Exclusive Interview
The first week of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT in New York: less pressure, more fatigue, and the same old disagreements. Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy, Senior Researcher in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme at United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, discusses the atmosphere, the chair’s new approaches, and the prospects for the final document.
The interview was conducted by Ms. Alexandra Zubenko, Deputy Director at PIR Center.
Ms. Alexandra Zubenko: How would you assess the atmosphere at this Review Conference compared to the previous PrepCom?
Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy: I wouldn’t draw a direct comparison between PrepComs and Review Conferences – the stakes are quite different. From what we’re hearing out of New York, there’s a certain level of fatigue compared to 2022. At the last Review Conference, there was a strong sense of pressure following the failure of the previous cycle, along with a clear determination to adopt a final document at all costs. After two consecutive failures, that sense of urgency seems to have diminished.
At this stage, the level of engagement from Russia, the United States (under the new administration), and China also appears lower than it was in 2022. At the same time, some concerns – such as the possibility that excessive time would be spent on procedural issues, or that the U.S. might block the Iranian vice-chair candidate and force a vote – have not materialized so far. In that sense, the lower level of engagement from the nuclear-weapon states may not be entirely negative.
Ms. Alexandra Zubenko: The President of the current conference, Ambassador Do Hung Viet, mentioned in an interview with the Arms Control Association that he is trying to take a more creative approach to the “structure of the conference” to help secure a final document. Is this innovation noticeable, and if so, how is it being implemented?
Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy: Ambassador Viet is indeed trying to improve the conference’s efficiency. His efforts include plans to strictly enforce speaking times (even to the point of cutting off microphones), a proposal to avoid establishing subsidiary bodies under the main committees, and an intention to release the first draft of the final document as early as the beginning of the second week.
In practice, however, adjustments are being made. At the request of several member states, subsidiary bodies were ultimately established, though without separate chairs – they will instead be led by the chairs of the respective main committees. So far, over the past days, we haven’t seen microphones being cut off. Finally, it remains to be seen whether the President will manage to present a draft final document in the second week, and what it will look like – particularly given repeated calls during the review process for it to be as concise as possible.
Ms. Alexandra Zubenko: At the last PrepCom, it seemed there was potential for compromise and even the adoption of a standalone document on strengthening the NPT review process. Do you think states parties have the willingness and ambition to reach agreement on this issue at the current Review Conference?
Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy: I’m not sure a standalone document is likely – apart from 1995, the NPT review process has generally been built around balancing different interests within a single final document. That said, I’m confident this issue will be actively discussed in the Third Main Committee and its subsidiary body.
Interest in the topic remains genuine and sustained, as demonstrated by the work of the working group ahead of the first PrepCom. Most delegations agree that the review process could be made more effective. However, the consensus-based decision-making procedure continues to limit the scope for more ambitious reforms.
Ms. Alexandra Zubenko: Based on the first few days, which issues are likely to be the most contentious on the conference agenda compared to the previous PrepCom?
Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy: Broadly speaking, the key issues remain the same: insufficient progress on nuclear disarmament, the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone, the conflict in Ukraine, and nuclear sharing arrangements – both within NATO and more broadly.
A potentially significant factor is the situation surrounding Iran, which has accused the United States of attacks on its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. There are also persistent tensions between the United States and its allies on one side and China on the other, including accusations regarding the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal. These disagreements could have far-reaching implications for the negotiations.
Given that the final document must be adopted by consensus, virtually any state can block its adoption, leaving room for a wide range of possible outcomes.
Ms. Alexandra Zubenko: The issue of negative security assurances seems to have taken a back seat compared to previous PrepComs. Do you agree with this observation, and if so, why might that be?
Mr. Andrey Baklitskiy: I wouldn’t say there have been any major changes in this regard. Negative security assurances have been mentioned in statements by nearly all regional groups and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and calls to codify them in a legally binding instrument remain.
However, in the absence of tangible progress and given the number of other pressing issues on the agenda, it is unlikely that negative security assurances will emerge as a central focus of this conference.
Keywords: NPT; Nuclear nonproliferation; RevCon 2026
NPT
E16/SHAH – 26/05/04
