Exclusive Interview

Exclusive Interview

IAEA Safeguards Under Pressure: Balancing Verification, Objectivity, and Geopolitics: Interview with Dr. Tariq Rauf by Grant Gevorgyan

Dr. Tariq Rauf,
independent expert, former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Department at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a member of PIR Center Advisory Board since 2013.

March 24, 2026

PIR Center continues its series of interviews with leading international experts on strategic stability and arms control.

Today’s guest is Dr. Tariq Rauf, former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Department at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a member of PIR Center Advisory Board since 2013.

The interview was conducted by Mr. Grant Gevorgyan first-year MA student of the “International Security” program at MGIMO University and PIR Center.

Mr. Grant Gevorgyan: In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has increasingly applied the state-level approach in the implementation of safeguards. In your view, does this approach strengthen verification effectiveness, and how can the Agency ensure that its application remains objective and technically justified across different states?

Dr. Tariq Rauf: The state-level approach evolved from what was previously known as integrated safeguards, which began to take shape around 2005. At that time, the Secretariat argued that integrated safeguards could lead to cost savings, meaning that the Agency would not necessarily need to conduct as much field verification as before, provided it could obtain a more comprehensive understanding of a country’s nuclear activities.

Subsequently, this concept was expanded to encompass the state as a whole. Prior to this development, the Agency primarily relied on a facility-based approach, focusing on verifying declared nuclear facilities to ensure they were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Under the Additional Protocol, the Agency also sought to verify that no undeclared nuclear material or facilities existed.

The next step was for the Agency to consider the state in its entirety and to evaluate all available factors and information. Both the facility-based and state-level approaches rely on diversion path analysis. This concept refers to assessing the potential steps a country might take if it attempted to divert nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons development.

Such analysis involves identifying technological gaps in a state’s capabilities. For example, one would examine whether the state possesses enrichment, reprocessing, or fuel fabrication capabilities. If gaps are identified, the Agency may monitor whether the state attempts to acquire the relevant technologies through legal channels or illicit means. The goal is to enable the Agency to receive early warning signals. If a state fails to declare the construction of a facility, such as an enrichment plant, the IAEA can raise questions and request clarification.

However, this approach gradually became politicized because the Agency began, to some extent, to rely on intelligence information provided by certain states. These states might claim that a country was attempting to procure equipment on the black market and encourage the Agency to investigate, but with a stipulation not to share the information provided with the accused state. The difficulty arises because the state providing the intelligence often insists that its identity remain confidential.

This creates a significant problem for the Agency. By definition, intelligence information cannot be independently verified by the IAEA. While such information on the basis of detailed scrutiny may serve as a basis for asking questions, the Agency must still obtain additional evidence to justify further action. This dynamic contributed to the politicization of the process. At the same time, broader geopolitical tensions, particularly the deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow, began to influence the debate. Much of the momentum behind integrated safeguards and the state-level approach originated in the United States, including support from nuclear weapons laboratories that funded related initiatives. Consequently, these developments became entangled in the political rivalry between the United States and Russia.

Mr. Grant Gevorgyan: The credibility of the safeguards system depends heavily on the perception that the Agency operates in an objective and depoliticized manner. What institutional or methodological steps are most important for maintaining this trust among member states today, particularly in light of developments surrounding Iran?

Dr. Tariq Rauf: In my view, it is important to distinguish between the Director General together with the Secretariat on the one hand, and member states on the other hand. Ultimately, the Director General is also a staff member who operates under the authority of the Board of Governors and the member states; but it is member states that fund the Agency and its activities and give instructions to the Director General pursuant to Article VII A and B of the IAEA Statute.

The Director General and the Secretariat itself must remain impartial and perceived as such. The difficulty arises when broader international political dynamics are brought into the IAEA’s work by member states. When external political disputes enter the Agency’s processes, they inevitably affect sensitive and complex issues such as the Iranian or North Korean nuclear dossiers.

In such circumstances, the Director General and the Secretariat may find themselves under pressure from opposing sides. For example, during Board meetings, Western states often focus exclusively on areas where Iran is not fully cooperating, while giving little or no recognition to areas where cooperation exists. Conversely, countries such as Russia, China and others tend to emphasize Iran’s cooperation while downplaying areas of non-cooperation.

