than «diplomacy». Donald Trump, much like a poker player, sees Iran’s «game » as a bluff and, confident in his hand’s strength, is sharply raising the stakes without regard for the chips – his own or others’. In the course of a joint US-Israel operation, one of the main targets was Iran’s top leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The scenario proven effective in Venezuela was decided to be tested in a new context to provoke a change of power in the country. How will Iran’s domestic political situation evolve amid these foreign policy challenges? How will the Gulf monarchies respond to missile strikes on their territory? And finally, what are the prospects for the current escalation? Today, Evdokia Dobreva, Junior Research Fellow of The Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Dr. Leonid Tsukanov, PIR Center Consultant, have engaged in polemics on all these and the other questions.
Evdokia DobrevaDr. Leonid Tsukanov
The polemics was moderated by Maksim Nosenko, PIR Center intern.
Maksim Nosenko: There is currently much discussion about how Iran’s population will react to such large-scale escalation amid losses among the country’s top leadership. Let’s take a brief step back. What was the last straw that ignited the mass protests in Iran in January and February this year? How stable has the situation remained after their suppression? Under these conditions, can Iran afford to continue resistance? Won’t this only make the situation worse?
Leonid Tsukanov: The protests that took place in Iran are far from the first, but they were the most large-scale in recent years. A combination of negative factors converged – economic, political, and social. The «trigger point» was the sharp devaluation of the national currency at the end of December–beginning of January 2025, which sparked the initial protests. A role was also played by some disappointment with the course of Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet, which, as part of its pre-election program, promised voters the easing of sanctions and economic recovery, but so far has failed to achieve a systemic solution to the problem.
After the protest wave was brought under control, the situation in Iran was characterized as generally stable – authorities maintained control on the ground, armed underground groups in border provinces were eliminated, and a patriotic upsurge emerged in society. Tehran succeeded in the main thing – preventing a serious split among the elites, although the targeted arrests of reformist wing leaders and activists in February 2026, following the suppression of the protests, triggered rumors of purges within the opposition ranks.
Evdokia Dobreva: Note that only part of society – those supporting the regime – experienced this patriotic upsurge. For another segment of the population, the brutal suppression of the January protests only intensified their overall animosity toward the system, as well as their desire for retribution. The divide between these two groups deepened; according to several expert estimates, they are roughly equal in size, each making up about 15% of the population.
Thus, social stabilization could only be considered temporary, especially since the ultimate goal of the Iranian regime’s adversaries – Israel and the US – is the destabilization of the regime itself. The 2024–2025 military situation led to the strengthening of conservatives in Iranian politics and further «tightening of the screws» in Iranian society. Dissenters are equated with enemies of the people, encompassing both street protesters and opposition-minded politicians – a stance that appears logical amid military confrontation.
The declaration of the Iranian parliamentary group «Reform Front», published in August last year, was met with fierce resistance by conservatives. The most radical members of the «Front » were arrested in early 2026, despite reformers formally being intra-system opposition. Among other things, the declaration articulated the need for economic reforms to avoid financial collapse. This statement was not unexpected, but subsequent macroeconomic trends confirmed the concerns it raised.
The «snapback» mechanism triggered by the E3 trio led to the reinstatement of previously lifted UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. The state’s attempt to cancel the subsidized exchange rate for importers and replace it with food vouchers caused the collapse of the Iranian rial’s value, intensifying inflation and pressuring urban populations. This triggered mass protests, bringing to the streets not only youth dissatisfied with the Islamic Republic’s ideological restrictions, but also city dwellers and merchants outraged that the state is unable to fulfill its basic duty of ensuring conditions for a dignified standard of living.
Leonid Tsukanov: As for the economic burden, the specifics of the Islamic Republic itself must be taken into account. As already noted, having spent most of its history under severe sanctions, the country ranks among the «record holders» in terms of the number of restrictions imposed. For this reason, Tehran has long established alternative routes for obtaining goods and technologies, as well as its own mechanisms for supporting the economy. This allows it to partially mitigate external pressure. Of course, resources for stable economic growth in such circumstances remain scarce, but the Republic has no other options for now. Moreover, concessions would likely entail even greater costs.
