Throughout the history Eurasia has attracted so many scholars, philosophers, and strategists, trying to understand its logic and patterns of behavior. Our age is not an exception, and it is not surprising. Nowadays, despite all the twists and turns in the global arena, Eurasia remains a dynamically developing continent, which accounts for an extremely high share of the world population, world gross domestic product (GDP), energy production and consumption, and military construction. In terms of interstate contradictions, existing and potential hotbeds of tension, the Eurasian region is also not in the last place according to international statistics. Fortunately, it also holds leading positions in terms of a large number of different interstate cooperation formats, be it integration groups, unions, coalitions, alliances or discussion forums.
In recent years, of all the modern geopolitical institutions associated with the region the most popular have become the Greater Eurasian Partnership project and the concept of Greater Eurasia put forward by Russia in the mid-2010s.
Why Eurasia is so special
As it is quite common for the concepts of that kind, the Greater Eurasia notion was incepted as an idea. A large number of Russian think tanks, journalists, publicists and, to a lesser extent, academic scientists rushed to offer their own meaningful content for this term, either economic, (geo)political, cultural or civilizational. Since then, Greater Eurasia has been analyzed at different levels and from different angles: in the context of Russia’s Pivot to the East in early 2010s, integration processes, seamless trade and infrastructure and transport connectivity, the development of a common security architecture and the emergence of new centers of power against the backdrop of the world order multipolarization, as well as a counterweight to the collective West and its colonial mentality. Sometimes the concept of Greater Eurasia is narrowed down to the analysis of Russian bilateral relations with the most prominent Eurasian players such as India, China or Iran, the prospects of regional international associations (EAEU, CSTO, SCO, ASEAN, GCC, etc.) or the situation in a particular subregion (Europe, Middle East, South-East Asia, for example) and its influence on the entire Eurasian space.
Greater Eurasia can be limited geographically in many different ways as well. As it is rightly pointed out, if it includes all the subregions of the Eurasian space, then geographically it will not be much different from the continent of Eurasia itself. Sometimes North Africa is often included in Greater Eurasia, primarily due to its civilizational connectivity with the Middle East. At the same time, Europe is increasingly less often included in the concept of Greater Eurasia, since civilizationally and geopolitically it is viewed as a part of the collective West. Despite the growing interest from the Russian expert community, high level of uncertainty still remains in understanding Greater Eurasia. It is believed to be a construct more metaphysical than geographical, and the borders of its interpretations are flexible and always moving.
Interestingly, but it would be difficult to define Eurasia itself without the adjective Greater. Typically, it has been understood in three possible ways: as the entire Eurasian continent; as a synonym for the Russian Empire/USSR/post-Soviet space, and currently as Eurasian integration under the auspices of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); and finally as a synonym for the Russian civilization in general.
Such uncertainty of (Greater) Eurasia could be explained by the fact that it has never existed as a single civilizational, economic, and political space. Historically, for many centuries, Eurasia was completely perceived dichotomously, not as one whole, but as two separate elements – Europe and Asia, completely different, no matter from what perspective we look at them. It is rightly noted that all the attempts to unite vast territories of the Eurasian continent, to unite the East and the West under one civilizational or political label, albeit on a limited territory, were predominantly associated with violence, whether that be the battles of Alexander the Great, the Muslim conquests, the Crusades, the Mongol invasions, the Napoleonic Wars, colonial conquests of Western countries or Hitler’s Drang nach Osten. Nowadays, the attempts of the United States and European countries to spread their liberal democratic values and traditions of political governance to the large parts of Eurasia with a view to imposing them from outside are often negatively perceived by local players.
A peculiarity of our time for Eurasia (let’s put the twists and turns of the 20th century out of the equation) is that its development is influenced by an extra-regional player, namely the United States. Based on its political culture the US is confident that it is an indispensable nation, responsible for maintaining peace and security in any region of the world including Eurasia. The US engagement in the Eurasian affairs, be it the presence of American corporations and nongovernmental organizations, military bases, alliances, long-established security perimeters, albeit with their time-to-time failures, as well as numerous US military interventions in the countries of the Eurasian continent throughout 20th-21st centuries (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, you name it) make Americans locals (either physically, or mentally, or at times both), who one way or another influence the balance of power in the Eurasian space.
Not surprisingly that Eurasia is now a battlefield for several hybrid wars fought simultaneously. It is quite a typical situation for Eurasia. What is worth remembering is the Great Gamesbetween the British and Russian empires in the 19th century. “When everyone is dead the Great Game is finished”, – wrote Rudyard Kipling in his famous novel Kim[1]. The Great Game in Eurasia is never over.
