Exclusive Interview
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: “Technologies are evolving much faster than diplomacy and political thought can keep pace.”
Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey A. Ryabkov met at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with first and second-year students of MA Program International Security (implemented by MGIMO University jointly with PIR Center), as well as graduates of its educational programs, staff members and interns of PIR Center. The full transcript of this meeting will not be released. However, fragments of this conversation with the students are provided below.
NPT: “We are ready to work towards achieving a result, but not at the expense of our core principles.”
Dr. Vladimir Orlov (Founding Director of PIR Center): This summer, an article on nuclear nonproliferation was published on the website of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). The article, in particular, states that some international relations experts in Western states, as well as a number of the so-called “brilliant intellectuals” in Russia, have been long arguing that proliferation of nuclear weapons may not be a danger, but a beneficial factor. “The possession of such weapons serves as a powerful deterrent against military conflicts. It also contributes to overall stability in the field of international security”, the article reads. Personally, I do not belong to this group of “brilliant intellectuals” who promote such ideas. What about you?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: I do not consider myself an intellectual at all, I am a mere bureaucrat. Why would I put myself on the same level with intellectuals, especially with those brilliant?
Regarding beneficial impact of nuclear weapons on international security, we can state the following, proceeding from a strict formalist standpoint: these brilliant intellectuals should ask themselves, how exactly do we then intend to launch an international negotiation process for a comprehensive revision of the NPT and how do we formalize the withdrawal of certain states from the Treaty? Are they prepared to face the consequences of such a withdrawal? If so, then what should be done with the vast body of work within the NPT framework that deals with the way how international community intended to complicate withdrawal from the Treaty?
Dr. Vladimir Orlov: Now let’s move on to the forthcoming NPT Review Conference. You have recently stated, that Russia will not put up with insulting accusations against herself or against her allies for the sake of adopting a final document which, frankly speaking, is not of critical importance for the functioning of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: I do not remember the exact wording but I am ready to restate the same idea. The problem is that there is a tendency for an influential group of Western states to constantly introduce wordings, ideas and proposals or to make various conceptual and ad-hoc injections for the sake of political expediency that have nothing to do with the core issue we meant to address (during the NPT review process or at the review conferences). This problem occurs not only on the margins of the NPT or within the review process, as we all know, but also across various multilateral platforms that deal with nuclear non-proliferation, arms and export control. Justifying their actions, these states cite what one might mildly call pressing, yet highly acute and intractable issues that, nevertheless, lie beyond the direct mandates of these forums.
Thus, weighing our own set of priorities against those of states that systematically subvert the rules of the game, we cannot agree to the wordings (that sometimes even deny the reality) absolutely unacceptable to us just for the sake of creating a document at a given nonproliferation or arms control event. As a result, it is the final documents that fall victim to this standoff. Frequently, it all ends with the adoption of procedural tautological reports, which also often entail further complications. I anticipate that the situation will unfold in a similar way at the next year’s NPT Review Conference. Should we manage to produce a substantive final document, it would be a great success. However, in this case the document would be drafted on the basis of the very lowest common denominator.
Our position in this case is open and transparent. We are ready to work towards achieving a result but not at the expense of our core principles. This is non-negotiable, it is the reality we are living in. The sooner our opponents realize and accept it as a given, the better.
Arms Control: Russia has placed unambiguous road signs for the way ahead. Here – straight through only. Here – no stopping. Here – priority Road.
Mr. Mirodil Mukimov, the Republic of Tajikistan (first-year student of MA Program International Security): Dear Mr. Ryabkov, commenting on the Russian Federation’s initiative on adhering to the existing limitations after the expiration of the New START Treaty for the following year, U.S. President D. Trump called this proposal “a good idea”. However, he has made no further public statements on this matter. In an interview with Izvestia newspaper on October 23, 2025, when asked about the possible reestablishment of the Russian-U.S. bilateral commission on New START Treaty, you mentioned that this question is not currently under consideration. In your opinion, are there any prospects for the restoration and development of Russian-American relations in the field of strategic stability?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: You quoted Mr. Trump, who called this proposal “a good one”. He later commented on this issue again stating that he generally liked the proposal and that denuclearization is a good idea. However, we are not talking about denuclearization.
