The world development today is influenced by two multidirectional trends. On the one hand, the desire of the majority of countries to build a multipolar equal system of relations. On the other hand, the former “hegemons” do not want to give up their positions and cling to the old, decrepit foundations of the old world order, dragging countries into ventures fraught with unpredictable consequences. The latest alarming events include unprovoked US strikes on Iran, some NATO countries’ obsession with inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, Western countries’ desire to further support the rotting regime in Kiev, which is drowning in the abyss of a hopeless war, and vain attempts to preserve the bleeding hotbed in eastern Europe, where Slavs are dying.
Such incidents make us think once again about the serious issues facing the world and the quality of the international system within which we live. Drawing on the discussions held at the timely and interesting XI International Forum Primakov Readings, recently organized by IMEMO RAS, I would like to present nine theses and one remark that are far from uncontroversial.
First. The main task of the current stage of international relations is to strengthen global strategic stability. This is of the utmost importance given the escalating confrontation between nuclear powers. A report issued a few days ago by the highly regarded Stockholm-based think tank SIPRI suggests that the nuclear arms race is intensifying while the global community is losing interest in arms control. However, the document reveals an increasing tendency to build up nuclear arsenals and escalate nuclear rhetoric. This state of affairs cannot but worry every sensible politician. The research institute’s figure of a total global stockpile of around 12,241 nuclear warheads raises serious concerns about the future of the world.
Second. Of particular concern are the provocative steps taken by certain nuclear-armed states to deploy military capabilities near the borders of other nuclear powers, such as Russia and China. The use of forces and means within the framework of Conventional Prompt Strike concept to solve strategic tasks cannot be ruled out. The realization of the “Golden Dome” concept would further aggravate the situation in terms of strategic stability. I would like to emphasize that the concerns expressed by the Russian President, Vladimir V. Putin, at the end of 2021, and set out in two Russian draft documents addressed to the United States and NATO countries, continue to be ignored. These documents underline the need for our country to obtain ironclad security guarantees.
Third. Joint efforts are needed to address the urgent challenges to international security. The Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, issued on May 8, 2025 provides a useful source of concrete ideas. I note that this document outlines the two great powers’ approaches to this issue, both of these countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It would be appropriate to organize international support for the ideas presented. At the very least, we should draw additional attention to this statement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This document would also be useful in New York. There is an obvious need for open debates on Russian and Chinese approaches to preserving peace and strengthening international security. Such debates could be held in Moscow and Beijing, as well as at influential international venues in Geneva and New York.
Fourth. The next Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place next year. The focus will be on the long-standing issues of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Currently, the likelihood of reaching an agreement on a final document is extremely low. Israeli and US strikes on Iran, primarily on the its nuclear infrastructure, raise additional questions about the role, effectiveness and prestige of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is a respected, authoritative and universally recognized organization responsible for monitoring the peaceful nuclear activities of NPT member states.
It seems that we already have the notorious experience of brandishing a test tube at the UN Security Council. The result was a devastating strike on the Middle East. Then they recognized it was a mistake. But who was happy about that? Now, in the context of Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA is distrusted again. I would like to emphasize that the Agency’s documents contain no facts regarding Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons.
The time has come to decide whether we will continue to rely on the IAEA’s assessments, or the decision regarding NPT compliance will once again be made by those with the most powerful military capabilities.
Then who will be next to suffer the fate of Iraq and Iran? Clearly, under the pretext of proliferation issues, there is an attempt to solve problems, including old ones, in the Middle East.
A few additional points should be added to the narrative of the crisis in the Middle East. Despite the region’s multifaceted contradictions, it is important to address the idea of a WMD-Free Zone once again. It seems that it is time for Israel to take a step toward the international community’s aspirations by first joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Then, it should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state and bring its nuclear activities under IAEA control; especially given the victory speeches from Israel telling about the defeat of its main enemies. Maybe it is now time for West Jerusalem to pay closer attention to calls for joint steps to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery? The nuclear powers’ positions on this issue before the NPT Review Conference, where this topic will be discussed quite loudly are extremely interesting
Fifth. The New START Treaty expires on February 5, 2026, while it cannot be extended. Proposals by American political analysts and former officials to retain only the verification regime from the current treaty are unacceptable. Ideas about negotiating an updated version of the bilateral agreement that would establish lower arms ceilings are not feasible in the near future. The point is that the review process of the Donald Trump administration’s strategic documents has not yet been finalized. We would also have to consider the issues of strategic nuclear weapons in light of the past 15 years and the current international situation. Thus, there is no quick solution to reaching legally binding agreements. This situation will negatively impact the environment surrounding the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Despite the unfavorable international situation, I firmly believe that the prospect of arms control remains. Experience has shown that national security can be strengthened through treaty-based legal mechanisms and instruments, not only by building up defense capabilities. Even in the current circumstances, I note that there are possible options, including interim ones, for preserving the bilateral format of nuclear arms control. We cannot rule out historical examples of agreements achieved between Moscow and Washington, including politically binding ones. The main factor is political will.