At home among strangers, stranger at home?
And what about Russia, Eurasia’s largest state, located in its North? Since the establishment of its statehood, Russia has been closely integrated into Europe. Nevertheless, long before Peter the Great, Russian statesmen tried to cut their window to Europe to be a worthy member of the European family. But in the European family Russia has always been a stranger as a result of a combination of factors such as, for example:
- the East-West Schism and the division into Orthodox and Catholic Churches (however, Catholics have been able to get along with Protestants);
- 143-year-long Mongol Yoke (however, the conquests of the Arab Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula or the centuries-long rule of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans did not alter the European identity of the conquered nations);
- long existence of serfdom (although in the West such a violent practice of slavery and colonial enslavement existed for a long period of time);
- Russia’s size (but it has not always been that vast though).
Despite numerous slaps in the face from Europe, Russia has not given up the very idea of being part of it, and many representatives of the Russian high society worshipped Europe as a source of progress, seeking to promote Western norms and values in Russia. More than that, the beliefs of domestic socialists and communists, who desperately struggled with the Western imperialism in 20th century, were based on Western philosophy and the views of their Western predecessors. It is fair to say that everything that came from the West to Russia was inevitably subjected to being russified. Suffice it to recall Friederike Auguste Sophie of Anhalt-Bernburg of Anhalt-Zerbst[2]! Similarly, whatever Russia does, whatever benefits it brings to humanity, has been traditionally perceived through the lens of being born by those Russians.
As the Russian philosopher and publicist of the 19th century Peter Chaadaev wrote in his “Philosophical Letters”, “we are not related to any of the great human families; we belong neither to the West nor to the East…”[3]. To these words sometimes one wants to add: Russia is always torn between the two. Chaadaev himself continued his thought by affirming that “we are an exceptional people”[4]. The 19th century in Russian history was full of disputes about the ways for Russia to develop. The echoes of the debates between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles can be heard to this day. Anyway, since the 1920s there has been a movement of Eurasianism which, broadly speaking, portrays Russia as a unique and identical civilization, incorporating the ethos of both the East and the West.
But is it real? So often in the entire Eurasia Russia seems to be on its own and a bit alien here. Sometimes it very much seems that it is not between the East and the West but above them. It is not surprising that it was Russia that proposed the concept of Greater Eurasia. It reflects the specificity of Russia’s identity and can be viewed essentially as an attempt to stop being torn between the West and the East, or Europe and Asia.
What did Vladimir Putin mean?
It may seem that the concepts of Greater Eurasia and Greater Eurasian Partnership are a kind of a tribute to fashion. How many have there already been the so-called Greaters in Eurasia in the 21st century? Greater Middle East, Greater Central Asia, Greater Europe. All of them were unsuccessful. But should Greater Eurasia be regarded as their true carbon copy?
The initiative of shaping Greater Eurasian Partnership was put forward by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2015-2016. In his speech at the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum in 2016 he underscored the importance of starting the joint work and the prospects of developing the cooperation within the framework of integration structures, such as the Eurasian Economic Union[5]. From his perspective, EAEU could become one of the centers of formation a wider integration network[6]. Vladimir Putin offered to think about the creation of a large Eurasian partnership with the participation of the EAEU, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and other countries, including Europe, and other associations as well[7].
Such a move towards Greater Eurasia could be perceived abroad as a reaction of Russia to the worsening relations with the collective West caused by the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the reunification of Crimea with Russia. But such assessments would not fully correspond with the reality because this concept has matured for so long and has become a manifestation of the evolution of the modern Russia’s Eurasian agenda as well as Russian understanding of the processes taking place in the world and its own place in it.
EAEU as a driver of integration process at the core of Eurasia
In the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept the Greater Eurasian Partnership is portrayed primarily under the label of trade and economic integration, including the strengthening infrastructure and transport connectivity[8]. In this context, the EAEU deserves a special attention.
Russia turned to promoting an integration process in the post-Soviet space already in the mid-1990s. In 2000, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). In 2007, the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia was launched. In 2011, in his preelection article “A New Integration Project for Eurasia – a Future Being Born Today” Vladimir Putin, Russian prime minister at that time, wrote that the Customs Union and the previously proclaimed Common Economic Space could become a foundation for the future formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, a powerful supranational union, capable of becoming one of the modern world centers and at the same time could play the role of a link between Europe and the dynamically developing Asia-Pacific region[9].
In 2014, the Astana agreement on establishing Eurasian Economic Union was signed between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Soon Armenia joined the EAEU. In 2015, Kyrgyzstan became a full-fledged member of the Union as well.