Evdokia Dobreva: Therefore, the shadow economy has developed in Iran as a result of adapting to life under years of sanctions, and the transparency of the financial system has decreased. The social subsidy system exerts pressure on the economy, consuming up to a quarter of the state budget. To generate additional budget revenue, the government needs to reform the subsidy and taxation systems, but any attempt at such reform inevitably provokes public protests and leads to mass demonstrations. Thus, a vicious circle emerges, forcing the authorities to balance between the need for reforms and the risk of new protests, which regularly reproduces the country’s economic problems.
Leonid Tsukanov: During the protests, this was well understood within the Iranian establishment, but the risk of panic in that milieu was low – contrary to numerous claims in the Western press, neither Iran’s Supreme Leader nor his inner circle left the country during the peak of the protests, just as they did not during the previous armed conflict. Nevertheless, the new US-Israel operation aimed at «decapitating» the Islamic Republic could, on one hand, rally political forces supporting the regime, but on the other, serve as a «green light » for the regime’s opponents.
Makism Nosenko: The activation of the negotiation process before the operation – what was that? Did Trump, like a poker player, mix up all the cards in such a way that it was impossible to discern bluff from a strong hand? In your opinion, was the negotiation process between Iran and the United States a genuine desire to achieve results, or a bluff to buy time to strengthen their position by deploying forces? How did Iran approach continuing negotiations with the US, bearing in mind the fate of the JCPOA?
Leonid Tsukanov: This is partly a pursuit of a «grand bargain» on Trump’s terms – especially since the United States withdrew from the previous Iranian nuclear deal at his instigation – and an attempt to maximally prolong the process and buy time to concentrate forces in the region. In the first case, Washington lobbies for the most sensitive issues – for example, the dissolution of the pro-Iranian «Axis of Resistance», restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program, and the like – in the second, it deliberately wears down its interlocutors so that they exit the talks first. And thereby legitimize the military option.
At the same time, it is evident that Trump still doubts the success of a hypothetical military operation – while continuing to build up a military presence near Iran’s borders – and therefore makes minor concessions to Tehran. For instance, the US agreed to move the first round from Turkey to Oman. The recent meeting in Geneva also took place with Omani mediation, which was Tehran’s requirement. It should be remembered that the position of the US is influenced by its numerous regional allies, most of whom are not interested in a conflict in the Persian Gulf.
Iran’s approach to the negotiations remains tough. The Iranians well remember the fate of the first «nuclear deal», and therefore insist on developing safeguard mechanisms that can protect the Republic in case any party unilaterally withdraws from it.
In fact, the negotiations between Iran and the US are being conducted to preserve the negotiating window. The parties advance conditions that are a priori unacceptable to the opponent but do not make them foundational, except for certain «principled points». This allows them to play on the diplomatic track for a long time, maintaining the appearance of engagement. However, it is still premature to speak of any real progress
Evdokia Dobreva: In my view, the negotiations between the United States and Iran served more as a tool for risk management than a genuine platform for swift compromise. For Washington, prolonging the dialogue provided an opportunity to simultaneously test the resilience of Iran’s economy and political system, maintain freedom of choice between diplomatic and military scenarios, and demonstrate control over the situation to allies. Tehran, in turn, viewed the talks as a way to reduce the likelihood of a direct strike, signal readiness for de-escalation to third countries, and maintain balance among various groups within its own elite.
At the same time, the parties took limited steps toward each other: the US expressed willingness to discuss a symbolic level of uranium enrichment, while Iran presented a package of possible economic preferences for the American side. As a result, the very fact of continuing the negotiations – for a certain, albeit short-term, period – restrained escalation. During this time, Iran managed to suppress waves of protests, while the United States redeployed its military contingent, increasing its presence in the region.
Maksim Nosenko: The results of last year’s 12-day war were highly controversial for the US and Israel. What were their goals this time, and were they able to achieve them? Moreover, the strike on Persian Gulf countries and discussions about blocking the Strait of Hormuz marked a qualitative shift in the situation around Iran. How will it affect Iran’s bilateral relations with Gulf states?