So far, no progress has been made. I believe, it is too early to comment on Washington’s overall stance regarding this proposal, even despite the positive signals from President Trump. I assume the relevant experts in Washington, who are currently engaged in analyzing, accessing and developing various options, are unlikely to have reached a stage where anything definitive can be said on this issue.
In my opinion, we have placed sufficiently clear road signs for the way ahead. Here – straight through only. Here – no stopping. Here – priority road. We believe it is vital to adhere to these signs so as to forge a more direct path ahead.
I do not know whether we will succeed in it. It seems clear to me that the framework established by President Putin’s proposal constitutes a call to the other party to act responsibly. This is crucial both for the security of our nations and in terms of cost efficiency. Should anyone in Washington decide to tell President Trump that supporting the Russian initiative could reduce the likelihood of future government shutdowns, this might help – or it might not.
Provided the United States does not significantly violate the strategic balance or undertake any actions that would constitute an infringement upon our security interests – whether through the development of its strategic offensive or defensive potential – then it is possible to adhere to the bilateral core quantitative limits of the New START Treaty for one year, with a subsequent assessment of further developments.
Regarding China, I believe we are all well aware of the position held by the People’s Republic of China in this matter. We regard this position with the highest consideration. We have excellent relations with China – a fact we deeply cherish – and we have full trust in our Chinese partners. It is our firm belief that this trust is fully mutual. Therefore, we see no need to bring additional variables into our relations, particularly ones as complex as those under discussion.
We are concerned about the current developments regarding the nuclear capabilities of the United State’s key European allies – the United Kingdom and France – both of which are pursuing modernization programs affecting delivery systems and, to some extent, warheads. Paris has indicated it may soon present an updated nuclear doctrine. We will be examining the contents of this document closely. Thus, it is evident that any future dialogue on strategic stability must necessarily take these factors into account.
We will undoubtedly raise this issue at the negotiating table – once the time is right and necessary preconditions are in place. Right now, no such negotiations are conceivable. However, the day will come when we will discuss what specific steps are required to engage the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the French Republic, in this process.
DPRK: We have forged deeply allied relations
Mr. Yoo Dong Suk, the Republic of Korea (graduate student at MGIMO University, member of PIR Alumni Community): Russia and North Korea signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty last year. Several months later Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, stated that the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program should be considered closed. Recently DPRK leader Kim Jong UN declared that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia would continue without interruption. In your opinion, is there any possibility of resuming discussions on nuclear nonproliferation concerning the DPRK or has this topic been completely removed from the Russian government’s agenda? Does Russia have any plans or intentions to restore dialogue and improve relations with the Republic of Korea?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: These days we have forged deeply allied relations with the DPRK. These relations do not pose a threat to any state. They do not represent a threat to the Republic of Korea as well. They are centered around the goal of reciprocal strengthening of our bilateral security. If one carefully reads Article 4 of the Treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang, everything becomes clear – mutual assistance is confined solely to the specific scenarios of aggression. That’s it. For this very reason there should be no concerns in the Republic of Korea on this account. Our military-technical cooperation with the DPRK is developing in strict compliance with our domestic legislative requirements and our international obligations.