As an element of Greater Eurasia substantially enriching this concept, EAEU is engaged in a variety of trade activities. For example, in 2015 the EAEU and Vietnam signed a free trade agreement (FTA). In 2018, EAEU managed to conclude the same document with China and an interim agreement paving the way to the formation of a free trade area with Iran. In 2019, free trade agreements were reached between the EAEU and Serbia, the EAEU and Singapore. In addition, EAEU continued in 2019 its negotiations with Egypt, Israel, and India on the issues of the FTAs. In 2020, Cuba and Uzbekistan were granted the status of observer states at the EAEU. In 2022, the decision was taken to start talks with the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia on the creation of FTAs.
Eurasian integration has demonstrated high dynamics of development even in the context of negative factors, be it the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trends towards deglobalization and self-isolation, and, what is more important, unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries in the wake of Special Military Operation in Ukraine launched in 2022. Geopolitical tensions and increasing economic pressure on its individual member states led to a 1.6 percent drop in Union’s GDP in 2022[10]. However, already in 2023 EAEU managed to recover its GDP’s sustainable growth[11]. In January-November 2023, the year-on-year industrial output of the Union increased to 103.8 percent[12]. At the end of November 2023, the total number of jobless people registered by specialized unemployment services in the countries of the EAEU, amounted to 804.700 people, an 11.6 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2022[13]. In 2020-2023, the EAEU reached good growth indicators in: GDP – by 4.1 percent; industrial production – by 8.3 percent; agricultural production – by 11.8 percent; and the volume of mutual trade within the EAEU states increased 1.5 times[14]. The portfolio of EAEU country projects remained quite diverse as well.
Among the strategic partners of the EAEU is China, which in contrast to Russia decided to make its Pivot to the West by introducing in 2013 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On May 8, 2015, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping announced the initiative of the cooperation for the conjunction of the EAEU and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) as the both sides ultimately sought to reach a new level of partnership that would create a common economic space across the entire Eurasian continent[15]and wanted to boost further deepening the relations of comprehensive partnership between the two countries in the interests of balanced and harmonious development of the Eurasian region and the world as a whole[16]. China is now the Union’s main external trading partner, accounting for more than 23 percent of the EAEU trade, but there is potential for growth[17].
Privileged conditions were created both for the goods exported from the EAEU countries to Vietnam and for the Vietnamese goods imported by the EAEU member states. Cooperation with Bangladesh is considered by the Union as important and mutually beneficial as well. In 2019, a memorandum of cooperation between them was signed. EAEU has been continuing negotiations on concluding a free trade agreement with Indonesia – the third round of talks was held in December 2023. Steps are being taken to move into the active phase of FTA negotiations with India. The volume of trade between the EAEU and India in 2022 doubled, and in the first six months of 2023 increased by another 90 percent compared to the same period of the last year[18].
EAEU has a good prospect for intensifying cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (on the issues of transport infrastructure in the context of the International North-South Transport Corridor, INSTC) and Oman (in the production of medicines, technology transfer and advanced pharmaceutical development). Recently negotiation process on FTA with Egypt has entered a crucial phase. On December 25, 2023, the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran finally signed the free trade agreement.
Based on the 2018 memorandum and within the framework of the established joint commission, the cooperation between the business communities of the EAEU countries and Cuba is further developing. For example, the sides interact within the framework of the industrial park in the Mariel Special Development Zone. The dialogue with Mexico on expanding the scope of cooperation in the field of agro-industrial complex continues as well. In January 2024, a memorandum of cooperation between the EAEU and Nicaragua was signed.
Also, the EAEU has established a constructive interaction with African countries. Only from January to September 2023, its trade with the African region increased by 34 percent[19]. In particular, exports from the EAEU countries to the African region grew by 40 percent[20].
The EAEU is also proactive in terms of cooperation with intergovernmental associations and international organizations. For example, under the memorandum of understanding, the cooperation in the trade, economic, financial, energy, scientific and technical spheres is being carried out with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). EAEU and SCO pay special attention to the issues of interconnectedness and efficiency of economic transport corridors in Eurasia. The interaction between them is an essential element of the integration agenda in Greater Eurasia, especially in the context of creating barrier-free economic environment, using national currencies in mutual trade, implementing joint projects in transport infrastructure, logistics, etc. The trade turnover of the EAEU with the SCO in 2022 amounted to 270.2 billion dollars, with the exports going up to 157.5 billion dollars and imports up to 112.7 billion dollars[21]. Trade volumes between the two entities grew by 40.3 percent (with the exports up to 56.6 percent and imports up to 22.5 percent)[22]. Besides, trade between the EAEU and BRICS is demonstrating growth as well. According to the results of the first half of 2023, their trade turnover amounted to 150 billion dollars[23]. Thus, the exports of the EAEU countries to the BRICS countries increased by more than 15 percent. EAEU-SCO-BRICS integration link is considered to be rather promising to promote settlements in national currencies and build new logistics and transport routes.
