Can security be ensured by risky escalation? In 2015, in his perceptive article Matthew Kroenig warned that Russia’s revisionist steps were undermining the institutional security architecture in Europe, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Kroenig wrote: “Russia’s reported test of an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile is a blatant violation of the INF Treaty… [Russian] intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles also happen to be perfectly suited to keep Western European NATO allies at bay, while Russia makes moves against its Eastern European neighbors”[3]. Kroenig’s article presciently foreshadowed the increased in 2019 US accusations of Russia in revisionist actions, exemplified, among other things, by the alleged violation of the INF Treaty[4].
These views are shared by a larger body of literature on international relations that regards the demise of the INF Treaty as yet another revisionist move of Russia[5]. More broadly, the literature on Russian studies points to its revisionist foreign policy towards the West[6]. Meanwhile, Russian government[7] and experts suggest that the US can also be blamed for a similar revisionism of prior commitments. As Dr. Alexey Arbatov explains, “Russia’s concerns should be addressed. Moscow claims that US missile defense launchers for Standard-2 interceptors deployed in Romania and Poland could be used to launch offensive Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles, which are deployed on US surface ships with the same Mk-41 launchers as the Standard anti-missiles”[8].
This chapter portrays crises as unconsciously routinized endeavors that provide ontological security to the actors involved. The demise of the INF Treaty, which was once a cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, can serve as an example.
But what if both parties abandoned the INF Treaty because further preservation of the validity of the Treaty would make it more anxiety-inducing than anxiety-reducing? The notion that even perilous routines can provide ontological security is not novel in the problematization of ontological security. Jennifer Mitzen discussed this concept in her work as early as 2006[9]. However, while Mitzen’s research is identity-oriented, we take a more practical approach to the problematization of ontological security. By integrating practices into the study of ontological security, we aim to show how escalation becomes an unconscious and self-evident pathway towards a predictable and psychologically preferable situation for those involved in a crisis[10].
To understand how crises function as a source of ontological needs for actors, we employ the vocabulary coined by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Specifically, we use the term field to refer to the institutional environment of practices, and the term habitus to describe the disposition of actors. In this context, the primary goal of escalatory practices is to establish ontological security which may not correlate with physical security and just implies the existence of stable and solid fora. We argue that the INF Treaty as a field has become an ontological threat to both the United States and Russia because the development of key missile technologies and the rise of China’s military posture changed the parties’ habitus.
Theorizing and practicing ontological security
Jennifer Mitzen argues that the pursuit of security is a “social practice that involves identity” emerging between states as an interstitial phenomenon[11]. Zarakol suggests that the “reformulation of state identity to represent a group of people who are both capable and apologetic about it” leads to feelings of “shame because they lived in semi-civilized or barbaric states”[12].
Securitizing identity is investigated by examining the maintenance of non-controversial autobiographical narratives of the self which preserve ontological security in various contexts. For instance, Jef Huysmans’ work explores the ways states perceive internal others as threats to self-identity, as they challenge the predictability and continuity of a state’s self-identity[13]. Further studies within this logic focus on migrants and their potential securitization[14]. Brent Steele’s research investigates a state’s notion of self and its ability to construct compelling autobiographical narratives[15]. Katarina Kinnvall[16] examines how nationalism and religion provide states with powerful narratives and beliefs that offer simple answers to state identity in a rapidly globalizing environment. Filip Ejdus[17] discusses the disruption of Serbia’s self-narrative by Kosovo’s independence declaration. Lastly, Raphael Leduc[18] argues that foreign fighters pose a significant ontological threat to authorities by challenging concepts of loyalty, societal cohesion, and the state as a singular international entity.
In this section, we endeavor to reconcile the notion of ontological security with research on practices, examining the literature in order to discern how ontological security is perceived as an objective for mundane interactions through practices. Ontological security, as posited by Anthony Giddens[19], refers to an individual’s sense of continuity and coherence in their identity and experiences, which allows them to navigate the complexities of everyday life with relative ease. This sense of security is shaped by routine interactions and practices that provide a stable framework for individuals to make sense of themselves and their social environments.
In his seminal work on ontological security Anthony Giddens established the foundation for theorizing practices as a source of ontological security. He posited that “the maintenance of habits and routines constitutes a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties”[20]. From Giddens’ perspective, it is these disciplining routines that foster a sense of Self in an individual and subsequently constitute the psychological architecture that facilitates seamless functioning in the world[21]. He asserts that ontological threats engender “a set of circumstances which – for whatever reason – radically disrupt accustomed routines of daily life”[22].