Iran remains a party to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement
Mr. Emil Erkulaev (first-year student of MA Program International Security): the IAEA is currently one of the key organizations that monitors nuclear nonproliferation to ensure compliance with agreements. However, we have already witnessed several crises around the IAEA – for example, the case of Iran. Iran withdrew from the agreement and resents it is the IAEA that transmits sensitive information to Iran’s adversaries… As a result, the level of trust of the Iranian side towards the IAEA has declined. Besides, the IAEA’s stance regarding Ukrainian attacks of the Zaporozhskaya and Kurskaya NPPs also raises concerns… Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that the IAEA needs to make more objective assessments, as the agency is currently politicized. What measures could the IAEA undertake to restore trust in itself?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: This is a complex issue from many perspectives. It requires thorough examination. Let me first clarify if I heard you right: you mentioned that Iran “withdrew from the agreement”? No, Iran did not withdraw from it.
On May 8, 2018, the first administration of Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Despite this, Iran exercised strategic patience for a year, taking no additional steps. It acted in compliance with all its commitments – hosted inspectors, adhered to enrichment limits, refrained from increasing the number of deployed centrifuges. A year later Iran gradually began to advance its nuclear program, retreating from the provisions outlined in the JCPOA and formalized under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231). As a result, the Iranian side elevated uranium enrichment levels to 60%, the number of fissile materials exceeded 400 kilograms. Tensions continued to mount.
Three attempts to secure a collective solution of the problem via the JCPOA framework remained fruitless. After Donald Trump took his office and appointed Stephen Witkoff as Special Envoy for the Middle East, the whole process narrowed to a number of indirect U.S.-Iranian negotiations on a limited array of issues.
On the eve of the third round of these negotiations, Israel, followed by the United States, conducted airstrikes on Iranian targets, including Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In essence, this strike targeted the very foundations of the IAEA safeguards system and undermined the IAEA’s political authority.
Subsequently, the Western group engaged in additionally highly destructive measures, notably declaring their intent to trigger the “snapback” mechanism aimed at restoring multilateral sanctions against Iran that were lifted under UNSCR 2231. As a result, on September 9 of the current year, Iran announced the suspension of its agreement and cooperation with the IAEA. Today, this is the only agreement Iran has officially suspended. Due to the expiration of UNSCR 2231 the JCPOA is also no longer operative. Iran still remains a party to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement.
Conventional arms: “The immediate focus should remain on achieving the objectives of the Special Military Operation before other steps can be considered”
Mr. Alexander Gromov (second-year student of MA Program International Security). My question concerns conventional arms control. The ongoing Special Military Operation demonstrates that a full-scale multi-domain military conflict involving conventional weapons is still possible. Lots of modern military technologies are being currently used at the forward edge of the battle area. European states are launching programs aimed at building up their defense industries. In your opinion, is it possible to conclude a new treaty on conventional arms control, particularly concerning unmanned aerial systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. Does Russia need such a treaty?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: One of the challenges the arms control framework is currently facing stems precisely from the fact that technologies are evolving much faster than diplomacy and political thought can keep pace. This phenomenon is evident not only in the military sphere. Consider the developments in artificial intelligence- this is the most vivid example.
As for the future of conventional arms control, I believe anything is possible… though only in the distant future.
The immediate focus should remain on achieving the objectives of the Special Military Operation before other steps can be considered. The objectives of the Special Military Operation were set by the President of Russia in 2022. They have not changed, though there may be various ways to achieve them. Military and forceful means are currently dominant. Still, diplomatic means are also possible.
There were periods when it was possible to achieve certain results by diplomatic means. Unfortunately, these results proved fragile or were not advanced to an operational level. Still, it doesn’t mean that political and diplomatic approaches have been compromised.
Most importantly, our determination to achieve the Special Military Operation’s objectives remains undiminished. Only after achieving both these objectives and at least a gradual normalization of the situation, some voices advocating for the restoration of the conventional arms control system will likely emerge.
I will refrain from specifying, even approximately, the geographical scope that such a system might cover. This issue is not just highly sensitive, it is also extremely politicized. As far as you know, we are increasingly promoting the concept of Eurasian security.
