№ 15 (73), 2025. PIR Center held a series of seminars “Nuclear ambitions, opportunities, and fantasies of Ukraine”

April 29, 2025

MOSCOW. APRIL 29, 2025. PIR PRESS. «Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities are far from weapons grade and have become even less significant since February 2022. The reason for this is the physical destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The political statements that are made in Kiev are aimed primarily at domestic audiences for political support, to promote funding for the army, and to support certain parts of society. At the same time, Ukraine’s international partners are clearly opposed to nuclear proliferation», – Kirill Prokhorov, a student of International Security MA program.

On April 10 and 17, 2025, PIR Center hosted a series of seminars at MGIMO University on Ukraine’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities as part of International Security MA Program (organized by the MGIMO University and PIR Center). The events, organized as part of the course “Current Issues in International Security”, were aimed at analyzing Ukraine’s missile potential, issues of physical nuclear security, and the potential role of the United States in these processes.

During the seminars, Yuri Shakhov analyzed Mariana Buzherin’s book Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine, highlighting the historical circumstances of Ukraine’s renunciation of its nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the USSR. The presenter focused on the historical circumstances under which Ukraine, which inherited the third-largest nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the USSR, was forced to give it up under pressure from Russia and the United States. The speaker particularly noted Kiev’s attempts in the early 1990s to defend the concept of “nuclear possession” and pointed out the political bias of the book’s author, who ignores some aspects of Russian-Ukrainian interaction.

Kirill Prokhorov, speaking as an opponent, criticized Ukraine’s current nuclear ambitions. He focused on the lack of infrastructure for uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons production, as well as the limitations of current missile developments, such as “Neptune” and “Trembita”, which are of purely tactical importance. He emphasized that Ukraine’s loud political statements towards nuclear potential are aimed primarily at a domestic audience and are not supported by real capabilities. 

Alexander Gromov examined the state of Ukraine’s nuclear energy sector and the hypothetical possibility of transferring control over nuclear power plants to the United States, pointing out the geopolitical implications. He noted that after the loss of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, Ukraine has only three operating plants, most of whose power units have exceeded their design service life. Alexander Gromov also analyzed the U.S. proposal for possible control over the Ukrainian NPPs, suggesting that it could be part of a strategy to strengthen geopolitical influence in the region, and pointed out the associated risks to nuclear safety.

Artem Plaksiy concluded the series of reports by assessing Ukraine’s missile capabilities and noting limitations related to both financial and infrastructural factors. In his report, he stressed Ukraine’s limited missile capabilities, despite the Soviet legacy of enterprises such as the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and Yuzhmash. Artem Plaksiy pointed to financial and infrastructural barriers that hinder the development of strategic missile systems, as well as the effects of military actions on production capacity. The reporter specifically noted that current developments, including the “Neptune” and “Blyskavka” missiles, pose a tactical rather than strategic threat, and are not suitable for delivering nuclear warheads.

The discussions allowed the participants to consider Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities from different angles, including historical parallels and modern challenges, as well as to gain insight into the views on the issue from China, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

The seminar participants commented positively on the speakers’ presentations. In particular, Herman Selyavin, a student of International Security MA Program, shared his impressions: “As the moderator of the seminar, I am fully satisfied with its results. This was largely due to the informative speeches of the speakers, which helped to form a holistic understanding of Ukraine’s nuclear potential. I am particularly pleased that the topic elicited a lively response and active discussion. Students from China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan contributed to the discussion, which is especially valuable.”

Vasily Prydein, a student of International Security MA Program, also shared his comments on the content of the seminar: “The seminar ‘Nuclear ambitions, opportunities and fantasies of Ukraine’ gave me a comprehensive view of the nuclear non-proliferation issues among potential nuclear weapons possessor countries. It is very important that we dealt not only with historical aspects of Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities, but also discussed specific risks and possible nuclear nonproliferation scenarios. I reckon the final part was particularly valuable, where we were able to compare both Ukraine’s ambitions and capabilities in this area.”

Keywords: Nuclear Safety; Arms Control; International Security; Ukraine

NS

F13/AST – 25/04/29