Vincent Pouliot integrates Bourdieu’s sociology into international political studies, offering a critique of representational bias in international relations. Pouliot contends that instrumental rationality (as found in realist literature), norm-following[23], and communicative action[24] are ontologically prioritized by practical knowledge due to its position at the intersection of agent and structure. Our analysis draws upon the framework proposed by Vincent Pouliot, who conceptualizes practices as socially meaningful patterns of activities[25]. The most pertinent domain of study in the context of practice theory in international relations (PTIR) encompasses historically established, symbolically meaningful diplomatic practices, such as pre-modern practices of the Iroquois tribes[26], diplomatic practices within the EU,[27] the UN[28], and NATO[29].
It is important to shed light on the basic concepts surrounding practices, namely Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus. Field is the social space of practices. It encompasses power relations[30], struggle and the matter of struggle[31] as well as the rules of the game shared by the players[32]. The second category, habitus, is responsible for the source (integrating past experience, perceptions and roles) of patterned practices. Vincent Pouliot and Iver Neumann refer to habitus as grammar that allows for action in a certain way, i.e., the formation of patterned practices in conjunction with the field[33]. Both habitus and field are structural concepts when analyzing the game of practices between actors (and applying the constructivist agent-structure dilemma)[34], with field being the institutionally organized topography of such interaction, and habitus being the language determined by this topography. The field structures the habitus, yet habitus contributes to the constitution of the field and may render it irrelevant when changed dramatically. For instance, why should North Korea continue to engage in the field of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when its disposition, stemming from the acquired nuclear missiles, has changed dramatically? Researchers analyze the habitus of decision-makers in security communities[35] on the eve of and during military operations[36], in diplomacy[37], or how habitusdetermines a state’s position on particular historical issues[38].
INF Treaty as the objective of ontological security
We hypothesize that an ontological threat arises when a shifted habitus no longer corresponds to the field in which parties are actively engaged. Consequently, the process of systemic delegitimization of the field paves the way for formulating a new social field that aligns seamlessly with the shifted habitus. As we argue, this was precisely the case with the delegitimization of the INF Treaty conducted by both parties. Prior to this escalation, however, the INF Treaty functioned as a new social field for parties seeking alignment with the emerging détente-oriented habitus, reflecting a shift towards new political thinking and reduced tensions. How did this become possible?
The 1980s marked the pinnacle of a military-political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The parties’ habitus entrenched in both the Ronald Reagan administration (1981-1989), dominated by Cold War hawks, and Andropov’s[39] Politburo, favored escalation as the sole viable option, in line with their ontological security. Paradoxically, they felt ontologically secure despite the physical risks of escalating to the brink of a nuclear conflict. In February 1977, the USSR deployed 300 SS-20 Saber missiles, each carrying three multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Positioned just minutes away from the targets in Western Europe, these missiles threatened to deliver a decapitating strike on the NATO headquarters and the entire European infrastructure of the alliance. In response, the NATO Council adopted a double-track decision in December 1979 to negotiate an agreement with the USSR while simultaneously preparing for the deployment of the US Pershing II missile defense system in Western Europe. In March 1983, president Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, prompting the Soviet Union to deploy SS-12 and SS-23 operational-tactical systems in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and to move nuclear submarines closer to the US Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Amid escalating tensions, both nations conducted major military exercises, with the US Pacific Fleet practicing simulated attacks on Soviet nuclear submarines, and Moscow coordinating large-scale exercises with the Warsaw Pact countries, including a general mobilization rehearsal.
The situation changed dramatically when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. He argued that “Security cannot be built forever on (deterrence)….to say nothing of the absurdity and immorality of a situation when the world becomes a nuclear hostage, and these doctrines encourage the arms race that could sooner or later get out of control”[40]. Brian Frederking demonstrates how the shift in the Soviet government’s political course, which was not met with unequivocal approval within the Politburo, ultimately altered the Soviet habitus towards a pro-détente one[41]. This change necessitated the synchronization with the social space of interaction between the USSR and the USA. At the 27th Communist Party Congress, the Soviets proposed an international collective security system encompassing non-aggression, disarmament, self-determination, and equal economic security. This concept mirrored Western Europe’s non-offensive defense. Soviet proposals on disarmament and regional development appealed to Western Europe as an alternative to deterrence.
