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Main Key takeaways of the Security Index Yearbook authors presented at the 1st International Security Forum

Key takeaways of the Security Index Yearbook authors presented at the 1st International Security Forum

Igor Istomin – Head of the Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems at MGIMO University; Member of the PIR Center Advisory Board:

  • We have experienced two fundamental shifts in our understanding of security threats. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, optimistic expectations prevailed. The thesis that war was becoming obsolete as a tool of politics gained widespread traction. The focus of expert attention shifted from great power confrontation to the risks of transborder spillover of instability from troubled states.
  • In the 2010s, a reverse revision of these perceptions took place. The focus returned once again to matters of inter-state rivalry. At the same time, the previous set of problems did not disappear: malnutrition, poverty, and inequality. For developing nations, overcoming the development gap remains a priority. Nevertheless, a significant portion of state resources is being spent on inter-state confrontation. The major change lies in the fact that today we are virtually in a state of a world war. The probability of major wars is increasingly recognized both in research and by the expert community.
  • The struggle among the major powers comes with heavy costs and leads to the exhaustion of strength. In the medium term, we are entering a dangerous period marked by risks of clashes between leading powers. The high probability of escalation in international conflicts is compounded by a high level of economic interdependence. The growing dependence of national well-being also intensifies the struggle for financial resources.
  • Today, states form flexible coalitions, meaning that the system is not polarizing, and the world is not splitting into two blocks.
  • A conflict in one part of the world does not mean that the confrontation will shift to another. There are three main hotspots of conflict localization in the world: between Russia and the West, between China and the US, and between China and India. Thanks to Russia’s efforts, the contradictions between Beijing and New Delhi are being kept at a minimally conflictual level.

Leonid Tsukanov – Consultant at the PIR Center, international security researcher:

  • For Iran, the current campaign is a continuation of the multi-level foreign aggression that the Islamic Republic has been subjected to since its proclamation. The conflict will be concluded once Tehran receives security guarantees that will not be violated.
  • The United States perceives the current campaign as a fundamentally new challenge to national security. Response measures are developed ad hoc, according to the dynamics of the crisis (while taking into account its previous iterations). The conflict will be concluded when the US is able to dictate its position to Iran without considering Iran’s own interests.
  • For Israel, the current campaign is multifaceted; it aims to achieve the strategic objectives that were not accomplished during the first campaign. Continuity has been maintained, but the ultimate goal has changed (eliminating the threat instead of containing it). The conflict will be concluded when the threat from Iran and its allied forces disappears.
  • Among the Arabian monarchies, tensions have escalated, but a “collective defense” has not materialized in the Gulf. At the same time, there is a surge of distrust toward Iran, accelerated militarization in specific areas, the rapid formation of new tactical alliances, and an increase in US influence over the countries in this group.
  • The Arab League has gained a chance to strengthen its influence on regional processes through intensified diplomacy. Among other Arab nations, there has been a surge of distrust toward Iran. The intensity of contacts with Israel has decreased, while US influence over this group of countries has grown. Economic “turbulence” can be observed due to Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Ankara aims to hedge risks to avoid becoming the “next Iran.” Turkey has relatively distanced itself from the hostilities, banking on its role as a mediator. The state is revising its approaches to regional security and seeking new deterrence formats amid growing tensions with Israel.
  • Today’s conflict is largely a consequence of the collapse of the “nuclear deal” in 2017. Diplomatic efforts under Western auspices have turned into a fiction, and the efforts of third-party mediators are neutralized by the inflexible positions of Washington and Tehran.
  • The preservation of certain elements of the Iranian nuclear program has become a tool for internal mobilization within Tehran.
  • Uncertainty triggers implicit shifts in the nuclear policies of other Middle Eastern countries.
  • Over time, the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is deepening. Iran’s tightening control over the strait is causing concern among the rest of the Gulf states. Iran is banking on legitimizing its control over the strait as an element of rigid bargaining.
  • The parties to the conflict have relied on conventional strike actions rather than cyberwarfare. While the volume of AI utilization in planning and conducting operations has grown significantly, the probability of a “Digital Hiroshima” scenario remains hypothetical, though not zero. Regional actors are attempting to strengthen their digital perimeter in advance to prepare for potential cyberattacks.
  • Information operations and “internet victories” are a vital part of the confrontation, as “likes” convert into real support for policies or political decisions. Emphasis is placed on engaging with foreign audiences. Consequently, the parties continue to “wage war” even during a truce.
  • In the past conflict, each side “won” in its own way. The situation remains in limbo, and the line between war and peace is conventional. The parties still need a breathing space, but alternative methods of “struggle” fail to yield the desired results. The diplomatic process is chaotic and highly dependent on the sentiments of the domestic audience. Israel is excluded from the main process, making its impact on the situation unpredictable.
  • From Russia’s perspective, the conflict in the Middle East poses a threat of increased turbulence in the region, which runs counter to national interests. Russia advocates a diplomatic rather than a forceful approach toward Iran, maintaining an equidistant position. Moscow possesses sufficient resources and influence to support the peacekeeping process. Russia’s position is that the mechanism of guarantees must not serve as a smokescreen to prepare for a new round of conflict.