Exclusive Interview
Northern Europe under an “Umbrella”: Militarization of the Baltic-Scandinavian Macroregion, Norway’s Involvement in the European Nuclear Deterrent System, and Challenges for Russia in the Arctic: Interview with Ivan Skripka by Anna Tishina
Dr. Ivan Skripka,
Research Fellow, Nordic Center of the Department of Country Studies, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences
June 15, 2026
Is Norway’s statement that the reason for its transition under France’s “nuclear umbrella” was exactly the Russian rearmament in the Arctic justified? Isn’t there any contradiction in Norway’s accession to the French nuclear deterrent in light of the fact that the country prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime? Can Finland join the French initiative? What military capabilities does Russia have in the Arctic to respond to the threat of Norwegian weapons?
In a new interview with PIR Center, Dr. Ivan Skripka, PhD in Political Science, Research Fellow, Nordic Center of the Department of Country Studies, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, analyzes the reasons for Norway’s increased military cooperation with other European states, highlights the importance of the Kola Peninsula for Russia’s nuclear deterrent system, and explains the processes shaping the trend towards militarization of the Baltic-Scandinavian Macrorregion. The expert shows gradual changes in Norway’s basic nuclear weapons policy, reveals the motives of the Northern European states to strengthen security and military-political coordination in the region, and describes Russia’s main tools to ensure its security in the Far North.
The interview was conducted by Ms. Anna Tishina, PIR Center intern.
Ms. Anna Tishina: In May 2026, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre officially announced the country’s accession to the French nuclear deterrence initiative. As one of the reasons served the “massive rearmament of Russia”. In your opinion, how justified is such a statement and what are the reasons for Norway’s desire to be under France’s “nuclear umbrella”?
Dr. Ivan Skripka: From my perspective, references to the “massive rearmament of Russia” should be considered primarily a political justification for the decision, addressed both to Norwegian public and to NATO allies. It is undeniable that the Russian factor occupies an important place in Norwegian strategic planning. However, it would be an oversimplification to reduce Oslo’s decision solely to a reaction to Moscow’s actions.
It is far more important to deliberate this step in the context of broader changes in the international system. European states are currently facing increasing security uncertainty. European defense has virtually relied on US guarantees for decades, whereas now there are coming up more and more questions about the degree and forms of American involvement in European affairs in the future. Donald Trump’s policy and the unpredictability of the future course of the United States have only intensified such discussions. Even though the Norwegian leadership continues to emphasize the exceptional role of the United States as the main guarantor of the country’s security, Oslo is striving to reduce dependence on one partner and expand the network of strategic ties within Europe.
It is in this context that the intensification of Norway’s defense cooperation with European powers should be examined. For example, in recent years, new agreements and programs of in-depth cooperation have been concluded with the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands with the purpose of increasing the compatibility of the armed forces and strengthening the collective defense of Northern Europe. The agreement with France appears to be a logical continuation of this line.
However, the practical significance of the current solution should not be overestimated. The French nuclear forces will not replace the American “nuclear umbrella”. Norway is not about to become a member of these forces in the same capacity as some NATO countries which participate in the alliance’s nuclear deterrence mechanisms. So far, this is more of a political signal demonstrating the willingness of European countries to coordinate security issues more closely.
Nevertheless, the symbolic significance of such steps cannot be ignored. They reflect the ongoing militarization of the Baltic-Scandinavian Macroregion and are gradually forming the political and institutional framework for deeper involvement of European states in nuclear deterrence and security issues in the future.
Ms. Anna Tishina: Norway’s plans to target multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the northern regions and direct them against Russian facilities on the Kola Peninsula have recently been reported in the media. Can this step be considered a continuation of the French initiative on nuclear deterrence in Europe, or is it solely Norway’s decision?
Dr. Ivan Skripka: I would not treat the possible deployment of Norwegian long-range missile systems as a direct continuation of the French nuclear deterrence initiative. We are talking about two interrelated, but still different processes.
First of all, it is worth noting that the information about targeting specific systems on the objects of the Kola Peninsula is largely predictive in nature. Surely, Oslo will not publish official lists of targets in case of a military conflict. However, certain conclusions can be drawn based on the decisions already made. Norway is purchasing long-range missile systems capable of hitting targets up to several hundred kilometers away, and representatives of the country’s military leadership have repeatedly stressed the special role of the Kola Peninsula in Russian military strategy. It is there that a significant part of Russia’s naval and strategic nuclear forces are concentrated, which makes this region a key element of Russia’s nuclear deterrence.
Therefore, it seems quite logical to assume that the potential capabilities of the new Norwegian weapons will be related, among other things, to facilities on the Kola Peninsula. However, it is essential to understand that it was not after the signing of the agreement with France that this line of thinking appeared. It has been formed over the past few years as part of a broader review of Norwegian security policy. In addition, to a greater extent, Norway’s modern defense planning is conducted in close coordination with other Nordic countries, primarily Finland and Sweden, as well as within the framework of NATO.
Following 2022, Oslo has been increasingly betting on strengthening its military presence, expanding the capabilities of the armed forces and developing regional defense cooperation. In this context, the purchase of long-range missile systems looks chiefly like a Norwegian initiative implemented together with regional allies.
I would not link this topic directly to the French nuclear initiative. The Narvik Agreement and Norway’s participation in the French enhanced deterrent are primarily of a political and strategic nature and are aimed at deepening security consultations and coordination. Concurrently, decisions on the purchase of weapons, the development of missile capabilities and the strengthening of NATO’s northern flank preceded the signing of the agreement with Paris.