Historian Vladislav Zubok argues that Reagan, viewing Gorbachev as an opportunity for détente, transformed from a Cold War knight into a staunch disarmament advocate. This change in habitus required a corresponding shift in the institutional field to ensure ontological security for both parties[42]. By September 1987, the US and the USSR had agreed to address intermediate-range and cruise missile issues based on the Global Zero formula which called for complete destruction of these weapons rather than their withdrawal from Europe. Signed in December 1987, the INF Treaty institutionalized a field of controlled military rivalry between the USSR and the US. Under its terms, the parties committed themselves to destroying all land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5.500 km within three years, including missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the USSR. This Treaty marked the first instance of an agreement to completely eliminate an entire class of existing nuclear weapons.
The INF Treaty incrementally becomes an ontological threat
This section examines the shifting dispositions of Russia and the US following the end of the Cold War. Firstly, we will explore how the US pursued missile defense deployment in Europe, as well as the development of target missile programs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which altered Russia’s habitus with regard to the INF Treaty. Secondly, with respect to the US perception of the field, we will concentrate on two pivotal issues: the American habitus transformation in relation to Russia’s 9M729 missiles and the evolution of China’s missile program.
By the end of 2001, the US policy had undergone a significant shift in its approach to ABM systems. While previously it had been considered an element of bipolar confrontation, at that point the US began to perceive ABM as a self-defense tool against terrorists and rogue states after having transitioned from the concept of mutually assured destruction to cooperation with Russia. Consequently, the 1972 ABM Treaty was losing relevance for the United States[43].
Despite Russia’s warnings of a possible INF Treaty withdrawal in response to the US departure from the ABM Treaty, Moscow’s reaction was composed. Vladimir Putin labeled the US decision as wrong yet predictable, adding that Russia possessed the means to counter enemy missile defense systems. As a result, ongoing consultations, and dialogue on strategic arms reduction, along with the US assurances that the decision did not threaten Russia’s national interests, helped avoid a crisis[44].
The issue of ABM systems resurfaced when the US decided to deploy missile defense systems in Europe. Initially, the project involved the deployment of silo-based interceptor missiles in Poland and the construction of a radar in the Czech Republic. Russia expressed concern about these plans and threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty. The US Defense Department officials countered them arguing that the system was not meant to threaten Russia and could not intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which outnumbered the planned interceptors[45].
In 2009, the Obama administration (2009-2017) replaced this program with the Phased Adaptive Approach[46]. The first phase, completed by 2012, involved the construction of a radar in Turkey, a command center in Germany, and deployment of American missile cruisers armed with the Aegis missile defense system and SM-3 interceptor missiles to the Mediterranean Sea. The second stage (by 2016) saw the Aegis Ashore interceptor missile complex deployed at the Deveselu base in Romania[47]. A similar complex is scheduled to become operational in late 2023 in Poland at the Redzikowo base[48]. An SM-3 Block IIA missile successfully intercepted an ICBM over the Pacific Ocean during a November 2020 test[49].
Russian leaders had repeatedly insisted that missile defense in Europe posed a threat to its ICBMs[50], which could be intercepted in the boost phase, and that such targets would be within the range of Russian theater-range missiles (up to 500 km). However, while Redzikowo is within reach, Deveselu located far from Russian borders can only be targeted by missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty. Another point of contention for the Russian leadership is the use of multi-purpose Mk-41 launchers at these sites, capable of launching not only SM-3 interceptor missiles but also medium-range Tomahawk sea-based missiles.[51] While sea-based missiles were not regulated by the INF Treaty, Russia regarded the placement of Mk-41s at missile defense sites as a grave violation of the Treaty[52]. US representatives argued that the type of launchers deployed in Romania and planned for Poland differed from the naval version and had never been tested with Tomahawk missiles and thus could not violate the INF Treaty[53].
Problems of target missiles and UAVs
Since 1999, Russia has been raising concerns about the US using target missiles for developing intermediate-range missile technology arguing that they test weapons delivery vehicles[54]. The US contends that these missiles are designed solely for research and development purposes and thus do not violate the Treaty[55]. Russia also maintained that US drones violated the INF Treaty, calling them de jure cruise missiles[56]. US officials argued that drones were not missiles, but platforms for delivering weapons, more akin to aircraft than missiles[57].