To a lesser extent EAEU interacts with ASEAN. The Russian Pivot to the East, or more precisely to the Asia-Pacific region, which was undertaken during the years of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-2012) (but not because of the Ukrainian events of 2014 as it is sometimes described in the West), ended up with quite modest results. Currently key obstacles for cooperation between both sides include the prioritization of dollar trade by ASEAN, their orientation to Asia-Pacific as well as the lack of common trade infrastructure, problems with foreign trade insurance and logistical difficulties. The dialogue between the EAEU and ASEAN is currently focused more on exchanging experience in integration building. Nevertheless, they achieved strong trade indicators in 2021 when foreign trade turnover of the Union with ASEAN increased by 34.6 percent and amounted to 23.9 billion dollars (exports of the Union rose to 10.2 billion dollars, or 53.5 percent, and imports grew to 13.7 billion dollars, or 23.3 percent)[24]. In 2023, a record level of trade turnover was reached again as it grew by 11 percent year-on-year. The trade of the EAEU is developing much more dynamically with those ASEAN countries which have concluded with the Union a free trade agreement (Vietnam) or a memorandum of cooperation (Singapore, Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia).
Even though it does not set the tone for integration processes in the Greater Eurasia as a whole, Eurasian integration, for sure, contributes to a greater interconnectivity of the countries of the continent. Considering the large number of geopolitical disasters of the last three-four years, it still demonstrates an ability to overcome difficulties, resilience, attractiveness, and high potential for the future. As a Member of the Board (Minister) for Trade of the EAEU Andrey Slepnev (Russia) once said, while the European Union was designed for a good weather (as Europeans themselves say), the EAEU is designed for any weather, including not very good one[25].
But every cloud has a silver lining. As it is broadly recognized, Russia cannot be defeated, Russia can be only destroyed from within. The same can be said about EAEU. The integration under the auspices of the Union has been facing many contradictions and conflicts of interests. As Vladimir Putin once noted, it would be impractical for the members of the EAEU to get ahead of themselves because the integration process within the Union is a delicate matter and everyone’s interests should be taken into account[26]. In the context of internal tensions, it is believed by many practitioners that it would be more than feasible for the EAEU member states to move beyond the Union itself, entering foreign markets and expanding integration network in Eurasia.
Not common and not indivisible security
However, Greater Eurasia is not regarded in Russia as an exclusively integration project. Greater Eurasian Partnership is also viewed from the perspective of peace and security. When and how it is to be achieved is the task even more complex and requires much more advanced conceptualization. The security situation in Eurasia at the moment looks very depressing whichever microregion we take for analysis. Europe has missed its historic chance for common and indivisible security from Lisbon to Vladivostok, preferring NATO’s eastward expansion and Transatlantic solidarity. Bloody conflicts are still tearing apart the Middle East, plunging the region into resource, ethnic and confessional wars risking to turn into limited nuclear war. In the South and East Asia, there are several hotbeds of tension that could lead to armed conflicts. Even some ASEAN countries with their inherent peacefulness are not far from being at odds with some of their neighbors, for example the territorial disputes in the South China Sea speaks volumes in this regard. A special case in the Asia-Pacific is the situation around Taiwan. Of course, it gives us only a bird’s-eye-view of the situation in the region, and this is not the whole story.
In terms of Greater Eurasian Partnership concept high hopes are laid on SCO. It is the largest regional organization on the Eurasian continent that makes it the institutional backbone of the Greater Eurasian Partnership in terms of peace and security but predominantly in its non-military meaning. But the SCO is not an alliance (neither political nor military) or an element of collective security architecture. Its member states have never concluded any non-aggression pact. Besides, despite numerous declarations on the coordination of positions and convergence of approaches to solving international problems, the SCO countries even do not speak with one voice at international forums. Hardly can anyone remember any SCO-sponsored draft resolution proposed to be considered by the United Nations General Assembly (the resolutions on cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization do not count[27]).
Currently SCO consists of:
- 9 member states: China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;
- 3 observer states: Afghanistan, Belarus, Mongolia (in 2022 the process of enhancing the status of Belarus to the level of member states was launched);
- 14 countries as dialogue partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates.