As for Euro-Atlantic security, our opponents reject the very idea that it can be shaped with Russia participating as its actor, let alone with due consideration of Russia’s interests. Today little remains of what was never particularly remarkable in terms of efficacy and scope: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Conventional Arms Control in Europe. Although some states still formally remain within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty, and a few states even undertake certain measures under the provisions of the Vienna Document, these efforts constitute imitation rather than substantive engagement.
The scope of a hypothetical future conventional arms control system or elements thereof will undoubtedly be a subject of discussion for future generations, provided there are favorable overall conditions. Some future generations will probably address this issue. By that time, we will probably find ourselves in a fundamentally different environment, particularly considering technological advancements.
Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space: “Our opponents lack political will to initiate dialogue”
Mr. Kirill Prokhorov (second-year student of MA Program International Security): Dear Mr. Ryabkov, my MA thesis is dedicated to the issue of preventing arms race in outer space. One of the key initiatives in this field is the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, initiated by Russia and China. Those, who advocate against this treaty, provide two main objections. The first one is the lack of a verification mechanism, though there are no grave political objections to its establishment. The second one deals with ground-based direct-ascent anti-satellite systems. Regarding these systems, there are many divergences in views. How would you characterize the possibilities for bridging these differences? On what basis could they be resolved? Is there any realistic possibility of achieving a legally binding agreement in this field, given the present US administration?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: We have been long promoting this initiative, which is linked to the political commitment on no-first-deployment of weapons in outer space. Given this is your area of studies, I am sure both initiatives are familiar to you.
As for the Russian-Chinese draft treaty, which was updated several years ago, I can tell you the following. Throughout all these years there has been no willingness to profoundly engage in this issue. Instead, all the actions were focused on inventing reasons for its rejection. Furthermore, since 2022 the European Union group has abandoned substantive dialogue with us. Now this group engages solely in preaching, trying to impose what it calls geopolitical pedagogy upon us.
The lack of a verification mechanism is not an inherent flaw of the Russian-Chinese draft. It is a calculated move aimed at encouraging opponents to enter discussions.
The situation directly mirrors the case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The same group of European states claims that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains effective, thus, it is necessary only to strengthen the Convention’s mechanism even in the absence of any verification procedure. In 2001 the USA unilaterally halted negotiations on the BTWC verification protocol when the text, in our view, was more than 90% complete. Still, nothing happened. The BTWC has been already in force for a quarter of a century. Yet, in the case of the Russian-Chinese draft treaty, they find it impossible to start discussions because the treaty apparently lacks verification mechanisms.
We often tell our opponents that if they had been truly serious about this issue, particularly given their deep commitment to transparency, inspections and verification, they could have drafted a viable text at least within 2 months. Then we could have started to discuss its merits and drawbacks. Besides, these very opponents, who claim to be so disadvantaged without a verification mechanism, possess such sophisticated national space surveillance capabilities that they are capable of detecting a tennis-ball-sized object, including its launch location, trajectory and orbital position. They do not even need any verification mechanism.
Therefore, this is nothing more than lip service, nothing more than just an excuse, especially for those unfamiliar with the issue. Our opponents often state that the Russians have allegedly came up with something dubious. As for destructive direct-ascent anti-missile systems or any other anti-missile systems, it should be mentioned that the USA developed such technologies long before Russia. China also possesses them. When Russia conducted tests that were reported to involve anti-satellite weapons, many voices argued that the use of such systems has resulted in a large amount of space debris left in orbit. However, the draft treaty prohibits the use of force against space objects. What specific systems or technologies would fall under the scope of this prohibition? This question requires discussion. This is the purpose of negotiations: to define the scope and establish clear boundaries.
There is a reference in the preamble of the New START Treaty to an inextricable nature of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It is a fundamental part of the treaty. During the early stages of developing the New START Treaty, a two-page document was negotiated and adopted by Russia and the USA. This document defined the scope and limitations of the future treaty.
Anything not included in this document remained outside the forthcoming negotiations. This is how it works.