Another complication arises when military actions occur shortly after the publication of an IAEA report. For instance, one report was issued on 31 May 2025, and Iran was attacked on 12 June. Another report was released on 28 February, and an attack followed on approximately 2 March. Observers may then draw a causal connection, assuming that the Agency’s report served as the basis for military action, even though this interpretation is not at all accurate.

Mr. Grant Gevorgyan: Do you have any ideas about how the role of the Secretariat, and especially that of the Director General, could be strengthened, given that this role is crucial as a mediator between opposing or even belligerent sides?

Dr. Tariq Rauf: This is essentially the same challenge faced by the United Nations and other international organizations. These institutions are funded and governed by their member states, and some states inevitably possess greater political and financial influence than others and are prepared to exercise it.

At present, the international system is not fully multipolar. The United States continues to exercise significant influence, while Russia and China, although major powers, do not currently carry the same level of weight in certain institutional contexts. This is simply a reflection of contemporary geopolitical realities.

Mr. Grant Gevorgyan: From my perspective, however, the IAEA, given its specific technical mandate related to atomic energy, might represent a more suitable platform for experimenting with new institutional approaches within the Secretariat, particularly since it is a smaller organization than the United Nations.

Dr. Tariq Rauf: The structural challenge remains essentially the same. The Agency depends on contributions from its member states, and the United States still provides approximately 25 percent of the regular budget, in addition it provides significant extra-budgetary funds. Russia and China contribute significantly less. This financial reality inevitably influences institutional dynamics.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the public often sees only a small portion of the Agency’s activities, primarily verification. Many other areas of the Agency’s work function effectively, particularly its development and technical cooperation programmes.

The difficulties arise primarily in the politically sensitive sphere of war and peace. Nuclear nonproliferation belongs to this domain and therefore receives the greatest political attention. If a technical cooperation project fails, the consequences are limited. However, proliferation-related issues can have serious geopolitical implications, including the possibility of military conflict.

Another problem arises when states choose to disregard international law. International institutions operate through established procedures, and those procedures must be respected. When powerful states act unilaterally or use military force outside these frameworks, they undermine the very institutions created to manage such disputes.

Mr. Grant Gevorgyan: Looking ahead, what key trends do you believe will shape the future of safeguards implementation, and how can the IAEA balance increasing political pressure from member states with the principles of objectivity, depoliticization, and evidence-based assessment?

Dr. Tariq Rauf: The Secretariat has already defined the core principles and methodologies of safeguards. These methodologies, technologies, and procedures are developed in consultation with member states. When the Secretariat proposes improvements, member states have the opportunity to review and comment on them.

Therefore, the Secretariat is not entirely autonomous in developing safeguards methodologies. While it has operational autonomy in implementing them, the development of the safeguards framework itself is based on a consultative process. For example, the Additional Protocol was negotiated over approximately eighteen months through extensive discussions with member states.

During these negotiations, member states did not grant the Agency all the authority it initially sought. Many states argued that certain proposals would infringe upon their national sovereignty. As a result, compromises were reached that preserved a balance between effective verification and respect for state sovereignty.

Safeguards ultimately function best in a cooperative environment. They cannot operate effectively in a hostile context. The underlying principle is transparency: a state demonstrates that it has nothing to conceal by inviting the IAEA to examine its nuclear programme and confirm that all activities are peaceful.

Difficulties arise when the Agency believes that a state is not providing complete information. Another challenge emerged during the transition between Directors General following Mohamed ElBaradei’s tenure. Following the end of the term of Director General ElBaradei, there was a perception that the subsequent Director General was more closely aligned with the United States. Once such perceptions develop, they are difficult to dispel, particularly when some evidence appears to support them.

Under the current Director General, Rafael Grossi, the Agency’s international standing has improved considerably, and the institution is once again viewed as technically independent on safeguards matters. Nevertheless, the Iranian nuclear issue remains highly politicized, and the Agency often finds itself caught in the middle of broader geopolitical tensions.

Keywords: Nuclear nonproliferation; IAEA

NPT

E16/SHAH – 26/03/24