Source: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(https://eng.sectsco.org/20170109/19219)
SCO proved itself as a real game-changer in Eurasia in 2005 when at the Astana Summit it demanded from the US to decide on the date of its military forces withdrawal from Central Asia[28], which had become by that time a front-line zone within the framework of Washington’s Global War on Terrorism and the US War in Afghanistan after 9/11. But how many other motions or initiatives of that kind are there in the track record of this Organization? The crisis in Afghanistan, which is a top priority for SCO, has been not resolved so far. American-led alliances and military bases maintain their existence around the perimeter and in parts of Eurasia strangling and squeezing the whole continent. Does the Organization use its full potential?
Although SCO was originally designed to primarily fight three evils (separatism, terrorism, extremism), in recent years it has increasingly focused on the economic component. Many countries are primarily interested in trying to join China’s economic projects. Yet, there is another approach as well – for some of the states SCO per se is an instrument to off-balance or limit Chinese economic assertiveness. Sometimes it may seem that the Organization embraces the philosophy of keeping friends close and enemies even closer.
But even if it is true, is it bad? The existence and functioning of such an organization composed mainly of Asian countries is a great achievement, considering all the historical peculiarities of interaction in the East. SCO is an excellent example of how countries can coexist even when they look at each other in the context of nuclear deterrence (as India and China or India and Pakistan do), or when they repeatedly engage in armed clashes (as happened with India and China in 2020 on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh). At the same time, SCO has yet to understand what its expectations are in the context of Greater Eurasian Partnership in order to avoid amorphous, demagogic, empty words and extreme anti-Western ideological ties between all the countries involved.
Can the security of Eurasia start with Russia’s military alliances?
Speaking about security and allied obligations in the Greater Eurasia, a few words should be said about the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It was established on
October 7, 2002, by six states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan based on the Collective Security Treaty signed in 1992. Over the years, the Organization has had a lot to worry about. Very often, especially after a geopolitical cataclysm, CSTO has faced with criticisms being accused of failing to provide security effectively. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that since 2002 the CSTO has grown into a strong guarantor of security and stability in Eurasia but not only in the basic area of its responsibility.
Firstly, CSTO enhances sovereignty and military capabilities of six large Eurasian countries located in its three different geographical regions (Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia), whose security depends directly on the military and political situation in the neighboring territories (for example, the situation in Europe is affected by tensions within the Baltic-Black seas conflict system, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia; there are also many challenges coming from the Middle East, or Afghanistan and Pakistan).
Secondly, CSTO develops diversified apparatus to combat transnational threats to security. Over the years of its existence, the Organization have managed to form an extremely comprehensive collective mechanism to dismiss them. It conducts on a systematic basis command-and-staff drills and exercises of collective and regional forces as well as operations to combat drug-trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, illegal migration, crimes in the field of modern information technologies. All these stabilize their domestic political situation and reduce criminal activity within the CSTO’s area of responsibility and beyond.
Thirdly, cooperation with international organizations, as well as with other countries, is one of the priorities of CSTO. By exchanging views and engaging observers in their activities, CSTO is actively sharing its experience in fighting transnational challenges and threats to security and in conflict resolution. In December 2018, in order to develop external relations, CSTO approved the doctrinal foundations of the legal observer status of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly (CSTO PA). This status was designed to provide any interested party, be it a state or an international organization, with the possibility to conduct practical cooperation with CSTO in separate or all areas of its activities. But it has not been fully implemented CSTO so far[29]. At present, there are only three CSTO PA observers: Lower House of the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Would not it be as useful to develop the CSTO-centric net of agreements in the field of security and confidence-building measures in Eurasia (or to collectively promote this idea under the SCO auspices)?
Fourthly, CSTO has all the instruments to combat challenges and threats of non-military nature. In its structure there is Coordinating Council for Emergency Situations (ECC). The main task of ECC is to develop a system of collective response to emergencies and their prevention. Since the mid-2000s CSTO has also been working on creating and strengthening the capacity of their peacekeeping forces formed by the member states for the period of a peacekeeping operation (the Organization systematically conducts their joint military training exercises Indestructible Brotherhood). The CSTO-led peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan in January 2022 gave a chance to prove its effectiveness.