Leonid Tsukanov: The goals of the US and Israel are stated quite straightforwardly – undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile potential. Washington and West Jerusalem have designated this in their official statements. Accordingly, the main emphasis during operations has been placed on this.
There is also a non-public but easily discernible component – the aim to eliminate key figures of the Islamic Republic (led by Ali Khamenei) and create a political vacuum inside Iran to set the stage for further internal destabilization. Speaking of a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz is premature – the IRGC has not officially taken such steps, but the high intensity of military actions in the region has prompted most external players to bypass the problematic area and opt for alternative routes.
As for the strikes on Arab countries – not only Arabian monarchies but also Iraq and Jordan – this has become a kind of signal that Tehran is broadcasting outward: providing territory for strikes against the Republic will no longer allow escaping unscathed without collateral damage. On the other hand, Iran has not issued a direct challenge to the GCC countries or other Arab players. The strikes so far are comparatively limited (though they cause collateral damage and bolster anti-Iranian sentiments). Therefore, dialogue between Iran and Arab players will experience some cooling in the near term, but without irreparable losses.
Evdokia Dobreva: I would emphasize that before the operation, a structure of «gunboat diplomacy » – that is, diplomacy backed by force – fully took shape around Iran. After the second round of talks, the dialogue became more substantive. However, the negotiation process was accompanied by a demonstrative buildup of military power in the region as a constant reminder of the military alternative in case of Iranian «inflexibility». In this sense, the situation almost literally illustrated Carl von Clausewitz’s famous formula that «war is the continuation of politics by other means», meaning military force can become the final word in negotiations, which is exactly what happened.
The direct use of force against Iranian territory destroyed previous informal restrictions and triggered a chain escalation, in which Tehran’s retaliatory actions become a matter of political necessity rather than choice. Tehran’s countermeasures, including attacks on Israel, US bases across the Middle East, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and missile strikes, could trigger an oil shock with prices up to $130–150 per barrel and regional destabilization involving proxy groups. If the world’s oil transit chokepoint is mined, we will likely see a naval battle involving the US carrier Abraham Lincoln and IRGC Navy forces. A full closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains an extreme measure, but even partial disruption of shipping could have a negative impact on the global economy. Beyond Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is also at risk, controlled by Iranian allies – the Houthis.
Maksim Nosenko: The next question is of an abstract nature. What key events or shifts in the balance of power are necessary for the situation around Iran to cease being the main focal point of regional and global attention in the Middle East? What is fundamentally behind the constant return to Iran-centric crises – with irresolvable ideological contradictions, geoeconomic levers, the nuclear dilemma, or the artificial maintenance of the «enemy« image for alliance consolidation? What is primary?
Evdokia Dobreva: There are several reasons why narratives around Iran become stumbling blocks for the entire Middle East policy. Here, the geoeconomics of the Strait of Hormuz and energy markets, the nuclear dilemma, the architecture of regional containment, and ideological conflict overlap.
The nuclear issue and the risk of closing the Strait of Hormuz automatically elevate any crisis around Iran to a global level. The nuclear topic makes the situation sensitive for Israel and the United States, while Hormuz affects the entire world due to energy market stability. However, the roots of the contradiction lie in the ideological conflict between Iran and Israel.
It is precisely the Israeli factor that transforms Iran’s nuclear program from a technical matter of controls and inspections into a question of survival. For Israel, it is not about enrichment percentages or formal guarantees, but about preserving strategic superiority. Iran’s acquisition of «threshold» state status automatically shifts the balance of power and undermines the containment system on which Israel’s security has been built for decades.
At the same time, in the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, one cannot blame only the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although the denial of Israel’s legitimacy became part of Tehran’s official ideology after the revolution, structural contradictions existed from the moment of Israel’s establishment in 1948. After the revolution, confrontation became an element of Iran’s state identity and part of its foreign policy. Viewed through the lens of ideologies, such confrontations do not allow for compromise. When one side officially questions the legitimacy of the other’s existence, and the second perceives the first as an existential threat.