The Russian 9M729missile
The 9M729 cruise missile was a primary focus of US criticism. At a Senate Hearing, it was described as part of a renewed arsenal of “new Russian ground-, sea-, and air-based nuclear or dual-capable delivery systems that […] are coming online in support of a Russian nuclear doctrine […] that emphasizes […] both coercive and military uses of nuclear weaponry”[58]. On January 23, 2019, during the briefing organized in response to the US concerns, Mikhail Matveevsky, Head of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Russian Armed Forces, highlighted that the missile is an upgraded version of the 9M728 missile, with a range of 490 km, higher accuracy, and a more powerful warhead. The missile had never been tested at a greater range[59].
For the first time, the cruise missile was shown to the participants, and the information about its design and specifications was provided[60]. The US declined to attend the briefing. According to an American diplomat Andrea Thompson, a static exhibit would not allow for determining the missile’s characteristics. This could only be achieved through testing “under conditions that the Russian military has no control over”[61]. The US representatives responded to Russian claims about the missile’s flight range asserting that these statements were false and that the 9M729 could have been developed based on the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile with a range of up to 2.500 km[62].
In November 2018 the US Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats reiterated that the 9M729strongly resembled other similar missiles but was tested from fixed launchers at a range of more than 500 km. It was then tested from mobile launchers at a range of less than 500 km, with claims that this was the maximum range[63]. The Russian leadership denied the accusations adding that they did test missiles with ranges of more than 500 km, but these were of other classes.
Chinese missiles
While in 2000 the Pentagon deemed China’s armed forces archaic, by 2013 the US National Air and Space Intelligence had already recognized that “China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world”[64]. In 2020, the US military acknowledged China’s significant advancement in combat capabilities even surpassing the US in several areas including the navy, air defense systems, and land-based missiles[65].
During the first half of the 2010s, the US expert community were debating the relevance of the INF Treaty in light of China’s growing medium-range missile capabilities, which threatened US allies and their power projection in Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region[66]. In April 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the US Armed Forces in the Pacific, said at a congressional hearing that the INF Treaty restrictions provided a huge advantage to China[67]. China’s accession to the Treaty would lead to the elimination of 95 percent of its missiles[68], while the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty would help counterbalance China’s increased military posture, as land-based systems are more cost-effective than warships and can be rapidly expanded if needed[69]. Upon leaving the INF Treaty, the US planned to consult with its allies to initiate the deployment of new land-based missiles to Asian countries, as soon as they are developed and adopted, to counter China[70].
Practicing field’s meltdown
In the previous section we overviewed the key historical moments that contributed to the shifting habitus of the US and Russia. Both nations became keenly aware about the changing balance in military technologies, which had gradually led to the perception of the Cold War-era INF Treaty as conserving a reality that no longer existed. Next, we will demonstrate how exactly the parties expressed the idea that the INF was no longer in line with the current realities. Although these comments might seem merely rhetorical, they helped frame the shared understanding of the INF Treaty’s irrelevance. In the subsequent section, we will trace the history of diplomatic practices of both sides which paradoxically espoused peaceful aspirations, and yet, unintentionally, brought the demise of the Treaty closer.
The field is obsolete
Since the late 1990s, it has become increasingly clear that the dispositions of Russia and the United States were shifting, leading to the emergence of mutual disputes and complaints over the INF Treaty[71]. The first signal of this shift came in 2000 when Vladimir Putin and Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov cautioned that Russia might withdraw from the INF Treaty if the United States departed from the ABM Treaty[72]. However, in 2000, Russia’s discontent was partially alleviated by the joint US-Russian statement of September 6, 2000, in which the presidents of the two countries agreed that “Russia and the United States reaffirm their commitment to the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. Russia and the United States intend to implement the provisions… of the INF Treaty”[73].
Nevertheless, the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which allowed the US to deploy intermediate-range anti-missiles, rendered Russia’s commitment to the field of the INF Treaty short-lived. On October 9, 2003, Russian Defense minister Sergey Ivanov in a conversation with his American counterpart Donald Rumsfeld raised the issue of the possibility of Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty for the first time. Rumsfeld cautiously replied that the US would not oppose such a scenario[74]. On April 24, 2006, Sergey Ivanov called the INF Treaty a relic of the Cold War that did not correspond to contemporary realities because dozens of countries, including India, Pakistan, Korea, China, Iran, and Israel, already had such missiles in their arsenals. Russia’s discontent with the field was further reaffirmed by the country’s political leadership.