Sixth. The arms control process requires impetus from the international community. It is based on a call for nuclear-weapon states to reconsider their Cold War approaches and move toward a policy of equal diplomacy. The goal is to prevent dangerous miscalculations and actions that could further undermine strategic stability. Joint actions should promote the elimination of the threat of direct military confrontation, as well as reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.
Seventh. It is time for all nuclear-weapon states to be actively involved in nuclear arms control negotiations as part of their obligations under the NPT. I emphasize that these are negotiations, as outlined in Article VI of the NPT. It should be more than rare discussions and annual statements by the P5 representatives. It should be real negotiations with a defined subject matter and format for joint work.
Eighth. Resuming face-to-face discussions among non-governmental experts on arms control and nonproliferation is very important and useful. If Swiss colleagues return to their previously highly respected neutral and impartial position, it would be good for them to organize a meeting of P5 experts to resume a conversation on the prospects for the five-party nuclear arms control process. The results of this work will certainly be in demand when real negotiations begin. To be frank, in 2009, when we were working on elaborating the New START Treaty, we clearly lacked such momentum.
Ninth. In these explosive times, with all the global contradictions between Russia, the United States, and other NATO members, I firmly believe that the art of diplomacy is in demand to reduce international tensions. Clearly, it will take years to change the Russophobic atmosphere in America and Europe, especially in Congress. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the majority of the international community recognizes that it will only benefit if Russian-American relations improve or normalize. Everyone is looking in that direction. Many hope that Donald Trump’s positive words about Russia will manifest as concrete actions in Washington’s approach to Moscow. I would not want a repeat of the situation during the first term of the current American president.
Now, regarding the remark mentioned at the beginning of the article. I would like to address some potential criticisms of the presented theses. What kind of nuclear arms control are we talking about? Western countries have unleashed a proxy war against us and dream of Russia’s strategic defeat. Some might say: how any serious negotiations on strategic stability, especially on nuclear issues, be conducted under these conditions? It is not wise to trust “colleagues” given their unscrupulous policies. I will try to elaborate my thoughts.
Firstly, the history of Soviet/Russian-American relations has shown the usefulness of bilateral agreements, despite the known examples of negative behavior of the partners
Secondly, there were times when conversation partners claimed to have been deceived. Incidentally, such offensive words were also used prior to the start of the Russian-American negotiations on the New START Treaty in 2009. It was a kind of unnecessary fear, even a fear of opponents. For my part, I have always resolutely opposed such panic-inducing thoughts. In practice, I have proven that we are at least as knowledgeable and skilled at negotiating as the Americans. We can achieve favorable for Russia results too. The results of concluding the New START Treaty clearly confirm this. We have nothing to fear. Instead of waiting for Washington to pull us into negotiations favorable to the United States, we should take a proactive stance. Furthermore, our opponents’ interests are already o a large extent clear.
Thirdly, I would like to refer to documents from the time of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States. Recently, I have read Henry Kissinger’s memorandum to President Richard Nixon regarding the results of his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. In essence, there are two ways to build a dialogue with the USSR. The first was to negotiate under the conditions of the Cold War and mutual confrontation to compartmentalize “the sphere of common interests from the spheres of their clash.” If it succeeded, it would improve relations.
The second way was to first accumulate positive developments in bilateral relations, and then reach agreements on reducing tensions. Henry Kissinger adhered to the first option. Even in the current circumstances, this approach seems preferable.
Fourth, we need arms control and a strengthened nonproliferation regime, just like the United States. However, on these issues, I believe, Russian representatives should speak from the position of a stronger and wiser participant in the international process. Despite Russian well-known initiatives being often rejected by Western countries, we need to consider a positive program on international security.
While working at the Ministry of Defense, my colleagues and I presented these kinds of ideas to NATO.
Instead of arguing, we suggested taking concrete, constructive actions to reduce tension. I remember the surprise and confusion on the officials’ faces.
The result was a scare and a demonstration of an unwillingness to engage in constructive cooperation. It is important to note that Russian military diplomats did not close themselves off from cooperation with representatives of an unfriendly bloc, but rather NATO officials hid in the bushes.
I realize that the same situation may happen again this time. However, nothing happens out of the blue, and gutta cavat lapidem. Such Russia’s position will be yet another demonstration of its focus and readiness for equal cooperation based on international law and the principle of equal and indivisible security.
This op-ed first appeared at the Kommersant Daily on June 25, 2025. (Translated from Russian by PIR Center).
Key words: Arms control; Strategic Stability; Russia-USA
AC
E16/SHAH – 25/07/01