From the Iranian side, the denial of Israel’s legitimacy has been the foundation of political discourse for decades. However, in Israel too, the issue has long gone beyond defensive strategy. In expert and political circles, scenarios of regime change in Iran or its deep «neutralization» – that is, weakening to the point where it ceases to pose a threat – are seriously discussed.
If one pushes ideological logic to its extreme, its «solution» could be the cessation of one side’s existence – either physically or in its current politico-ideological form.
Leonid Tsukanov: A sharp shift in the balance of power between Iran and Israel – with the weakening or serious politico-ideological transformation of either side – would inevitably trigger a profound transformation of the regional security landscape. For instance, in the event of Iran’s hypothetical weakening, Turkey would become the next «existential threat» for Israel on the list, which Israeli officials are emphasizing significantly today. Conversely, if Israel were weakened, there is a high likelihood of renewed intensification of rivalry between Iran and the Arabian monarchies for influence over minds in Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries. In this case, one could hardly expect rivalry as acute as that between Tehran and West Jerusalem, but it would still have negative consequences for the region.
Evdokia Dobreva: A rational way out of this vicious circle is possible only through a transformation of the conflict’s ideological foundation. In Iran’s case, this would mean abandoning anti-Israel rhetoric and recognizing the State of Israel. Such a step would automatically shift the conflict from an existential plane to a political one. Without such a shift, any nuclear agreement, missile range limitation, or regional de-escalation will remain technical measures and will not eliminate the root contradiction.
Leonid Tsukanov: At the same time, neither side today is not only unwilling to abandon conflict rhetoric but is actively amplifying it. In this sense, a kind of «point of no return» became June 2025 – the first prolonged direct confrontation between Tehran and Western Jerusalem. Of course, one could fairly object that the first clashes occurred back during the mutual exchange of missile strikes in 2024. However, those actions were more symbolic in nature and did not aim to inflict strategic defeat on the opponent. In June, by contrast, we observed a complex military operation whose goal was to destabilize the country and effectively destroy Iran’s military nuclear project. As a result, both sides gained a patriotic surge, strengthened positions for the «hawks», and a promise of revenge.
Maksim Nosenko: Who exactly would be interested in preserving Iran as a focal point of tension, and who would benefit from de-escalation?
Evdokia Dobrevа: First and foremost, societies on both sides of the conflict would benefit from de-escalation. For Iranians, this would mean a chance to resolve the long-standing nuclear dossier, gradual lifting of sanctions, restoration of access to financial channels and investments, as well as reduced inflationary pressure, increased employment, and overall improvement in the economic situation. The Iranian economy has functioned under sanctions for decades, and even partial normalization could improve everyday life.
For Israel, de-escalation would mean the effective removal of the constant threat from Iran and its proxy allies. This concerns not only the nuclear program but also the missile infrastructure, drones, and armed formations that have been involved in shelling for years and create continuous pressure. Reducing this factor would allow for resource reallocation, decreased military burden, and a lower level of constant mobilization alert.
However, in such a scenario, the political elites of neither side are interested. In Iran, the image of an external enemy serves as a tool for internal consolidation. In Israel, the Iranian threat is also a central element of the strategic agenda and an important factor in political mobilization. The conflict sustains a certain security architecture, budgetary priorities, and coalition ties.
This is precisely why de-escalation would theoretically benefit societies but not the political elites, who have built their domestic and foreign logic around this confrontation for years.
Leonid Tsukanov: Israel is not only uninterested in de-escalation with Iran but is also taking additional steps to fracture the country from within. In particular, since June 2025, Israeli media holdings have been actively working with Iranian monarchists – led by the descendant of the last shah of the Pahlavi dynasty – helping him conduct a propaganda campaign among skeptical Iranians. These information operations were especially intense during major upheavals in the Republic: in June 2025, amid the Israeli operation against Iran, and in January 2026, during mass protests in Iran. Although none of the attempts have succeeded so far, parts of the Israeli elite, it seems, do not plan to abandon the «Shahzadeh» project. This, in turn, gives Iranian authorities an argument that the Israelis are trying to provoke a color revolution in the country and achieve the restoration of the monarchy. This further complicates interaction between Tehran and Western Jerusalem, creating additional space for distrust.
Keywords: Middle East; Iran; The United States; Israel
