The Sahel region is extremely rich in unexplored resources. As noted in a comment to AiF by former USSR/Russian Ambassador to Burkina Faso and Mali, leading research fellow at the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yevgeny Korendyasov, “Russia lacks 15 types of mineral resources (manganese, chromium, iron ore, bauxite) or the cost of their extraction is very high because deposits are located in permafrost zones or other hard-to-reach places. We produce 4 thousand tons of uranium, but we need 11 thousand to support our nuclear industry.”
Despite economic and political difficulties, the Sahel countries, endowed with a powerful resource base, can become reliable partners for Russia in the field of mineral extraction. Mutually beneficial cooperation is possible provided that the countries of the region are willing to sell resources at competitive prices, while Russia, in turn, supports solving the complex social and economic problems facing the Sahel countries.
The unexplored nature of the region’s resources is linked not so much to a lack of interest from the Sahel countries but rather to their limited capacity for independent exploration and the deterrent effect of international investors’ concerns over security risks. Russia is uniquely positioned to overcome these obstacles due to good political relations with the regional states, a developed contractual framework, deep understanding of local processes, and readiness to seek comprehensive, mutually beneficial solutions.
However, the traditional approach of “resources in exchange for security” requires modernization. Mineral extraction should not only bring economic benefits but also contribute to improving the socio-economic situation in the region. Although this appears obvious, all international players (France, the USA, China) have neglected the socio-economic dimension of projects in Niger. In practice, each industrial complex must create its own microeconomy involving residents of nearby settlements. Detailed recommendations for each point analyzed in the study are provided below.
Exploration and extraction of uranium and other minerals
- Regarding uranium exploration and extraction, Niger is currently the only country in the region openly interested in cooperation with Russia in this area, having openly invited Russia to extract uranium on its territory. Niger’s advantage is that all uranium deposits are concentrated in one area within the Tim Merso basin, a sub-basin of the Ilemmeden basin. The Tim Merso basin is near the main Arlit-In Azoua fault line, lying between the mining towns of Arlit and Akokan, about 900 km northeast of Niamey (over 1200 km by road). Currently, licenses for exploration belong to Chinese CNNC (Azelik deposit) and Canadian Global Atomic, developing the Dasa uranium project, with production planned to start in early 2026. Given the large confirmed uranium reserves in the basin and that most deposits are surface-near and can be open-pit mined, this offer may have significant commercial benefits for Russia. Coordination with neighboring companies, such as CNNC, will be important for safety and infrastructure sharing. China’s experience in sanctions evasion and logistics coordination could be useful (for example, oil exports via the Niger-Benin pipeline managed by Chinese CNPC have been blocked and then resumed after Chinese intervention). Latest data shows CNNC lacked water purification infrastructure at the site due to underfunding, and employee living conditions were poor; infrastructure support coordination could benefit both Russia and China;
- Other promising deposits include the Falea deposit in southern Mali; Tibesti region in northern Chad and Mayo-Kebi in the south; Bakouma deposit in the Central African Republic (CAR), where Russia already has transport infrastructure and a military base;
- To enhance project sustainability and comprehensive development, Russia should propose a model of national or cross-border “territorial-industrial complexes”-protected industrial zones combining energy generation, mining enterprises (not only uranium but also other minerals), logistics, and security systems. With the recent creation of the Sahel States Alliance, such a cross-border complex could be established between Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger (possibly Chad). These enclaves can serve as anchor points for regional development and foster new trade and transport corridors;
- Effective creation of such complexes requires improving coordination among Russian mining companies. Tibesti in northern Chad is potentially promising for uranium and other minerals. The Tim Merso basin contains copper, niobium, lithium, manganese, cobalt, and nickel, enabling broader mining complexes. A transboundary complex could also link Burkina Faso’s Nordgold gold mining and Mali’s gold processing plant in Bamako supported by Russia’s Yadran Group. Mali’s most promising uranium deposit, Falea, is also in the south;
- Uranium extraction cooperation should be paired with measures to improve nuclear material security in the Sahel. This includes accelerating ratification and participation in all international conventions and initiatives on nuclear safety and countering nuclear terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. IAEA guidelines on handling disused radioactive sources should be implemented, regulation of control, accounting and protection of radioactive sources expanded in countries lacking it (such as CAR and Libya), and state oversight, full registries, and strict export licensing for Category 1 radioactive sources reinforced to minimize risks and strengthen overall nuclear security in the region.