“…Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems…”.
President Vladimir Putin’s Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy February 10, 2007 Source: Official Website of the Russian President (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034)
On February 15, 2007, the chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluevskiy warned that Russia might withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to the US plans to deploy a third missile defense positioning area in Eastern Europe, which, according to Russian military commanders, posed a threat to Russian strategic forces. This statement resonated widely in both Russia and the US prompting US officials to assure that the missile defense system was not directed against Russia. In particular, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested that Moscow might be concerned about the growing threat posed by medium-range missiles deployed in the proximity to its southern and eastern borders, referring to Iran’s missile stockpile[75].
The field dissolves
Since then, both parties had actively pursued a consistent delegitimization of a field recognized as inconsistent with their habitus. On August 15, 2011, the Wall Street Journal published an article by John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security under George W. Bush (2001-2009), in which he sharply criticized the INF Treaty due to changing strategic realities[76]. He asserted that Chinese power had risen, and medium-range missiles were being developed in rogue countries such as Iran and North Korea, which threatened the security of the US allies. Consequently, Bolton argued, the Treaty had to either be extended to all the countries possessing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (which was unlikely) or be abandoned as a relic of a bygone era[77]. The INF’s counterintuitive nature regarding Russian interests was partially acknowledged by Vladimir Putin as well when, on June 19, 2013, he called the USSR leadership’s decision to abandon intermediate-range missiles “at least controversial”[78], but noted that Russia intended to act according to the realities of today and comply with the Treaty.
On July 28, 2014, US president Barack Obama sent a letter to Vladimir Putin accusing Russia of testing a cruise missile with a range of more than 500 kilometers. These accusations were later reiterated by the United States in the US State Department’s annual reports of July 31, 2014[79], June 5, 2015[80], and April 11, 2016.[81] The reports did not specify which missile was in question, whether it was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, or whether Russia planned to deploy it[82].
Meanwhile, Russia continued to criticize the US missile defense policy in Europe. On October 9, 2015, Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Russian delegation to the First Committee of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, stated that US planned to deploy the Mk-41 vertical launchers at the missile defense facility in Romania were “incompatible with the obligations under the INF Treaty”[83]. On May 27, 2016, Yevgeny Ilyin, deputy head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation at the Defense Ministry, accused the United States of testing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles under the guise of missile defense capabilities[84]. On October 19, 2017, speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club Forum Vladimir Putin said that Russia was prepared to retaliate if the United States decided to withdraw from the INF Treaty[85].
On November 29, 2017, Christopher Ford publicly pointed the finger at the Russian missile that the US believed to be in violation of the Treaty: the 9M729[86]. On December 9, 2017, in response to Thomas Shannon’s interview, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov confirmed the existence of the 9M729 missile but claimed there was no direct evidence of the violation of the INF Treaty. Ryabkov also accused the United States of deploying launchers in Romania capable of launching not only interceptor missiles but also Tomahawk attack missiles, although their deployment on land contradicts the INF Treaty, as well as the intention to develop land-based cruise missiles of a prohibited range. Ryabkov warned that the US appeared to be looking for an excuse for the already taken decision to leave the INF adding that Russia was prepared for a symmetrical response[87]. This narrative was endorsed by Vladimir Putin who said that the US had “in fact… already withdrawn” from the INF Treaty by deploying facilities in Romania where “anti-missiles can be easily replaced by medium-range missiles”[88].
On October 20, 2018, the US President Donald Trump announced the US intention to withdraw from the Treaty due to Russia’s consistent non-compliance and concerns that the US could be at odds with China’s development of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles[89]. On August 2, 2019, the US withdrew from the Treaty. In the respective statement by the US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, he cited “prolonged and repeated violations” by Russia as the sole reason. Russia’s suspension of its participation in the meetings of the joint consultative group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) (2015) and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2016) were also mentioned among the reasons for the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty[90]. On August 5, 2019, Putin issued a statement in which he held the US responsible for the situation.