From the very beginning CSTO has played an important deterrent role in the context of the recurrent escalation of conflicts, although its possibilities have always been limited to some certain extent. It would be worthy to pay attention to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. CSTO has made numerous efforts to sober up Armenia and Azerbaijan and put out the heat of the rhetoric between them, declaring support for Armenia in case of a strike on its recognized territory, as well as warning about possible destabilizing effect of openly involving Türkiye or other countries in the conflict. However, the Organization could not deal with Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. That is because Nagorno-Karabakh had never been a part of the CSTO area of responsibility nor a part of Armenia. Moreover, Armenia itself does not recognize its border with Azerbaijan and does not know where it ends. Moreover, CSTO has never classified Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes as an act of aggression by Azerbaijan against the territorial integrity of Armenia (eventually, the CSTO Charter does not provide the definition aggression as well as the notion of assistance in the context of armed attacks; after all, help may take different forms). Routine criticism of Yerevan of CSTO boils down to allegations that the Organization refused to provide Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh with military assistance against Azerbaijan, but is not entirely fair. The attempts of Armenia to block the activities of the CSTO in one way or another or, what is worse, conducting joint military exercises with the US, as it was in September 2023, are not the best manifestations of allied commitments of this country to Russia.
For many years Russia has tolerated such a multi-vector (or better to say multi-faceted) policy pursued by its close CSTO allies. Many times, Russia has turned a blind eye to their flirtations with other players in an attempt to distance themselves from Moscow. None of the CSTO members recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia apart from Russia in 2008. None of the CSTO members, not even Belarus, which in parallel with this Organization is building the Union State with Russia, has recognized the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014. None of the CSTO members (with the exception of Belarus) has declared support for Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022. At best, Russia’s allies have typically demonstrated tacit neutrality. At worst, they have publicly criticized Moscow.
Very often the members of the CSTO do not act concertedly even in matters where they seem to have common interests. It is difficult not to recall in this context the situation at the 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[30]. Some delegates noted the loneliness of the nuclear giant. Actually, none of the Russian allies dared to openly contradict, when the country was criticized by Western countries in a biased consideration of the situation around the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). This was in stark contrast to how united the collective West was. Moreover, it was so strange and incomprehensible considering that CSTO expressed its concerns over the danger to establish a link between proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism already back in 2004[31].
That is not to say that the CSTO countries have not actively made joint statements on the issues of the NPT review process before. In 2014, the members of CSTO called for strict compliance with the provisions of NPT, noting that further steps towards nuclear disarmament required the involvement of all states with nuclear potential in these efforts without any exception. In 2020, the CSTO Permanent Council adopted a Statement on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Holding of the Anniversary Session of the Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[32]. CSTO members reaffirmed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, a reliable basis for advancing towards nuclear and general and complete disarmament, and an effective instrument for promoting peaceful application of nuclear energy. In the Statement they even supported Kazakhstan’s initiative to hold the International Day against Nuclear Tests on August 29. The choice of such a date was a clear reproach to Russia as on August 29, 1949, the USSR conducted its first nuclear weapons test, which, no more, no less, prevented the implementation of American plans of the 1940s and 1950s to A-bomb Soviet cities. For sure, the consultations within CSTO on the NPT review process, as well as on the broad issues of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, periodically take place, but they can be limited to general terms and quite typical words in declaring support to and compliance with NPT and the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime, or in raising concerns on the issues of arms control.
Could you imagine that the US would let their European allies deploy military bases, military personnel or biological laboratories in the territory of another state, or let them be parties to the agreements which Washington rejects, or let their political elite and establishment now and again criticize NATO, or even block the activities of the Organization by ignoring its summits or exercises? These days it seems unbelievable. Unlike the United States, Russia does not know how to make others bow down to it and to impose its own point of view because it might deny the right of its partners to have their own opinion and position. Russia was never a prison of peoples, as Western countries used to portray it. And it is not a prison for its close allies and partners either.
Long-existing dividing lines within CSTO are not the reason to renounce the Organization. It is not a place to promote someone’s vested interests and it is not a Russian mouthpiece for imposition on others of its views, declarations, and propaganda. And it is not only for Russia at all. Despite so much criticism against it both internal and external, CSTO has already proved itself as an effective mechanism to combat common challenges and threats. But it could benefit from building more substantive interaction and coordination of positions in international organizations and at forums as well as from developing external relations with other players that promote security cooperation in Eurasia.
Prospects for Greater Eurasia
Such close attention to EAEU, SCO and CSTO in the context of Greater Eurasian Partnership is not accidental. They are the stronghold of Russia’s Greater Eurasian policy, its basic tools for building Greater Eurasian Partnership. Besides, it allows us to understand its specifics of foreign policy approaches to developing relations with partners. The concept of Greater Eurasian Partnership has often been criticized for lack of specific content, lack of a clear plan of action or at least new ideas. But is it really so much important given that Greater Eurasia is, in fact, a conceptual, philosophical framework for promoting international cooperation in the vast Eurasian space which has never before been common and united?