Cooperation in nuclear energy
- Russia’s comprehensive strategy to enter the Sahel nuclear energy and uranium mining markets should be based on cautious and phased entry, relying on small but stable projects. Due to political instability, fragile economies, and limited infrastructure, large-scale initiatives face high risks. As a Rosatom expert told the author, nuclear power plant construction is premature due to physical and nuclear safety risks and financing and staffing shortages. Therefore, a multi-stage strategy is optimal: first focusing on exploration, uranium mining, and preparing human resources; second, expanding industrial and infrastructure bases when political-economic conditions allow. Flexible models with adaptability to changing conditions are important. Legal protection against arbitrary contract revisions, government liability for industrial security, and loss compensation mechanisms must be ensured;
- Although major nuclear power plants in Sahel countries are not currently feasible, cooperation with interested states (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali) on small research reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) is important. SMRs may become a promising direction, but risk mitigation in security must be comprehensive;
- Promoting non-energy nuclear technology applications is essential, such as radiotherapy and diagnostics in medicine, sterilizing agricultural products for food security, and water treatment and sustainable water use technologies. This multi-purpose presentation of nuclear technology allows it to be perceived as a development tool rather than only a business project;
- Favorable political conditions also matter. Authorities in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso show openness to deepening cooperation with Russia, creating a unique opportunity for energy partnership consolidation. Russia can offer-and already partially offers-comprehensive packages including energy infrastructure development, nuclear technology healthcare facilities, and systemic specialist training with technical students and professionals sent to Russian training centers.
Infrastructure support as a key project element
- Infrastructure support integrated at every project stage is crucial for successful nuclear energy and uranium mining projects in the Sahel. Soviet experts noted the main barrier to mining development in Africa is the lack and cost of transport infrastructure. Projects must consider not only energy facility construction but also the parallel development of critical infrastructure-transport hubs, security facilities, logistics systems, and cargo storage and convoying-in partnership with national governments, who should be primary sponsors. Project budgets should initially include physical protection elements, based on Russian experience in critical infrastructure protection and military-technical cooperation. Security serves to protect both mines and local populations;
- Russia could also consider joint projects with other external actors in the region, including China and some Middle Eastern countries involved in mining (not only uranium) and infrastructure development. China has highway projects but lacks security solutions. Multilateral cooperation can reduce costs via shared financial and logistical burdens and increase project resilience through diversification of supply sources, technology, and political support;
- Diplomatic and infrastructural support for creating or renewing alternative logistics routes-through Libya, Sudan, Togo, Ghana, or Senegal-could reduce dependence on unstable or sanctioned export routes and minimize risks from fluctuating political situations and power balances. Supporting regional cooperation in trade and logistics will also facilitate cross-border development;
- Water resource development is an integral part of any long-term collaboration strategy in the Sahel. Given acute water shortages, efficient and sustainable use is key for social stability and industrial projects. Project documents should include underground water exploration, well construction, and water purification and reuse technologies. Ecologically rational water use in mine and energy complex operations is vital to minimize ecosystem strain and prevent local conflicts.
Social dimension of cooperation
- The social component must be an important part of Russia’s presence strategy in the Sahel, ensuring project legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Emphasis should be on training local personnel and involving the population in production chains-from initial exploration to infrastructure operation and logistics. Russian-involved enterprises should create local employment. Humanitarian support-including healthcare, education, and water supply-should remain integral, strengthening population trust. Monitoring migration and population movements, especially to prevent activities of international extremist and criminal groups, is essential. These can be paired with technical assistance for border protection, monitoring, and information security;
- Near industrial mines, conditions should be created with national governments for controlled artisanal mining with training and skills upgrading. Legalizing small-scale mining at the state level to prevent population exploitation by armed groups is needed, along with enhanced control and accountability over mineral extraction and export, including strengthened border and transport route monitoring;
- The population should also be engaged in building, operating, and securing infrastructure-water, transport, storage. Creating transport corridors and water resources should support food security, trade development, and combat illegal activities. Such an integrated approach enables efficient exploitation of Sahel’s mineral wealth and enhances state stability and local welfare, creating a strong foundation for long-term cooperation with Russia.
Russia’s media image in the region
- Russia maintains a predominantly positive image in regional countries. The main task at this stage is preserving population trust and gaining a competitive edge by highlighting Russia’s approaches and achievements in cooperation with the Sahel countries;
- Although Russia enjoys an advantage as a partner free from neocolonial approaches, media presence should shift from military narratives to showing comprehensive contributions to the region’s sustainable development. Active communication of tangible and potential cooperation benefits-including energy infrastructure construction, healthcare development, personnel training, humanitarian initiatives, and production localization-is necessary. Emphasis should be on presenting Russia as a supplier of sustainable solutions-from reliable and autonomous energy sources (including small nuclear reactors) to water supply and medical infrastructure technologies;
- Strengthening this image requires working actively with local media, bloggers, regional universities, and cultural centers. A positive agenda highlighting African countries’ independence in choosing external partners and the obsolescence of postcolonial cooperation models should prevail, showing respect for their culture, sovereignty, and internal dynamics;
- Developing media partnerships with other regional states is also important, as most local media in Sahel countries are national with limited technical and financial resources. Encouraging the creation of pan-African information platforms and media consortiums where Russia participates as an equal partner will bolster Russia’s positive image and reinforce African media independence from external influence centers. Promoting deeper public understanding of the crises’ nature and layers in the Sahel can be done through expert channels and media alike.