Discussion: towards a balance of interpretation via practices
This chapter highlights the dilemma of disjunction between habitus and the social field, a subject central to the works of Vincent Pouliot and Iver Neumann, who examined this intersection almost a decade ago. Drawing on practice theory, these scholars primarily explore the elements that precede diplomatic or international crises. They argue that crises arise from a number of complex and problematic results of the combination of the institutional settings where actors interact and the practices they employ are shaped variably by space and time. Neumann exemplifies this disruption through the situations when Russian diplomats, following an extensive interaction in non-European international arenas, uphold dispositions viewed as barbaric, uncivilized, or at best regressive[91]. A similar argument, though in reverse, is put forth by Pouliot, who maintains that post-Cold War European and Russian diplomats endeavored to construct a new institutional reality using their old habitus[92]. Building on Bourdieu’s concepts, Neumann and Pouliot describe this phenomenon as hysteresis, whereas Ted Hopf characterizes the same logic as a productive crisis.[93]
While current scholarship offers insights into the causes of such crises, the ramifications of these disruptions warrant further examination. Moreover, how can we conceptualize the process of harmonizing – or marrying back – actors’ habitus with the institutional sphere? This chapter intends to take the first step in analyzing this critical nexus.
Firstly, while the disintegration of the INF Treaty serves as a stark illustration, such productive crises, we hypothesize, are a natural byproduct of the continuously evolving habitus of international actors and the perpetually lagging institutional milieu in which they operate. In essence, these crises can be attributed to the routine activities of agents in international relations aiming to reestablish a balance of interpretation of each other’s dispositions by virtue of an evolving institutional sphere. This enduring necessity to restore such a balance of interpretation makes it a structural feature of international engagement through practices.
Secondly, international crises, though ubiquitous and countless, often remain invisible to observers due to the continuous routinization of these phenomena by actors via practices. An ontological threat, perceived as an intuitive yet frequently unarticulated demand for change, triggers alterations in our practices to correspond with external realities. Within the context of this chapter the INF Treaty epitomizes a vivid crisis affecting the bedrock of strategic stability. However, according to the theoretical paradigm used within this chapter, its disintegration is a natural progression resulting from the habitual adaptations of actors to align their environment with their habitus. Such adjustments are universally present in other domains too, such as economic and political reforms as well as diplomatic negotiations.
Conclusion
For many years, Vladimir Putin has framed Russia’s behavior in its relations with the United States using a sequential logic. In explaining Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the Russian President confirmed this perspective: “Our American partners have announced that they are suspending their participation in the Treaty, and we are suspending it, too. They announced that they are engaged in experimental design works, and we will do the same”[94]. This chapter posits that escalation may not only stem from instrumental actions but also from unconscious practices that respond to ontological threats, rather than merely physical ones.
To theorize this hypothesis, we combined two relatively distinct theoretical perspectives: research on ontological security and practice theory. We employed concepts from Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology as applied in international political studies: field as the social environment of practices, and habitus as the agent’s disposition. Thus, ontological threat arises when the agent’s disposition changes over time, rendering the field of interaction irrelevant. Consequently, the very environment in which agents interact becomes a source of ontological threat.
We conclude that this may be part of what transpired with the INF Treaty. It itself became an ontological threat to the participants, having altered their habitus in 20 years, manifested both in the perception of changing missile technology and of the geopolitical environment of the post-bipolar world order. The delegitimization of the INF Treaty is paradoxical in nature: rhetorically condemned and criticized by the actors negotiating its preservation, it becomes self-evident and inevitable. It is more dangerous to be bound by its terms and conditions than to interact without it.As we reflect on the developments that have unfolded, it becomes evident that the withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the subsequent escalation of tensions hold implications far beyond the immediate confines of international relations. While the actions and rhetoric of political leaders often dominate the headlines, our investigation unveils a deeper layer of dynamics that have contributed to the evolving landscape of nuclear issues and security in Europe. Following the demise of the INF Treaty, Europe has returned to an explosive military situation reminiscent of the heat of bipolar standoff between 1976 and 1987. However, due to a number of political (NATO expansion) and technological (more advanced weaponry) factors, a new missile crisis may take a much more acute form. Moreover, with the termination of the ABM and CFE treaties, there are no longer any real instruments to deter armed escalation in Europe. This chapter seeks to discern the sinister banality that has resulted in this situation: by tacitly practicing shifting dispositions one step at a time, Russia and the US had in the end rendered the INF Treaty an impossible reality by 2019.
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[2] The authors express their gratitude to Igor Istomin, Alexander Chekov, Iver Neumann, Ted Hopf, and Anne Crowley-Vigneau.
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