Greater Eurasia propagates right and important ideas postulates: absence of hegemonic practices; equality and equity; dialogue of civilizations, tolerance, and solidarity; autonomy in determining priorities; primacy of national interests without violating the interests of others; mutual benefit and pragmatism. Unlike other geopolitical structures such as Greater Middle East or Greater Central Asia, Greater Eurasia is not designed to divide the countries in order to rule them. It is not aimed at democratizing someone, by imposing West-oriented development paradigm. It is designed for everyone. It is designed to consolidate a vast heterogeneous continent in recognition of its diversity.
It is now difficult to imagine that Greater Eurasia could become an international legal phenomenon, be it an international organization or an economic or military-political alliance. But there is no need in that at all. The same thing can be said about creating a single Eurasian civilization or a single identity. There is no need to do that because Greater Eurasian Partnership ensures the coexistence of several civilizations, helps to overcome the conflict between them and to get united behind the set of shared values of international communication despite the setbacks of transformational processes in the global arena and despite the current trend for abuse in modern international relations.
It should not seem insufficient. First and foremost, for Russia itself. Russia should avoid large-scale initiatives that deprive it of freedom of action and autonomy, forcing it to dissipate its strength, to be distracted from its internal problems and to do everything in the interests of others. Missionary activities usually lead to obsession. (Neo)colonial experience of the Western countries suggests that civilizational mission sometimes end up in violence. Many episodes in Russian history, especially of the 20th century, testify to the fact that you should not be in the thrall of your own illusions. Besides, Russia should not go to extremes just for the reasons of the moment. Current divorce with the West after many years of trying to be integrated in the Western world is not the reason to become just a part of Asia or to promote Greater Eurasia on an anti-Western platform. Russia does not belong either to the West or to the East. It is on its own. And a result, it is not so much about Russia’s geopolitical self-isolation but rather about its freedom and independence, vast experience of interaction with other states and a high level of empathy that the modern world so much lacks.
It should be noted that the concept of Greater Eurasia is in its essence a cultural and developmental paradigm; it is a paradigm for a multipolar world order in which Eurasia will be a bulwark of peace and security. In this vein it will always be at gunpoint for those who have a different view on the future of humanity or want to use Eurasian space to eliminate their competitors and enemies. So, in decades to come, another round of Great Games in Eurasia will not come to an end. But in order not to end on a Kipling’s Kim-styled pessimistic note, let us recall the famous Fyodor Tyutchev’s quatrain written in 1866:
You will not grasp her with your mind
or cover with a common label,
for Greater Eurasia is one of a kind —
believe in her, if you are able…[33].
[1] Kipling R. Kim. Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1999.
[2] It was the full birth name of Catherine the Great, Empress of the Russian Empire from 1762 to 1796, who abandoned her family and Prussian roots, turned to Christianity despite the opposition of her father, and took a stand against Frederick the Great of Prussia let alone put so many efforts to territorial expansion of the Russian Empire, etc. To say it metaphorically, she was a far more Russian empress than her predecessor and husband, the Russian Emperor Peter III Fyodorovich Romanov.
[3] Чаадаев П.Я. Философические письма : С прил. его письма к Шеллингу, ст. о нем И. Гагарина (S.I.) и отрывка из «Былого и дум» [ч. 4, гл. 30] А. И. Герцена / Пер. с фр. 2, 3 и 4 писем Б. П. Денике под ред. и с предисл. Вл. Н. Ивановского ; П. Чаадаев. – Казань : тип. Д. М. Гран, 1906. 99 с. разд. паг. ; 23. – (Философская библиотека, изданная под общей редакцией приват-доцента Казанского университета Вл. Н. Ивановского ; № 8). – Библиографические сведения о П. Я. Чаадаеве (с. 73-75) // Президентская библиотека. URL: https://www.prlib.ru/.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Пленарное заседание Петербургского международного экономического форума // Официальный сайт Президента России, 17 июня 2016 г. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2023 // Russian Foreign Ministry, March 31, 2023. URL: https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/.
[9] Путин В.В. Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня // Евразийская интеграция: экономика, право, политика, 2011. № 10. С. 10-14.
URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/novyy-integratsionnyy-proekt-dlya-evrazii-buduschee-kotoroe-rozhdaetsya-segodnya.
[10] В ЕАЭС определили основные ориентиры макроэкономической политики на 2024-2025 годы // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 25 декабря 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/v-eaes-opredelili-osnovnye-orientiry-makroekonomicheskoy-politiki-na-2024-2025-gody/.
[11] Страны ЕАЭС вышли на траекторию стабильного роста // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 16 ноября 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/strany-eaes-vyshli-na-traektoriyu-stabilnogo-rosta-/.
[12] Промышленное производство в ЕАЭС выросло на 3,8% в январе – ноябре 2023 года // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 16 января 2024 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/promyshlennoe-proizvodstvo-v-eaes-vyroslo-na-3-8-v-yanvare-noyabre-2023-goda/.