Military dimension of cooperation
- Russia’s military cooperation with Sahel countries responds to current regional security challenges and forms part of a wider geopolitical strategy to restore and consolidate influence after weakening its position in the Middle East, particularly after losing military infrastructure in Syria. With troop withdrawals and reductions in East Mediterranean military-diplomatic presence, Sahel countries gain importance as potential bases for a new configuration of Russian military presence in Africa;
- Russian military presence, like economic involvement, should be multifaceted, countering transnational threats including international terrorism, trans-Saharan crime, uncontrolled migration, and arms trafficking. Such bases can serve as hubs for intelligence, supply, personnel training, and symbolize a new regional power balance. Formal agreements with host governments and framing Russian presence as mutual defense, not power projection, is essential;
- To enhance Russia’s military influence, cooperation formats should diversify beyond bases to include regional training centers, joint exercise ranges, airports, military-humanitarian missions, and supplying equipment like drones and electronic intelligence systems. Logistics corridor limitations mean base creation should be viable only with stable supply lines. Russian naval base projects could justify increased military presence to ensure access;
- Russia should support the emerging Sahel States Alliance (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). Promoting integration and cross-border projects in energy, mining, infrastructure, and security can reduce costs, minimize duplication, and enhance resilience to external pressure. Russia can offer practical assistance in coordinating actions, intelligence sharing, joint operations planning, technical standardization, etc. Helping the three countries overcome international isolation will increase their political autonomy and strengthen Russia’s role as a key external partner. This policy should not be free; participation in complex projects covering energy, infrastructure, security, and social spheres will lower overall resource extraction costs and secure a strong strategic presence, extending influence across Africa and reinforcing Russia as a global energy and security partner;
- If Russia aims not only at business and strengthening positions but also fostering more sustainable regional states, peacekeeping initiatives should be explored alongside military involvement. RSMT report authors note that French and international military interventions focus on armed conflict resolution with civilian casualties, associating the armed figure with danger, while people seek peace and ways to achieve it. Friendship among historically cohabiting ethnic groups is central to restoring normalcy. Despite Mali’s distrust of the UN MINUSMA mission (due to French leadership), projects like Community Violence Reduction involving 26 local NGOs are key reconciliation efforts. Given current global conditions, new UN missions are unlikely, so peacekeeping initiatives with humanitarian organizations, NGOs, and regional bodies should be considered.
Russia’s Unique Selling Proposition in Uranium Mining
To avoid prior security provider mistakes, Russia must offer a more comprehensive approach to mining-critical for all states’ economies-and military cooperation overall. State control over territories where minerals are mined and the transport infrastructure is paramount for undermining the “conflict economy” and protecting Russian companies from risks.
Russia’s unique selling proposition in Sahel uranium mining is based on these key advantages:
- Russia can offer Sahel countries a comprehensive partnership model integrating energy, security, infrastructure, and social development into a unified sustainable growth strategy. The main feature is systemic and long-term: projects form interconnected elements of regional development and security architecture, not isolated contracts;
- Russia’s centralized business management structure surpasses Western countries’ decentralization, enabling high project coordination and uniting mining, energy, and infrastructure into territorial-industrial complexes. This model lowers costs, boosts resilience against external risks, and makes projects manageable through all stages-from exploration to processing and transport;
- Russia’s key strength is blending economic and infrastructure development with security measures. Moscow can support building transport and military infrastructure, improving industrial facility security, controlling mines and supply routes, and reducing losses from conflicts and smuggling;
- Strengthening the Sahel States Alliance (SSA) remains vital. Russia can help the SSA enhance combat capability and institutional coherence, turning cooperation into systemic transboundary solutions-from counterterrorism to resource management. Russia can also link SSA countries with West African neighbors, including coastal states, stabilizing politically and sanction-restricted export routes;
- Russia offers a significant social component. Each project prioritizes local personnel involvement, job creation, professional training systems, and humanitarian support-from health to water supply-creating a social base, reducing poverty, and legitimizing projects among locals;
- As a nuclear energy leader, Russia can lay the foundation for future regional nuclear infrastructure development. Although large nuclear power plants are unlikely soon, small modular reactors, research centers, and non-energy nuclear technologies (water, medicine, food security) make Russian proposals uniquely adapted to Sahel realities.
SAH
E16/SHAH – 25/10/20