What is lacking in our draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space? Nothing, except the political will of our opponents. They lack it due to the fact that any such agreement would hinder their efforts to weaponize outer space, to secure their perceived undeniable advantages in outer space. Simultaneously, nothing stops them from attaching geopolitical labels to their adversaries, accusing them of whatever they please.
About a year ago the Biden administration suddenly began to make unfounded allegations that Russia intended to deploy nuclear weapons in outer space. It was an ultimate exploitation of a serious issue for political purposes because nuclear weapons in space – if used- would inflict just as much damage on you and your allies as on your adversaries, indiscriminately destroying every military capability.
In case of mini-nukes, the effort required to deliver them to an appropriate distance is a hundred times greater (I am simplifying) than destroying the very same target of our adversary through direct kinetic impact. One does not need to be a military strategist to understand this. Yet, there was so much clamor and noise including from those who echo Washington.
I am a strong supporter of BRICS
Ms. Anastasia Mirskaya (second-year student of MA Program International Security): Given the challenges the arms control regime is currently facing, considering the development of dual-use technologies, artificial intelligence and threats to space security, can BRICS become a platform that offers new perspectives and approaches towards addressing these issues? In your view, to what extent are the member states interested in and prepared to engage in substantive dialogue on this topic?
H.E. Sergey Ryabkov: I am a strong supporter of BRICS. I have been consistently focusing on BRICS for many years. Therefore, I can tell you that BRICS certainly has significant potential that remains intact. The accession of a substantial group of new participants along with the creation of a new membership category (partner states) have not weakened its internal dynamics. While a larger audience often generates more noise, in this case, the reverse has occurred. The expansion has not come at the expense of the organization’s efficiency.
Having said that, I should also note that any observer or analyst by picking up BRICS documents and reading them from a certain perspective, will not only notice what is discussed within them, but also what is left unaddressed.
This is not accidental. Take nuclear disarmament. Brazil and South Africa’s approaches differ from those of Russia and China. This is the most vivid example, although it doesn’t mean we are deliberately narrowing the agenda or that there is no discussion within BRICS. Discussions do take place in relevant formats. Foreign ministers discuss this matter, as well as high-level representatives responsible for security issues. This topic is also raised at the leader level. Nevertheless, this cannot be considered equivalent to the formulation of a unified stance in contrast to the practice regarding many other matters even those of direct relevance to international security discussed within this particular format.
One of the conceptual and methodological strengths of BRICS lies in its principle of non-imposition: no country is compelled to adopt positions against its will. Membership in BRICS does not automatically entail endorsement of all collective positions – each nation retains its sovereign prerogative.
Absolute respect for national priorities (and, consequently, the mandatory consensus-based adoption of any decision wording) may to some extent affect the pace of progress on certain issues. Yet, this very approach provides the strongest assurance of all members’ comfort and full engagement within the BRICS framework.
Therefore, we will continue to focus on hard security in the broad sense of this term. However, it does not mean BRICS will necessarily serve as an idea generator or a guiding beacon in this particular sphere. There are certain domains where this is feasible, with artificial intelligence representing one of such domains. Under Brazil’s leadership this year, BRICS achieved a milestone: alongside streamlined wordings incorporated into the principal summit’s declaration in Rio de Janeiro, BRICS adopted its first-ever standalone leaders’ declaration focusing on artificial intelligence. This is a significant step further. It also illustrates that BRICS might be undergoing an internal transformation.
As India prepares to assume the chairmanship, we look forward with anticipation to our Indian partners presenting their perspectives on key priorities of BRICS. I anticipate that in the coming year we may hear something new from BRICS even in the sphere of “hard security”.
I anticipate that in the coming year, we may hear something new from BRICS even in the sphere of “hard security.”
This text of Q & A Session of the meeting with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey A. Ryabkov is translated from Russian into English by PIR Center.
Keywords: Arms Control; Nuclear Nonproliferation; BRICS
RUF
E16/SHAH – 25/11/19