[13] Численность безработных в ЕАЭС сократилась на 11,6% // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 16 января 2024 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/chislennost-bezrabotnykh-v-eaes-sokratilas-na-11-6/.
[14] ЕЭК представила итоги работы за последнее четырехлетие // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 19 января 2024 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eek-predstavila-itogi-raboty-za-poslednee-chetyrekhletie/.
[15] Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks // Official Website of the Russian President, May 8, 2015. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49433.
[16] Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики о сотрудничестве по сопряжению строительства Евразийского экономического союза и Экономического пояса Шелкового пути // Официальный сайт Президента России, 8 мая 2015 г. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4971.
[17] Диалог между ЕАЭС, ШОС и БРИКС поможет выдержать растущее внешнее давление // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 24 мая 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/dialog-mezhdu-eaes-shos-i-briks-pomozhet-vyderzhat-rastushchee-vneshnee-davlenie/.
[18] ЕАЭС продолжает диалог по формированию зоны свободной торговли с Индией // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 22 сентября 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eaes-prodolzhaet-dialog-po-formirovaniyu-zony-svobodnoy-torgovli-s-indiey/.
[19] Сергей Глазьев: «Евразия и Африка становятся новыми центрами мировой экономической активности» // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 6 декабря 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/sergey-glazev-evraziya-i-afrika-stanovyatsya-novymi-tsentrami-mirovoy-ekonomicheskoy-aktivnosti/.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Михаил Мясникович принял участие в саммите глав государств-членов ШОС // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 4 июля 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/mikhail-myasnikovich-prinyal-uchastie-v-sammite-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-shos-/.
[22] Ibid.
[23] ЕЭК предлагает создать современные и надежные системы расчетов между странами ЕАЭС и БРИКС // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 12 сентября 2023 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eek-predlagaet-sozdat-sovremennye-i-nadezhnye-sistemy-raschetov-mezhdu-stranami-eaes-i-briks/.
[24] ЕАЭС и АСЕАН наращивают объемы товарооборота // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 6 сентября 2022 г. URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eaes-i-asean-narashchivayut-obemy-tovarooborota-/.
[25] Андрей Слепнев: «Вызовы, которые мы уже прошли, являются разминкой перед теми вызовами, которые нас ждут» // Евразийская экономическая комиссия, 20 октября 2023 г.
URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/andrey-slepnev-vyzovy-kotorye-my-uzhe-proshli-yavlyayutsya-razminkoy-pered-temi-vyzovami-kotorye-nas/.
[26] Путин не считает целесообразным забегать вперед в интеграции внутри ЕАЭС // ТАСС, 27 октября 2022 г. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/16179045.
[27] See: Генассамблея ООН приняла резолюцию по сотрудничеству с ШОС // ТАСС, 30 августа 2019 г. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6826082; UNGA Adopts a New Resolution Entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” // Shanghai Cooperation Organization, September 8, 2023. URL: https://eng.sectsco.org/20230908/UNGA-adopts-a-new-resolution-entitled-Cooperation-between-the-United-Nations-and-the-Shanghai-954979.html.
[28] Astana Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the SCO, July 5, 2005 // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: https://eng.sectsco.org/documents/?year=2005.
[29] Положение о статусе Наблюдателя при Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности // Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, 24 декабря 2018 г. URL: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/statements/polozhenie_o_statuse_nablyudatelya_pri_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded.
[30] See: Karnaukhova E. Still a Coma? Results of the Last Week of the Tenth Review Conference through the Eyes of Russian Public Diplomacy / The Tenth NPT Review Conference (2022): Chronicle of the Failure Foretold. M.: PIR Press, 2022. – 124 p. – (Security Index Occasional Paper Series). URL: https://pircenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/%E2%84%961-35-2023.-The-Tenth-NPT-Review-Conference-2022-Chronicle-of-the-Failure-Foretold.pdf.
[31] Заявление Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности по вопросам политики в области нераспространения, 2004 // Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности.
URL: http://www.odkb.gov.ru/disarmament/azf.htm.
[32] The CSTO Permanent Council Adopted a Statement on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Holding of the Anniversary Session of the Review Conference on the Treaty // Collective Security Treaty Organization, September 9, 2020. URL: https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/zayavlenie-postoyannogo-soveta-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-po-sluchayu-50-leti/#loaded.
[33] Tyutchev F. You will not grasp her with your mind… (in translation by Anatoly Liberman) // The Penguin Book of Russian Poetry (Penguin Classics). 2015. 480 p.
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