Exclusive Interview
The situation in the Middle East is changing drastically every day. Following the stalemate in the Islamabad negotiations, Pakistan augmented its forces deployed in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt continue to attempt to persuade the U.S. and Iran to hold another round of talks, as Middle Eastern powers are deeply concerned about the prospect of ongoing escalation and the erosion of security guarantees. Would middle powers like Egypt seek new security guarantees akin to the SMDA? Ms. Monica William, international relations analyst, answers these and other questions in an exclusive interview for PIR-Center.
The interview was conducted by Mr. Maksim Nosenko, PIR Center intern.
Mr. Maksim Nosenko: Does the SMDA reveal the new trend of cooperation between middle powers in the sphere of security?
Ms. Monica William: The Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) can indeed be interpreted as part of a broader and accelerating trend of cooperation among middle powers in the sphere of security. What is unfolding in September 2025 reflects that it is not an ad hoc realignment, but rather a structured and pragmatic reordering of alliances driven primarily by hard security interests, economic resilience, deterrence capability, and regime survival. This transformation is best understood through the lens of Realism, which places the state, its survival, and the maximization of power at the center of international politics.
At the core of this shift lies a growing vacuum of trust in traditional security guarantees, the perceived decline in the credibility and consistency of American commitments exacerbated by abrupt regional developments and a more selective engagement strategy, which has compelled several states, especially in the Gulf, to reassess their reliance on a single security patron. In response, they are increasingly pursuing diversified and flexible partnerships capable of delivering immediate and tangible deterrence. The rapid conclusion of the Saudi–Pakistan agreement exemplifies how quickly such alignments can materialize as confidence in legacy alliances erodes.
Equally important is the role of acute security shocks in accelerating convergence between states. Strategic surprises and escalating regional threats often serve as catalysts for fast-tracked defense cooperation. In this context, the Saudi–Pakistan alignment emerged amid heightened regional tensions, including perceived Iranian threats and broader instability. Such dynamics reinforce a core realist assumption: states are more likely to align when confronted with shared or converging threats. The SMDA, therefore, is not only a bilateral arrangement but a manifestation of a wider pattern in which middle powers act swiftly to hedge against uncertainty and vulnerability.
Moreover, the agreement highlights a deepening interdependence between economic and security interests, which can be described as a “money-for-security” equation. Wealthy states with substantial financial resources seek advanced military capabilities and strategic depth, while states with established defense infrastructures and geopolitical leverage pursue economic support and investment. The Saudi-Pakistan partnership illustrates this reciprocal logic with particular clarity: Riyadh enhances its deterrence posture and strategic autonomy, while Islamabad secures critical financial inflows and political backing. This fusion of economic and security incentives is increasingly characteristic of contemporary middle-power cooperation.
A notable dimension of the SMDA is its shift from long-standing strategic ambiguity to a degree of partial transparency. For decades, Saudi-Pakistani relations were understood to involve implicit security understandings, including speculation regarding nuclear guarantees, without formal acknowledgment. The recent agreement, however, signals a more explicit articulation of these arrangements, including references direct or indirect to a nuclear umbrella. Yet, this transparency remains incomplete, leaving key operational questions unresolved: the conditions under which such guarantees would be activated, and the extent of coordination mechanisms between the two sides. This calculated ambiguity allows both parties to enhance deterrence while preserving strategic flexibility.
Finally, the timing and signaling of the agreement carry important geopolitical messages. These signals gain additional significance amid the ongoing war in Gaza and the increasing domestic pressures across the Arab world, which constrain overt alignment with certain regional configurations.
Hence, the SMDA reveals a broader trend: middle powers are no longer passive recipients of security but are increasingly proactive actors in their own deterrence networks.
Their cooperation is less ideological and more transactional, less hierarchical and more flexible, marking a shift toward a more multipolar and interest-driven security order.
Pakistan’s response to Saudi requests for support in confronting Iranian attacks reflects a carefully calibrated strategy shaped by structural constraints and strategic priorities, rather than a lack of willingness; while coordination between Asim Munir and Khalid bin Salman signals political alignment, it does not necessarily imply readiness for direct military engagement. First, domestic constraints remain decisive, as Pakistan’s sectarian composition, particularly the presence of a significant Shia population, renders any confrontation with Iran politically sensitive and potentially destabilizing, pushing Islamabad to prioritize internal stability. Second, regional geopolitical pressures further limit options, given Pakistan’s shared border and interdependence with Iran, as well as its primary strategic focus on India, which discourages opening an additional conflict front. Third, in line with Realism, Pakistan is likely to pursue a strategic balancing approach through a dual-track policy providing intelligence and technical support to Saudi Arabia while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Tehran to avoid escalation. Finally, escalation remains conditional, as Pakistan may expand its role only in scenarios involving existential threats to Saudi Arabia or severe disruptions to critical energy supplies, though even then its involvement would likely remain cautious and indirect.
Mr. Maksim Nosenko: Would countries like Egypt now be interested in obtaining similar security guarantees from Pakistan or other countries, in particular with the option of nuclear deterrence?
Ms. Monica William: Based on a close reading of Egypt’s foreign and defense policy, it cannot be argued in a definitive or conventional sense that Egypt requires Pakistani support to achieve nuclear deterrence. This is primarily due to legal, strategic, and doctrinal constraints that define Cairo’s position within the international nonproliferation regime, despite observable military cooperation patterns between the two countries.
Egypt has been a long-standing signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1968 and has consistently advocated for the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. Its nuclear trajectory is explicitly framed around peaceful applications of nuclear energy, most notably through its cooperation with Russia on the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant project, which represents a cornerstone of Egypt’s civilian nuclear ambitions.
In terms of security doctrine, Egypt’s deterrence posture is not based on nuclear capability in the military sense, but rather on a strong conventional military establishment. Since 2014, Egypt has significantly upgraded its armed forces through diversified procurement strategies that combine Western, Russian, and French systems. This includes platforms such as the F-16, Mi-26 helicopters, and Rafale fighter jets, as well as domestically developed and imported missile systems, reflecting a broad and balanced force structure.
Egypt’s broader strategic orientation is defined by a “balanced hedging strategy,” whereby it diversifies its international partnerships to avoid overreliance on any single power. This is evident in its simultaneous engagement with Russia on defense and nuclear energy, China on economic development, and other regional and international actors on security coordination. Within this framework, Egypt’s deterrence model is increasingly characterized as “modified deterrence,” in which military capability is used as a political tool to prevent conflict rather than to initiate it.
This doctrine is reflected in Egypt’s expanding military modernization agenda, which includes developing infrastructure such as new military bases, enhancing force readiness, and expanding domestic defense industrial capacity. Egypt has increasingly focused on localizing arms production, including armored vehicles, anti-tank systems, and naval vessels, and has announced indigenous unmanned aerial vehicles showcased at defense exhibitions such as EDEX 2023. These developments signal a gradual shift toward self-reliance in key defense sectors.
So, finally, Egypt’s evolving deterrence strategy is embedded in what analysts describe as modified deterrence, which emphasizes optimizing available capabilities to achieve strategic objectives without direct military confrontation. This approach prioritizes flexibility, multi-dimensional power projection, and compliance with international norms, while still ensuring credible deterrence.
In parallel, Egypt has expanded its security cooperation frameworks, including defense agreements, memoranda of understanding, and increased military engagement in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa. These initiatives reflect an effort to stabilize its strategic environment through influence, cooperation, and capacity-building rather than through nuclear capability or direct escalation.
Keywords: Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Strategic stability; Middle East
RUF
E16/SHAH – 26/04/24
