Book Review
We publish reviews and speak about new books on international security issues
Is the Nuclear Win-Win Strategy Reconceptualization Coming Back on the Rails?
Mr. Artem Astvatsaturov,
PIR Center «Information and Digital Communications» Unit Intern
January 9, 2025
Today, we are pleased to share a review by Mr. Artem Astvatsaturov, the PIR Center Information and Digital Communications Unit intern, on the monograph written by Dr. Michael Krepon titled Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace.
Krepon, Michael. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace. The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control. Stanford University Press. 2023. ISBN: 978-1-5036-2961-5
There is no doubt that previous approaches to determining various nuclear strategies in the era of nuclear arms control revival are becoming irrelevant due to the rapid evolution of the strategic stability architecture. Nowadays, we are dealing with a new reality in reshaping the P5’s mutual efforts to create an environment for arms control. Nevertheless, in his monograph “Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace,” Dr. Michael Krepon analyzed the process of nuclear peace reconceptualization within the framework of integrating neorealist and neoliberal orders to facilitate a probable arms control revival in the current foreign policy environment. Dr. Krepon divided his fundamental study into two sections: the historical background of the arms race and the nuclear factor in world politics, and a review of the contemporary conditions of nuclear arms control (2017-2022), along with his foreign policy forecast and recommendations regarding nuclear peace.
In the first section, Dr. Krepon highlights the common principles of U.S. deterrence policy towards Moscow, as seen in the White House’s general nuclear doctrines and military strategies. He places significant emphasis on the “Escalate to De-escalate” strategy, developed during John F. Kennedy’s administration in the 1960s. In Dr. Krepon’s view, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War was linked to the formation of a mutual deterrence strategy that leveraged fear, elaborated by both the U.S. and the USSR. Notably, Dr. Krepon draws readers’ attention to the evolution of arrangements between U.S. and USSR foreign policy elites. According to his analysis, both parties found common ground in arms control and nuclear risk reduction during the détente period starting in the late 1960s. Dr. Krepon emphasizes that understanding the conceptualization of nuclear peace during the Cold War era is only possible within the context of the bipolar system of international relations. Consequently, after the collapse of the bipolar international relations model, old mutual nuclear deterrence approaches must be discarded in favor of new approaches to nuclear weapon use de-escalation, as outlined in Article VI of the NPT.
Moving away from the idealistic illusions of nuclear weapons prohibition, Dr. Krepon focuses on the unacceptable damage a nuclear war would inflict on humanity, referencing Ronald Reagan’s statement: “A nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won.” Dr. Krepon suggests a new key principle for states: creating nuclear peace among the P5 members and new nuclear weapons possessors (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) by adhering to the norm of not threatening to use nuclear weapons.
Dr. Krepon also addresses the dangerous nature of nuclear weapons due to their immense combat power and the negative effects of their presence in the territories of states outside the “nuclear club.” He raises the issue of establishing a mandatory general commitment to a nuclear test ban for all nuclear weapons possessors. This commitment is necessary to prevent the demonstration of nuclear prowess by a wide range of states. Thus, Dr. Krepon suggests adding an imperative norm to international security law: the prohibition of demonstrating power through nuclear testing.
Another key issue suggested by the author is the deliberation over the role of the No First Use (NFU) policy as the only permissible doctrine for nuclear weapons use in the future strategic stability model. Dr. Krepon argued that the development process of Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) depends directly on establishing a mandatory NFU policy as the accepted nuclear weapons use doctrine for all nuclear weapons possessors. Furthermore, the researcher believes that the future revival of a high level of global security is directly linked to the successful implementation of nuclear non-proliferation among both nuclear weapons possessors and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Additionally, the author suggests that the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation course depends on the U.S. decision to renew non-proliferation diplomacy with Iran and North Korea to maintain a secure and safe global security environment, based on mutual guarantees at the state level. Consequently, Dr. Michael Krepon emphasized three key components for rebuilding nuclear peace: nuclear non-proliferation, a nuclear test ban, and the NFU policy as superior approaches for nuclear weapons possessors.
Michael Krepon analyzed the situation in arms control negotiations, referring to the U.S.-Soviet historical background of nuclear disarmament during the détente era. In his research paper, the bipolar model of arms control negotiations is described as a great delusion in the contemporary development of strategic stability. The author suggests expanding the format of arms control negotiations to include the following nuclear weapons possessors: the other P5 members (China, France, and the UK), as well as India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, Dr. Krepon emphasized that China’s long-held position is that the United States and Russia must reduce their nuclear warheads to China’s level before reshaping the arms control system, with China playing a separate and important role in it.
Consequently, the author formulated a new compromise formula for all “nuclear club” members: creating a multilateral build-down regime for arms control, which could alleviate security concerns for both triangular nuclear competitions and all four pairings of nuclear rivals. He also argued that drawing down multilaterally might be less difficult than doing so bilaterally or trilaterally, due to the common ground shared by all nuclear weapons possessors for the ultimate purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Hence, Dr. Krepon also suggested the continuation of strategic arms (non-nuclear strategic weapons) modernization by nuclear powers involved in the new arms control system, while fulfilling their commitments to implementing national interests and ensuring compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Additionally, the scholar stated in this research paper that an important condition for making the new arms control system more viable within the global security system is the formation of a mandatory component of transparency beyond the comfort levels of nuclear states, including the release of verifiable information on their holdings and plans.
Additionally, Dr. Michael Krepon does not believe that North Korea could be included in the arms control system due to its illegitimate status as a nuclear power and its unauthorized nuclear activities in the 1990s and 2000s. According to him, in the future arms control system, the international community, under the auspices of the UN Security Council and the IAEA, will need to reduce the nuclear potential of Iran and North Korea, ensuring the effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation policy and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Furthermore, Dr. Krepon does not view the Ukrainian Crisis as a contradiction between the U.S. and Russia regarding the Strategic Stability Dialogue. Thus, the research paper does not cover the full range of issues between Western and Eastern nations on the “nuclear issue,” which complicates a comprehensive understanding of nuclear arms control negotiations in the contemporary global security environment. Apart from that, Dr. Michael Krepon suggested new approaches for forming an innovative model of arms control that considers the national interests of nuclear powers, which is crucial for reshaping the outdated bipolar model of arms control negotiations.
In conclusion, the author emphasized that deterrence is not self-regulating but self-generating. According to Dr. Michael Krepon, nuclear deterrence without reassurance is dangerous and prone to catastrophic failure. The process of reconceptualizing ultimate nuclear norms for a new arms control system, as suggested by Dr. Krepon, is directly linked to a synthesis of pragmatism and idealism. The author’s proposals are highly achievable because the norms of the NFU policy and the prohibition of nuclear testing are the most challenging for any national leader to violate. While convening a seven-nation forum to reaffirm these norms might be ambitious, implementing a build-down norm for all seven nations is even more challenging. However, these norms are crucial for ensuring a high level of strategic stability and should be addressed through step-by-step consultations among all nuclear powers.
Dr. Michael Krepon’s book is a significant contribution to the field of international security and contemporary arms control. The author analyzes the historical background of arms control and various aspects of achieving nuclear peace during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This work is recommended for specialists in international security as well as a broader audience interested in arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.
Key words: Arms Control; Global Security; Nuclear Nonproliferation
NPT
F4/SOR – 25/01/09