Thus, we are talking about two parallel processes. On the one hand, Norway is strengthening its own conventional capabilities jointly with the Nordic countries and NATO. On the other hand, it seeks to diversify security guarantees through closer cooperation with France and other leading European powers. Both processes are part of the general trend towards militarization of the Baltic-Scandinavian Macroregion, but one should not be automatically derived from the other.
Ms. Anna Tishina: In your estimation, how does Norway’s accession to the French “nuclear umbrella” initiative correlate with Norway’s basic policy and with the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the country’s territory in peacetime?
Dr. Ivan Skripka: To date, I see no reason to say that Norway’s joining the French nuclear deterrence initiative means abandoning the basic security policy that the country has adhered to for decades. The Norwegian leadership has repeatedly stressed that it is not a question of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of the country in peacetime. Moreover, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre specifically noted that the current restrictions remain in place and the agreement with France does not change the fundamental approaches of Oslo to this issue.
On paper, there really is no contradiction. Since joining NATO, Norway has based its policy on a combination of allied commitments and certain self-restrictions in relations with the Soviet Union and then with Russia. The country remained part of the nuclear alliance and enjoyed guarantees of expanded deterrence, while at the same time refused to permanently deploy nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime. The new agreement with France still fits exactly into this logic.
However, it would be untrue to say that nothing is changing. In my opinion, we are witnessing a gradual broadening of the scope of the basic policy. Previously, the stress was mostly put on restrictions and precautions, whereas today the task of strengthening deterrence is coming to the fore. This is reflected not only in the development of a dialogue with France on nuclear security issues, but also in increasing military spending, expanding the allied presence, developing military infrastructure and deepening defense cooperation with NATO countries.
Therefore, this agreement with France can be felt as another step in the process of adapting Norwegian security policy to new conditions. By itself, it does not imply abandoning the previous principles, but it indicates that the balance between self-restraint and deterrence tasks is gradually shifting in favor of the latter.
At the same time, Norway is unlikely to be interested in completely dismantling the current model. It remains crucial for Oslo to maintain its reputation as a predictable State that combines reliable alliances with a responsible approach to regional stability. Thus, in the foreseeable future, Norway is likely to continue to adhere to the old principles, avoiding solutions that could lead to a sharp increase in tension in Northern Europe.
Ms. Anna Tishina: In your opinion, can Finland, which has recently joined NATO, follow the example of Sweden and Norway? Why was Norway the first to make such a decision among the Nordic NATO member countries?
Dr. Ivan Skripka: It is highly probable that Finland will join the French nuclear deterrence initiative. Finnish leadership has already confirmed that it is considering a corresponding proposal from Paris, and Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has expressed Helsinki’s interest in cooperation in this area.
However, it is important to understand that we are not talking about replacing American security guarantees. Like Norway, Finland considers the French initiative predominantly an additional element of the European deterrence system. Since joining NATO, Helsinki has consistently expanded the range of available security tools, seeking to rely not only on the United States, but also on the major European powers.
Regarding the motives of the Northern European states as a whole, several factors can be identified. Firstly, they are all located in close proximity to Russia and are particularly sensitive to changes in the military and political situation in the Baltic-Scandinavian Macroregion. Secondly, European allies are trying to prepare for possible changes in the nature of the American presence in Europe. Even if no one questions the importance of NATO, the desire to diversify security guarantees is becoming an increasingly noticeable trend.
The political aspect cannot be disregarded either. Today, we are witnessing a competition for leadership in the emerging security architecture of Northern Europe. For the States of the region, participation in new European initiatives allows them not only to enhance their own security, but also to demonstrate political subjectivity and willingness to participate in the development of a European deterrence strategy. To a certain extent, this also acts as a signal of support for the efforts of France and other leading European powers to strengthen Europe’s security component.
Therefore, if Finland joins the initiative in the near future, it will not look like an exceptional decision by Helsinki, but rather a continuation of a broader trend towards deepening military and political coordination between the Nordic countries and key states of the continent. On the other hand, a pause for decision-making may, on the contrary, serve as an indicator of the reasonableness and independence of Finland’s decision.
Ms. Anna Tishina: The Russian Embassy in Norway reported that the deployment of shock weapons in Norway would not go unanswered and an appropriate military-technical response would follow. With what military capabilities in the Far North can Russia counter this threat?
Dr. Ivan Skripka: Technically, such statements should be primarily seen as an element of political and diplomatic rhetoric aimed at identifying the possible consequences of a change in the military and strategic balance in Northern Europe. In this respect, diplomatic and legal instruments remain Russia’s primary response tools, including the review of strategic stability and arms control regimes issues, among them, within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Concerning the military component, Russia’s potential in the Far North is already largely focused on the tasks of deterring and preventing escalation in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Further development of the Northern Fleet’s capabilities is underway, including the commissioning of new underwater carriers, the improvement of coastal defense systems and the build-up of high-precision and hypersonic weapons. This configuration is complemented by the expansion of infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route, including Arctic bases and an early detection system’s components. Collectively, these measures form a potential described as elements of a restricted access zone that makes it difficult for a potential adversary to plan and operate freely in the region.
Concurrently, it is significant that such logic is primarily of a deterrent nature and should not be construed as an automatic movement towards military escalation. Given the high density of military activity in the Baltic-Scandinavian Macroregion, it is critically important for Russia to maintain manageability of crisis scenarios and avoid rhetoric that could further stimulate an arms race in the Arctic and Northern Europe. In this sense, the key task remains to preserve equilibrium between demonstrating deterrence potential and maintaining the minimum required level of strategic predictability.
Keywords: Norway; Northern Europe; Nuclear deterrence
RUF
E16/NOS – 26/06/15
