Exclusive Interview
Considering the evolving international political landscape in global security and the prospects for improving U.S.-Russia relations, we are pleased to present an interview with H.E. Anatoly Antonov, a Professor at MGIMO University and Ambassador of Russia to the United States (2017-2024).
This interview is based on a Q&A session during a seminar held at MGIMO University on February 27, 2025. The seminar, dedicated to the future of U.S.-Russia relations, was conducted as part of the course “Current Issues in International Security” under the MGIMO-PIR Center Master’s program “International Security.” During the meeting, Anatoly Antonov shared his assessment of the current situation and possible scenarios for the development of bilateral relations.
Grace Smith: My name is Grace Smith. I am a graduate student in a dual-degree program between the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, where I’m studying nonproliferation and terrorism, and PIR Center-MGIMO, where I’m focusing on global security, nuclear policy, and nonproliferation. I just want to thank you for taking the time to hear our questions and share your insights. Your perspective is invaluable to me as someone dedicated to understanding the future of arms control, nonproliferation, international security, and, of course, U.S.-Russia relations.
If I may, I have two questions for you. Considering the recent shifts in U.S.-Russia relations under the Trump administration, how do you envision Russia maintaining long-term stability in its diplomatic approach toward the United States, especially given the potential for changes in U.S. leadership and policy direction in the coming years?
My second question is: in light of the ongoing discussions about ending the conflict in Ukraine, how does Russia plan to balance its strategic interests with the need for global cooperation on critical issues such as nonproliferation and counterterrorism? And what role do diplomatic channels between Russia and the United States play in addressing these complex challenges?
Anatoly Antonov: I have already said that we should wait and not rush to draw any conclusions. It is better to wait for concrete actions from the Trump administration on the U.S.-Russia track. We prefer not to discuss this today, and it is understandable why. I once visited a TV station where they told me: “Mr. Antonov, we know you and want to warn you — let’s not criticize the Americans.” That is exactly what I have been saying for a long time. I never criticize anyone; all I do is try to explain and promote Russia’s national interests.
I had to work under Donald Trump’s presidency, and I have said this before and continue to say it: I stood at the airport with tears in my eyes, watching as two U.S. planes took away 200 Russian citizens who had been expelled by that U.S. administration.
At the same time, I was constantly told in the White House that the Republican administration wanted to improve relations with Russia. Unfortunately, Mr. Trump was unable to achieve this. The so-called Deep State and the Democratic Party obstructed and undermined these efforts. I remember the Helsinki summit, sitting at the press conference as the two presidents spoke—when suddenly, I received a message from Washington about how poorly America had perceived Donald Trump’s conversation with Putin. I couldn’t understand — how this could be happening, and why?
That is why I want to say this: I truly believe Mr. Trump. He has considered what happened, and I hope his vision can become reality. He did everything possible to improve relations with Russia, but concrete actions are needed. We will see what response comes this evening or tomorrow morning from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding today’s negotiations in Istanbul.
We have had six properties seized from us. We own a magnificent eight-story red-brick building in San Francisco. I visit it every year, stand there, and see that I am being photographed by unknown individuals. But this is our building — it is Russian property, and it was simply taken from us. On what grounds? I do not understand. They also confiscated the residence of our Consul General in San Francisco and another in Seattle.
I must say — our consulate in Seattle was closed for an absolutely absurd reason. According to the U.S. authorities, Russian diplomats allegedly used mobile phones to gather information about the nearby U.S. naval base. So, are we spies now? The very idea is absurd — diplomats do not engage in such activities. What is even more paradoxical is that I was allowed to transfer all the diplomats from Seattle to our Embassy in Washington. So, were they spies or not?
They also seized our diplomatic retreat on the Chesapeake Bay, where the children of our embassy employees used to attend summer camp. The U.S. side claimed we had set up a “spy center” there. I calmly asked, “Perhaps I am unaware of something, and my colleagues are withholding information from me. Can you provide at least one piece of evidence?” Their response was: “You are the Ambassador, you know everything.” But what exactly do I know? The entire situation is completely unclear.
They took away our trade mission building in Washington — a beautiful structure. What was wrong with it? Why was it confiscated? They also seized our diplomatic property in New York, citing claims that we had allegedly assisted Donald Trump in his election campaign. When Trump was elected, I said, “Well, if we helped him, then return our property to us!” It would only be logical. But there seems to be no logic to these actions.
As for your second question, we have never denied the need for cooperation on nonproliferation and counterterrorism, even in the most difficult times. The conflict in Eastern Europe does not change our readiness to collaborate on these critical issues. Next year, the NPT Review Conference will take place. I have always advocated for the P5 states to work together and not allow bilateral disputes between Russia and the U.S. to overshadow multilateral discussions at such conferences. Unfortunately, the Americans have often used these platforms to undermine our international standing.
I believe it is essential to separate issues of nonproliferation and counterterrorism from the situation in Ukraine.
Alexandra Zubenko: Mr. Antonov, I have two questions on the topic of arms control. First, in 2026, the New START Treaty will expire, and the treaty does not provide for any further extensions. Given the very tight timeline, do you think it is possible for Russia and the U.S. to reaffirm the principles of the New START Treaty?
Second, the Trump administration recently stated — or rather, Trump himself said—that he would like to initiate negotiations on denuclearization. He likely meant disarmament between Russia and China. In your opinion, is a trilateral format for consultations or negotiations between the U.S., Russia, and China possible? And would such a format be beneficial for us?
Anatoly Antonov: I feel like saying: read my interview, where I specifically addressed these questions. Over the past few days, I have closely examined the American press and various studies on what to do after 2026. I can say that the Americans are quite confused.
First, they claim that there is no possibility of extending this treaty, as it can only be extended once. Second, they assume that it is necessary to reach an agreement with Russia to maintain the verification regime. The Americans dream of coming to us — despite the ongoing war against us — accessing the launch silos and checking how many nuclear warheads we have on each delivery system. They are eager to verify us. This was one of the main issues during the talks on the New START Treaty.
Third, they propose something akin to the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which would define the key parameters of U.S. and Russian perspectives on arms control and verification procedures.
It is important to keep one crucial point in mind: every new administration that enters the White House takes several years to conduct a review of military policy. For instance, Joe Biden needed 3.5 years to complete such a review. When I went to the U.S. Department of State and was invited to sit at the negotiation table, I would ask what we were going to discuss and what the American side wanted. There was no response to such a question from the American side.
For Russia, the participation of France and the United Kingdom in the nuclear disarmament process is essential. I have always argued that the era of bilateral agreements has passed. We need to bring the P5 states together at the negotiating table and decide on the next steps.
As an initial proposal, it would be sensible for the entire P5 to agree on not increasing their nuclear arsenals. Is this possible? So far, it seems unlikely, given that China continues to expand its nuclear potential and considering the fact that the United States views China as its strategic adversary.
Perhaps the idea I am proposing now is unrealistic, but saying nothing and doing nothing simply because an idea may seem unfeasible would be wrong. Finally, we must remember that Russian President Vladimir Putin has mentioned this issue multiple times in the context of concrete security guarantees. What we need are legally binding guarantees.
Key words: International Security; Russia-US; Strategic Stability
RUF
F4/SOR – 25/03/12
