MOSCOW, OCTOBER 27, 2025. PIR PRESS. «The future of multilateral arms control involving France and the United Kingdom will hinge on acknowledging the security concerns and interests of all parties, sustaining strong political will, and reinforcing the overall credibility of arms control as a foundation for strategic stability and global security. The trajectory of bilateral convergence in strategic forces, China’s involvement in arms control, and evolving technological developments will critically influence whether France and the UK deepen their engagement in multilateral or trilateral arms control frameworks in the coming years», said Ms. Aleksandra Zubenko, PIR Center Consultant.
Today, PIR Center releases the report “Beyond the Bilateral: Retrospective Analysis of the Issue of British and French Nuclear Arsenals Offset in US-Russian Strategic Stability Dialogue,” authored by PIR Center Consultant Ms. Aleksandra Zubenko. The report, part of PIR Center Reports Series (№46), offers a retrospective analysis of the discussion about the potential inclusion of France’s and the UK’s nuclear weapons in arms control talks from Soviet, U.S., and French-British perspectives. The study aims to explain why the inclusion of French and British forces has not been possible to date and whether the Ukrainian crisis has prompted shifts that could enable such a dialogue.
The report is based on the author’s master’s thesis, defended at MGIMO University in June 2025.
Key Findings:
- Soviet efforts to engage the United Kingdom and France in discussions on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons failed for several reasons. First, during the Cold War, the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union far exceeded those of Britain and France in both size and technology. Until the mid-1970s, British and French delivery systems and warheads were still in the early stages of development. Second, London and Paris saw the arms race and bilateral arms control with the superpowers as ways to enforce a bipolar world order that would place them in subordinate roles. Symbolically, participating in such talks would have meant accepting the bipolar structure – something both countries wanted to avoid. Finally, neither the United Kingdom nor France was willing to give up their nuclear cooperation with the United States – an arrangement that became crucial for Britain in the 1960s and for France in the 1970s.
- Soviet demands to end U.S. nuclear cooperation with Britain and France were just as unacceptable to London and Paris. Until the 1990s, both countries’ nuclear arsenals were significantly smaller and less advanced than those of the superpowers, making any restrictions incompatible with maintaining a credible second-strike capability. Additionally, neither London nor Paris wanted to participate in negotiations setting joint limits with Washington, as this would have increased their reliance on U.S. nuclear planning and targeting. At the same time, American technological aid remained essential, especially for the United Kingdom during the early stages of its nuclear program. Interestingly, each new round of Soviet-American strategic stability talks tended to strengthen, rather than weaken, bilateral nuclear cooperation between Britain and France.
- Recognizing these realities, the Soviet Union – though genuinely interested in limiting the growth of British and French nuclear arsenals – probably used the issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. By the time the START II talks began, it was clear that involving France and the United Kingdom directly was unlikely. Instead, during both START I and START II, the USSR informally factored their arsenals into calculations of overall ceilings with Washington.
- Today, neither France nor the United Kingdom is interested in joining strategic arms control agreements, while Russia insists that further bilateral reductions with the United States are impossible without their participation. Given these opposing positions and the worsening security situation, the chances for immediate progress on arms control involving Britain and France are very low.
- The current situation – shaped by the war in Ukraine, the modernization of all five recognized nuclear arsenals, and uncertainty surrounding U.S. and NATO policies – has increased concern across Europe, including in London and Paris. Both countries are mainly interested in restarting dialogue on nuclear risk reduction and, in the long term, discussing the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the control of conventional arms, especially regarding Russia’s dual-capable systems. Confidence-building measures – such as restoring military-to-military contacts and establishing notification agreements – could also be important, but their success depends on resolving the Ukraine conflict, improving relations between Russia and European nations, and recognizing Russia’s security interests in Europe.
- In the long term, stronger Franco-British cooperation in the nuclear sector could help synchronize their approaches to nuclear deterrence and multilateral arms control. A successful U.S. effort to include China in arms control talks could further motivate London and Paris to join a multilateral framework.
- The future of arms control in Europe ultimately relies on recognizing the security concerns of all parties, having sufficient political will, and addressing changes in the size and quality of the nuclear arsenals of the “P5” countries.
Reviews of the master’s thesis defended at MGIMO University, on which this report is based
“The dissertation of Ms. Zubenko represents an original research work focusing on the independence of British and French nuclear forces and the reasons for their lack of inclusion in ultimately bilateral SALT and START arms control processes. Ms. Zubenko’s choice of a topic is undoubtedly of great scholarly interest. In addition, she also makes a number of policy recommendations for Russian policymakers seeking to involve Britain and France in strategic arms control, recommendations that may be worthy of further discussions.” – Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Professor; Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Project (EANP); Middlebury Institute of International Studies.
“Based on the intensive study of primary sources, memoirs, interviews and literature, Alexandra convincingly argues that, at various stages of US-Soviet negotiations, earlier Moscow’s demands introduced a politically untenable condition. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, France and the UK were still in the process of developing their deterrent capabilities. Neither government was ready to constrain their nascent forces while the US and the USSR maintained far larger arsenals. Besides, Moscow appeared to see the issue primarily as leverage in the SALT negotiations without genuine expectations of extracting binding commitments from London or Paris, but seeking to account their arsenals in the limitations negotiated with the US. Given the depth of the analysis, Alexandra’s research represents a valuable contribution to the study of the evolution of the British and French nuclear postures, as well as of the prospects for an eventual multilateralization of nuclear arms control.” – Dr. Andrey Zagorski, PhD in History, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Head of the Nonproliferation and Arms Limitation Section at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the PIR Center Advisory Board since 2014.
Keywords: Nuclear Nonproliferation; Global Security; Arms control
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E16/SHAH – 25/10/27
